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CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.
An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

ALBANIA

Party Chief Pins No 'Great Hopes' on U.S. *[INTERVISTA Jul]* 1
Influence of U.S. Democratic Ideals Extolled *[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE 7 Jul]* 2

CZECH REPUBLIC

Havel, President Mubarak Hold News Conference *[Cairo MENA 13 Jun]* 4
Mubarak Comments on Cooperation *[Prague Radio]* 4
Mubarak Views Peace Process *[Prague TV]* 5
Defense Ministry Said Facing Personnel Problems *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 12 Jul]* 5
Army Reequipment Focuses on Arms Modernization *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 12 Jul]* 6
No Decision Made on Supplier of Infantry Arms *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 12 Jul]* 6
Air Force Most Affected by Reductions *[LIDOVE NOVINY 13 Jun]* 6
SIPRI Misstated Figures on Czech Arms Trade *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 9 Jul]* 7

SLOVAKIA

Kovac, Mubarak Discuss Development of Relations *[Bratislava Radio]* 8
Poll: Meciar Trusted by Largest Number of People *[SME 8 Jul]* 8
Agency Director Analyzes Recent Poll Results *[SLOVENSKY DENNIK 11 Jul]* 8
Commentary Analyzes Most Recent Opinion Poll *[SME 11 Jul]* 9
Conference Confirms Deepening Split Within KSU *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 11 Jul]* 10
Social Democracy Head Outlines Party Objectives *[Bratislava Radio]* 11
Energy Enterprise Statement on Mochovce Plant *[SME 11 Jul]* 11
First-Quarter Economic Data Released *[SME 11 Jul]* 12

HUNGARY

Defense Minister-Designate on Army Reduction *[Budapest TV]* 13
Interviewed About Future *[MAGYAR NEMZET 13 Jul]* 13
Finance Minister-Designate Urges Restraint *[Budapest Radio]* 14
Biographies of New Government Ministers Published *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 25 Jun]* 15
National Bank President Bod Pressured To Resign *[UJ MAGYARORSZAG 22 Jun]* 18

POLAND

Minister on Privatization, 'Strategy,' Future *[WPROST 17 Jul]* 20
Entrepreneurs Comment on 'Strategy' Program *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 13 Jul]* 21
Defense Issues in Constitutional Drafts Viewed *[POLSKA ZBROJNA 11 Jul]* 22
SLD Chairman Kwasniewski Interviewed *[NOWA TRYBUNA OPOLSKA 7 Jul]* 24
ΩEffect of German Drug Law on Poland *[PRAWO I ZYCIE 4 Jun]* 25
Council Reaffirms Non-Proliferation Commitment *[Bucharest Radio]* 27
Melescanu, FRG's Kinkel Sum Up Security Talks *[Bucharest Radio]* 28
Vacaroiu Tells Kinkel of Need for Investors *[Bucharest Radio]* 28
Kinkel: Conditions Unfulfilled for EU Entry *[Bucharest Radio]* 29
Government Condemns Disregard for Law in Cluj *[Bucharest Radio]* 29

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Izetbegovic, Juppe, Hurd Stress Border Integrity *[Sarajevo Radio]* 30
Bosnian Serbs To Decide on Division Plan *[TANJUG]* 31
Karadzic Criticizes Contact Group Peace Plan *[AFP]* 31
Rejects Independent Bosnia *[TANJUG]* 32
SDS Asks Contact Group To Complete Proposal *[TANJUG]* 32
Karadzic: SDS Debate Continues *[TANJUG]* 32
Hurd Warns Serbs Against Rejecting Peace Plan *[Pale Radio]* 33
Refugees Discuss Plan With Juppe, Hurd *[Sarajevo Radio]* 33
Zubak, Iranian Ambassador Discuss Peace Plan *[Sarajevo Radio]* 33
Zubak Discusses Demirel Visit With Ambassador *[Sarajevo Radio]* 33
Pale Radio Reports Inter-Muslim Clashes Raging 34
Abdic Demands Special Powers for Canton *[MLADINA 12 Jul]* 34
Report Views New Appointments in HDZ *[VECERNJI LIST 11 Jul]* 35
Zubak Views New Administration, Constitution *[OSLOBODJENJE 30 Jun]* 37

CROATIA

UN Rejects Blame for Refugee Situation *[AFP]* 40
Blockade Escalation Threat *[HINA]* 40
UN Base Blocked *[HINA]* 40
Turkish President To Address Assembly 16 Jul *[HINA]* 40
Position of Serbs in Croatia 'Deteriorating' *[TANJUG]* 40
Serbs Protest Army Helicopter Overflights *[TANJUG]* 41
Serbs Launch Infantry Attack on Mount Dinara *[Zagreb Radio]* 41

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

President Gligorov, Ministers Talk With Farmers *[VECER 13 Jul]* 42
European Census Experts Reject Criticism *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 13 Jul]* 42
New Government Secretary 'Unofficially' Appointed *[VECER 20 Jun]* 43
VMRO-DPMNE Deputy Chairman Interviewed *[PULS 18 Feb]* 43
Democratic Party Deputy Chairman Interviewed *[PULS 15 Apr]* 49

SLOVENIA

Drnovsek, Valentic 'Satisfied' With Talks *[DELO 9 Jul]* 55
LDS To Discuss 'Housing Affair,' Coalition *[DELO 12 Jul]* 55
FYROM Quotas Disrupt Free Trade Agreement *[DELO 8 Jul]* 55

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Government Prepared for Dialogue With Albanians *[TANJUG]* 57

Serbia

Milosevic Meets With UK's Hurd, France's Juppe *[TANJUG]* 57
Milosevic 'Courting Disaster' if Plan Rejected *[TANJUG]* 58
Demonstration in Belgrade Against Hurd, Juppe *[TANJUG]* 58
Jovic Warns Serbs Against Rejecting Plan *[Belgrade Radio]* 58

Party Chief Pins No 'Great Hopes' on U.S.

AU1307161794 Tirana INTERVISTA in Albanian No. 40 Jul 94 pp 2,4 (tentative)

[Interview with Idajet Beqiri, chairman of the National Unity Party, by unidentified INTERVISTA correspondent in Tirana—"7 for 7"; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [INTERVISTA] This week, our foreign minister went to Poland to attend a meeting, dedicated to Eastern countries, where he was received by U.S. President Clinton. Given this fact, do you expect the United States to turn its eyes more frequently toward the Eastern countries and Albania?

[Beqiri] A widespread idea has been created, according to which our party allegedly is against the United States. It is not true. We do appreciate the U.S. role as an important international factor for restoring peace and security. However, to tell the truth, we do not pin very great hopes on the United States as regards the resolution of our national problem. The U.S. interests in the Balkans are global. It is not interested in particular states. It does not even care at all to know where a country like Albania happens to be situated. If the United States had Albania so much "at heart," Clinton, who was just on the other side of the sea, would easily have come to Tirana too, as he has done for other Eastern countries or for the countries of the former Soviet Union. Here have come only those, who, in the aftermath of their visit to our country, have resigned and are no longer in power today, including also a Serbian son-in-law, Mr. Eagleburger. I discern euphoria among our ruling leaders regarding the U.S. "rapprochement" toward Albania. This euphoria could be witnessed also in the TV news, when announcing the forthcoming meeting of our foreign minister with Clinton. However, I assure you that all the foreign ministers present there will shake hands with Clinton. Such is the diplomatic rite. The news announcing the meeting of our ambassador to Germany with that country's new president was also euphoric. We forget, however, that he called the ambassadors of the whole world accredited there, and all of them do shake hands with the president. We tend to propagate these diplomatic rituals as great victories of Albania's foreign policy. Thus, I do not expect anything special from Serreqi's meeting with Clinton. It is just a shaking of hands, no less and no more. What matters is the concrete U.S. commitment to the Albanian national policy. It is the same as those policies which look upon Albania with dislike. It does not allow more than the option of granting Kosovo the special status of an autonomy going not further than that of 1974, which we have already had without any U.S. support, even a little more, because at that time we were not under Serbia but under Yugoslavia. All U.S. efforts go no further than this limit. On the other hand, without any U.S. backing, we have had many more rights under Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], too. Now all these rights have been suspended there: no schools, no names of Albanian streets, no bilingual use, no television in Albanian. As for the Albanians in Montenegro, they are living in limbo. The Albanian state never speaks of them. The United States is not aware at all of their existence there either. We expect nothing from the United States with respect to the solution of our national question, because of another reason: the Serbs, the state of Gligorov, Bulatovic, and the like, were the first to knock at its doors. The Serbian lobby in the United States has already blocked all the doors we are trying to knock at today. When saying We, I mean our Albanian state and its foreign policy regarding our national Albanian question. I do not expect anything from the United States in this respect. The only reason why Clinton went to Poland and other Eastern countries was that his country is striving by all means to weaken to the maximum Russia's strength and potential, extract these states from Russian influence, and bring them as closer as possible to the Atlantic Alliance, because the United States is as a matter of fact still viewing Russia as a rival, especially in the military field. Thus these visits simply serve only the interests of the United States.

[INTERVISTA] Mr. Arbnori [speaker of parliament] was earlier this week in Vienna, attending the meeting of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly. His speech was broadcast by the Albanian Radio- Television. If you followed it, could you give us your opinion about his speech?

[Beqiri] The only "good" thing our leaders are doing is that they are banging at the doors of various international organizations, eager to secure everywhere Albania's admission as a member. They make or read good speeches. All of them, Mr. Pjeter [Arbnori] in particular, have learned perfectly well some democratic slogans, but what do we gain from these visits? Let us have a glance at the requests put forward by Mr. Pjeter for a Kosovo protectorate under the surveillance of an impartial UN-member state, or the United States. Asking for a protectorate, today, at the turn of the 20th century, seems to me an extremely bankrupt and mediocre policy. Protectorate was what the African and Arabic countries, plunged into extreme poverty or civil wars, demanded in order to get some support from the great powers, France, and so on, so as to survive and build up their state. To demand the same thing today in Kosovo, when it at least formally has its own president, when it has already had once a much greater autonomy, it seems to me that this is done with the sole goal of throwing dust in the people's eyes, telling them: "Here you are, we are doing something." I am convinced that Europe and the whole world know that this policy is outdated; I am convinced also that Kosovo itself is not prepared to ask for this thing. Kosovo with its development, its great intellectual potential, capable of running a state. Demands for Kosovo's autonomy sound to me like its second Serbian occupation. I am of the opinion that for the resolution of the Albanian question in general, and its primary Kosovo issue in particular, we must turn to ourselves for help and act through peaceful means, of course, but self-defense and self-determination are also democratic

means, the latter being sanctioned in the UN Charter which is the most supreme law for all nations. If the people there, the people of Kosovo, have made up their minds to have their own republic, or demand national union with Albania, and vote in favor of this thing, then they should use all possible means until they achieve their end. This cannot be achieved by academic talks at grand hotels, or by asking for a protectorate, which is tantamount to taking chestnuts out of the fire with the hands of others, but can there really be any state in the world that would readily burn its hands for the sake of the Albanians and their national cause?!

If we were really able to turn to ourselves for help, if we knew how to build up alliances among ourselves and among our political forces in order to solve our national question, if we knew how to turn against the Serbs the animosity existing among us, then we would beyond any doubt achieve success. Because you must know that both the PD [Democratic Party] and the LDK [Democratic League of Kosovo] leave no stones unturned to destroy any other political party which does not agree with their "Ghandi-ism"—a Ghandi-ism grafted with opportunism, a pacifism and an unnatural dread, which are never to be found in the Albanian's character. Moreover, it is a pity that neither of these two parties, the PD or the LDK, understand that this policy is nowadays outmoded. [passage omitted]

[INTERVISTA] Also this week, there has been a great deal of reaction by the press with regard to the census in Macedonia. They say that there are a lot of irregularities in this census. What do you have to say about it?

[Beqiri] The truth is that the census in Macedonia could have been an act that would have decided upon a lot of things relevant to the fate of the Albanians in Macedonia. However, though being one of the greatest national actions, it was not handled as such, and according to our opinion it was even boycotted. It was sabotaged first of all by the Albanian state, its policy, our national mass media, beginning with the Albanian Radio- Television, the ATSH [Albanian Telegraphic Agency—ATA], the newspapers owned by the party-state, and other newspapers that are their lackeys. It is now that the Albanians in Macedonia needed to come up more united than ever. The political forces should have found a common language and good understanding, and it should have even been stated that there was only one party in Macedonia, and that party was the party of the Albanians. Only in this way could they have coped with this great action. Exactly at this point, it was our state that sowed the seed of discord, splitting thus the Party for Democratic Prosperity, the party of the Albanians in Macedonia, in two. This seed of discord has been also witnessed among other Albanian political forces, at a time when they should have been united in the face of the census. They failed to come to terms with one another, leaving Gligorov's state alone to make the law according to his wish, and contrive all sorts of restrictions in order to make it impossible for the Albanian population to have their real number declared by the census. Even if a bit harshly, but correctly, we have already declared that the Albanian state would not be very happy with an outcome of the census giving the figure of nearly 1 million Albanians living in Macedonia, as there really are.

It is our state, with its lack of transparence, that knows best why this happens so. We pat Gligorov on the back, just to please the great powers, even when he plays all sorts of tricks on Albanians living in their own land in Macedonia. In this respect, it seems as if our state is anxious that Gligorov's prediction in this census by all means comes true: namely that the Albanians in Macedonia account for not more than 20-21 percent, at a time when they make up at least 40 percent of Macedonia's population. Furthermore, if we were at the appropriate level and looked at this problem with a benevolent eye, pursuing a genuine national policy, it would turn out that the Albanians there were the most common in terms of the number of the population. The Macedonians would come second and that state would be designated the State of Albanians, Macedonians and other peoples, Aromanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, etc. I am of the opinion that the Albanians were wrong to participate in this census, which in fact is a farce aimed at defeating the Albanians by all means. I am certain that the outcome of that census will yield less than 20 percent Albanians, as Gligorov himself has declared a few months ago. The responsibility for this lies with the Albanian state. [passage omitted]

Influence of U.S. Democratic Ideals Extolled

AU1307132894 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 7 Jul 94 p 3

[Gezim Hadaj article: "Ideals of U.S. Democracy in Albanian Thought"]

[Excerpts] The years of restoration of independence, the parliamentary regime and the June revolution marked a climax of U.S. democracy's impact on Albanian thought. A faraway country across the ocean, the United States in those years exerted a direct effect on Albanian thought. During the second decade of this century, many Albanians fled their country to escape persecution, to the land of their dreams, the United States. There they discovered democracy, became acquainted with human rights and freedoms, learned to respect the law, strengthen their love for their homeland, and assess the necessity of organizing themselves.

Instituting Democracy

In 1912, the Albanian colony in the United States founded the pan-Albanian federation "Vatra" [Hearth], whose aim was to organize Albanians in the United States and institute democracy in Albania. [passage omitted]

Indirect Influence

There is another early influence of U.S. democracy on Albanian thought, dating back to another zenith of Albanian history—the period of the Albanian Renaissance. [passage omitted]

The Post-Communist Era

For more than half a century, this country was hermetically sealed off from the outside world. However, the thirst of Albanians for democratic ideals was like a strong temptation toward forbidden fruit. The bravest ones, defying the ill-famed agitation and propaganda clauses of the constitution, crammed the prisons and concentration camps. Others, with their radios and TV sets supplemented with home-made tin reception enhancers, and TV antennas hidden under the roofs or under the beds, defeated the noisy channels of the official communist media and their electronic jamming apparatus.

The cruel dictatorship could not numb the Albanians' love for and faith in the U.S. democracy. A vivid proof of this affection for the U.S. system was the grand reception the people of Tirana reserved for U.S. Secretary of State Mr. James Baker in 1991, when Albania was still governed by communists. As in no other European capital, the walls of Tirana were covered with the slogans: "Long live the United States! Long live President Bush! Down with communism!"

In the wake of communism's collapse and the victory of democracy, countless channels of communication of the U.S. democracy were ultimately opened to Albanians. The last two years have witnessed a boom in the impact of U.S. culture, especially among the youth, with its extremely democratic character, its music and rhythm of dances, its movies, its literature, and so on.

However, one can not speak of a thorough U.S. social influence in Albania. In Albanian society of today, certain strata and various age groups are still under the strong grip of the traditional influence, which is resisting the pressure of the U.S. culture. However, in recent surveys analysts have found that 70 percent of the Albanian youth are in favor of the U.S. democratic pattern. And U.S. ideals regarding foreign policy, freedom, equality among nations, and the increase of competences of the international community are dear to every Albanian, both inside and outside the country. Albanians have always strived and are still striving to convince the United States and the whole world that they have been and still want to be a factor for peace and stability in the Balkans and Europe.

Havel, President Mubarak Hold News Conference

NC1307183094 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1650 GMT 13 Jun 94

[Text] Prague, 13 Jul (MENA)—Czech President Vaclav Havel appreciates President Mubarak's constructive role in the Arab world and the Middle East and described Mubarak as an international figure worthy of respect.

At the outset of a joint news conference with President Mubarak at the end of their talks in Prague today, Havel said that the talks focused on bilateral relations and political and economic cooperation.

The two sides had agreed to establish strong relations, and this was underlined during this visit, he said.

He added that bilateral relations will be developed and boosted in the next stage. He said the talks also dealt with Middle East developments, Arab and international issues, and the situation in Iraq.

In his speech at the beginning of the news conference, President Mubarak said the talks dealt with bilateral and international issues and the situation in the Middle East.

He said: This is the first time I have visited your country, and I would like to remind you that Egypt established its relations with the former Czechoslovakia in 1920. The ties have grown since then, reaching their peak in 1955. We are now working to strengthen these ties.

The two presidents then began answering journalists' questions. Asked about the Czech economic reform experience and whether Egypt can benefit from it, President Mubarak said: There are some differences between the Egyptian and the Czech economic reform programs. In Egypt, many individuals owned factories and agricultural lands, while the government in the former Czechoslovakia owned all of the lands and factories.

President Mubarak pointed out that Egypt is working to privatize some factories and various projects so that the public sector can gradually be converted into the private sector.

He noted that the inflation rate has dropped and that the exchange rate has been stabilized.

Asked what role the Czech Republic, which is not a permanent Security Council member, can play in the Middle East, President Havel said the Czech Republic has good relations with the concerned parties, referring to his meeting with Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat. He stressed that the Czech Republic is ready to play a role to help achieve peace in the Middle East.

Asked whether the Egyptian-Czech talks dealt with the import of arms from the Czech Republic, President Mubarak said: We are currently working to establish peace; we are seeking a peaceful settlement, and this is far from a search for weapons.

He said that most of Egypt's arms come from the United States. If Egypt needs Czech weapons, he said, it will not hesitate to ask for them.

President Mubarak said Egypt is supporting its defense capabilities.

On the situation in Yemen, President Mubarak said: We discussed this subject.

Asked why he chose the Czech Republic as the first East European country to visit, President Mubarak said that he is returning Havel's visit of 1991 and that the visit is part of the strong relations between the two countries.

President Mubarak said that the two sides are discussing prospects of cooperation between them. He described the relations between the two countries as special and said that businessmen are discussing ways to promote cooperation. He pointed out that ministers of the two countries will continue to discuss joint projects and that the two finance ministers will hold talks in Cairo in the next three months to discuss the problem of double taxation.

President Mubarak said that the Czech prime minister will visit Egypt before the end of this year.

Mubarak Comments on Cooperation

LD1307190594 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Interview with Egypt's President Husni Mubarak by correspondent Pavla Jazairiova on 13 July in Prague; Mubarak speaks in English with superimposed Czech translation provided by Jazairiova—recorded]

[Text] Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, who is on an official visit here, gave an exclusive interview to Czech Radio and Czech Television this morning. On behalf of Radiozurnal the questions were asked by Pavla Jazairiova.

[Jazairiova] The first question is as follows: In what way is the Czech Republic important for Egypt?

[Mubarak] People often do not realize that our relations have a great tradition. We have been in frequent contact since 1955, but diplomatic ties date back as far as 1922. The first contacts between Egypt and the then Eastern bloc were with what was then Czechoslovakia. I even remember how you used to train our military experts. Our first military aircraft were from you. We have maintained intensive economic cooperation. That is why cooperation with the Czech Republic continues to be so important.

[Jazairiova] How do you evaluate the current state of that cooperation?

[Mubarak] It is very modest now, but I think it is very important to expand it. My economic ministers have

come with me to Prague, and today I will meet your prime minister, and we will discuss this here and also later in Egypt.

[Jazairiova] Mr. President, your country is currently developing a major privatization program. Can our experience in any way be of use to you?

[Mubarak] I have heard that the privatization in your country is going pretty well, but the situation in your country and in Egypt is very different. In your country, everything belonged to the state, every single little shop. In our country, the private sector has always been very important. Furthermore, 98 percent of Egyptian land is under private ownership. We started to privatize roughly a year and a half ago, and it is progressing quite well because essentially only heavy industry was nationalized.

[Jazairiova] And what, Mr. President, do you think of the work and expansion of the European Union? Do you think the Arab countries could cooperate on a similar basis?

[Mubarak] Twenty years ago, maybe more than that, the Arab states proposed an Arab common market. Putting it into practice is taking a long time. The European countries are much quicker in this respect. However, I think that progress will be achieved soon.

[Announcer] Husni Mubarak also spoke about the Middle East peace process, the situation in Iraq and other Arab countries, and the contemporary problems and achievements of Egypt.

Mubarak Views Peace Process

LD1307202094 Prague CT 1 Television Network in Czech 1730 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Studio interview with Egyptian President Husni Mubarak by an unidentified correspondent on 13 July—recorded; Mubarak speaks in English with superimposed Czech translation]

[Text] [Correspondent] Mr. President, following an agreement with the IMF, your country intends to privatize a substantial part of its state sector. What is your opinion of Czech privatization? Could some of its elements also be used in Egypt?

[Mubarak] I think that the privatization process in the Czech Republic has been successful. There are, however, substantial differences between the two countries. Earlier on, all Czechoslovak companies, including the smallest, used to belong to the state. In our country, a substantial part of the economy has always been in private hands.

[Correspondent] The Czech Republic is greatly interested in the success of the Middle East peace process. What, in your opinion, is the future of the Palestinian state?

[Mubarak] I cannot take any stance on this issue at present. Jewish settlements in the occupied territories objectively remain a problem. The number of settlements has grown considerably in recent years. These settlements have to be taken as a fact today, and it is necessary that a form of peaceful coexistence in this area be found.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, what is your recommendation by way of a solution to the problem of the Golan Heights?

[Mubarak] I have said several times, even right in front of the Israelis, that the Golan Heights should be returned to Syria. Without Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, Syria will not accede to peace. Israel is aware of that. There is still a long way to go before a final resolution is reached.

Defense Ministry Said Facing Personnel Problems

AU1307161294 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 12 Jul 94 p 7

[Article by Jaroslav Kmenta: "Young Officers Needed for Subordinate Assignments"]

[Text] Prague—While the Army will most probably be able to cope with its efforts to resupply, the Defense Ministry will have to combat personnel difficulties for a long time to come. The problem is that last year alone 17,000 professional soldiers left the Army. Those leaving are most often officers in the most productive age, from 21 to 30 years. On the other hand, older soldiers cling to the Army until their retirement or the completion of their service years.

Jaroslav Cuhra, director of the ministry Personnel Department, believes that people leave the Army, above all, because of the conditions under which they serve, and also for the low respect in which the military profession is held.

One of the adverse consequences of young officers leaving is the fact that currently there are proportionately more colonels in the Army than there are lower ranks. The experts claim that there is a greater need for the lower-ranked officers because they can be assigned to command squads and companies. They are sometimes commanded by conscripts, and that does not favorably contribute to the professional training of new soldiers.

The ministry intends to deal with the problem of the larger number of colonels in the Army than lower-ranking officers by having the colonels serve in subordinate assignments. The ministry has not yet announced any other measures.

The Army should have approximately 65,000 professional soldiers at the end of 1995. Currently, there are 88,000 of them. Most of the men serve with the infantry (42,030), 14,849 serve in the Air Defense Troops, and 12,889 are in the Air Force.

Army Reequipment Focuses on Arms Modernization

AU1307131794 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 12 Jul 94 p 7

[Article by Jaroslav Kmenta: "When Reequipping the Army, the Defense Ministry Will Play on Modernization of the Currently Held Weapons"]

[Text] When changing its weapons, the Army will orientate itself more toward the modernization of the arms currently at its disposal than toward the purchase of completely new arms. A complete reequipment of the Army would not be acceptable, given the present military budget. Although the Army has not yet published its reequipment program, numerous companies have indicated interest in supplying it with their goods. The domestic producers have a better chance of success.

The OT R-5 armored carriers, for instance, providing communication between commanders and staffs, were added to the Army's equipment recently. This means of communication is placed on the infantry combat vehicle BVP-1.

Two modern reconnaissance systems also appeared in the Army this year—the opticoelectronic system for air reconnaissance and the automatic target-finding system on the basis of the interferometric predictor, with digital signal processing.

In the sphere of arms, weapon systems, and ammunition, the Army introduced to its equipment, above all, the L-39 MS aircraft and large-capacity mobile obstacle-making systems [zatarasovac] VZ-92, with corresponding ammunition.

The obstacle-making system can lay antitank mines or scatter antipersonnel mines on the surface. The L-39 MS training jet aircraft is a modernized version of the L-39 aircraft.

In addition, the Army plans to purchase and include 72 L-159 aircraft in its equipment before 2004. Because of its modern navigational equipment and the ability of carrying intelligent NATO-standard ammunition (very likely, the French Matra guided missiles), this aircraft should, to a certain degree, replace the MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft. The aforementioned aircraft should reinforce the stock of the fighter bombers and Su ground attack aircraft.

The modernization of the Soviet T-72 tank and the Soviet MiG-21 fighter bomber will also be included in the reequipment program.

No Decision Made on Supplier of Infantry Arms

AU1307162094 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 12 Jul 94 p 7

[Article by Jaroslav Kmenta: "The Manufacturer of Arms for the Infantry May Be Domestic or Foreign"]

[Text] While a definite decision was made regarding certain types of heavy arms, to date no one knows with what kind of infantry arms the Czech Army will be equipped. Defense Minister Baudys said that, at present, one cannot speak about a single type or even a single manufacturer who would supply the Czech Army.

It is generally expected that the Defense Ministry plan of modernizing the Army will include the demand for the production and supply of the Lada infantry system. This system, consisting of a submachine gun (assault rifle), short-barrelled submachine gun, and hand-held machine gun should be supplied by the Uhersky Brod arms manufacturing plant, and its price should be about 20,000 korunas per system.

The Lada infantry system goes back to the end of the 1970's. It was originally planned for the Soviet Kalasnikov rifle caliber of 5.45 mm, and later reworked to NATO standard caliber of 5.56 mm.

Nevertheless, the conceivable purchase of the Lada system is not completely certain. The ministry did not rule out the possibility that the modern Bull Pup systems will appear in the equipment of the Army in the future. The Austrian AUG, British L1-A85, and French FA Mas Clarion (demonstrated by the French soldiers during their exercises in the Czech Republic in June), for instance, are such weapons.

Air Force Most Affected by Reductions

94CH0314A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 13 Jun 94 p 5

[Commentary by Jan Gazdik: "A Marriage Based on Common Sense"]

[Text] The Czechs have relegated the popularity of the military profession (and the police are not much better off) close to the 20th position—immediately ahead of charladies. The Army has thus become, judging at least through the eyes of public opinion, a wench for all purposes. In part, it must blame itself for that; at other times, the view of the Army continues to be tied to the services of the previous regime. Nevertheless, it is paradoxical that military aviation, although marked the least by totalitarianism, is the most affected today: Under pressure from a number of cities, the Army closed bases on which it was originally counting and gave up even the best-located airfield at Bechyne. And, until recently, it had not really been decided where the aviators would stay, so they moved from one tragicomic situation to another. After closing air bases, hundreds of people moved to others, but even those were closed shortly thereafter as a result of protests by cities and towns. Aviators thus stopped believing in anything—they preferred to revert to civilian life, despite the fact that no one was directly chasing them away.

After much back and forth, the soldiers have remained at five airfields: Caslav, Namest nad Oslavou, Pardubice, Kbely, and Prerov (by 1 January 1997, they will leave

even Budejovice). Nevertheless, even at these locations there are some reservations regarding the military. Many of the reservations include accusations that, in working out noise studies regarding air operations, the soldiers are "cheating," although the measurements are being done by a civilian firm. The studies are done to determine the limits of areas of excessive noise pollution that will be applied to operations at the airfields and life in their vicinity. Also, 40 million korunas [Kc] of compensation for health deterioration of citizens living in the vicinity of bases is at stake. However, there are no criteria for distributing the funds or for investing them. The transforming Air Force is also changing the noise impact in the vicinity of airfields. Some mayors intend to use the acquired funds to improve their election program instead of donating them to reducing noise levels in occupied parts of the city. They say they know best what they need.

The sooner regulations are worked out (they are supposed to be part of the laws on the Army of the Czech Republic that are under preparation) according to which military aviation as well as towns in the vicinity of bases are governed in their conduct toward each other, the better things will be for citizens suffering from noise as well as for the decimated pilots, who are lacking in self-confidence. For the cities, for the time being, they are a necessary evil and so are attempting to gain at least some utility from what is essentially illegal "military conduct." However, changes cannot be brought about only by laws, but also by rendering Army operations more efficient. When soldiers do only that for which they are authorized, they will cease, in the true sense of word, being wenches for all purposes and offer their vicinity more job opportunities. The case of neutral Switzerland, where citizens, even under the influence of events in the former Yugoslavia, voted in a referendum to purchase 34 of the most modern supersonic F-18 fighters, despite the absence of any legal arrangements for coexisting with military aviation, is something else already.

SIPRI Misstated Figures on Czech Arms Trade

AU1207183394 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 9 Jul 94 p 2

[Article by Johanna Grohova and Jaroslav Kmenta: "The Stockholm Bureau Admits It Published Erroneous Data on Exports of Czech Arms"]

[Text] Prague, Stockholm—The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Industry and Trade Ministry still cannot agree on data on the Czech exports of arms for last year. Nevertheless, the prestigious Swedish institution admitted on 7 July that its original information on the military material trade concerning the Czech Republic was inaccurate.

Two weeks ago, the Stockholm institute reported that the profit the Czech Republic generated last year from arms sales amounted to $482 million, which ranked the country as the sixth among the world arms exporters. Although the Swedish experts adjusted this amount last week, after consultations with Czech diplomats in Stockholm, to $275 million, the Czech Industry and Trade Ministry insists on the amount of $167 million. This figure would rank the Czech Republic as 13th in the world.

Stanislav Fritzl, deputy director of the License Administration Department at the Industry and Trade Ministry, said that the Swedish international institution included in its data even the business transactions that the Czech Republic will conduct in the future. According to Fritzl, this concerns exports of L-59 and L-39 aircraft by the firm Aero Vodochody. SIPRI included the sale of 84 of these aircraft in the total. This figure is correct because Aero will actually sell that many to Thailand and Egypt, but the Czech company sold only 33 of these machines last year.

The difference of more than $100 million between the two figures on profit is explained by Siemon Wezeman of the Stockholm institute by different methods in preparing the data. Wezeman said that the Czech ministry uses in its calculation actual amounts for which the arms were sold, while his institute uses its own method that facilitates an easier comparison among data coming from all parts of the world. "Thanks to our method, we are able to draft a table of the world trade in arms. The Czech approach cannot be used in the overall statistics," Wezeman said.

Fritzl believes that these estimates overvalued the prices of Czech aircraft.

Kovac, Mubarak Discuss Development of Relations

LD1407083194 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0800 GMT 14 Jul 94

[Text] This morning, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak began the official agenda of his visit to Slovakia. After the welcoming ceremony at Primates Square, Mubarak met Slovak President Michal Kovac. Their discussion focused, above all, on the possibilities of developing relations between the two countries.

Later today, Mubarak will meet Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the Slovak Parliament and Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik.

In the afternoon, the Egyptian president will end his visit to Slovakia and depart from Bratislava by air.

Poll: Meciar Trusted by Largest Number of People

AU1207174094 Bratislava SME in Slovak 8 Jul 94 p 2

[Article by "r": "If Elections Were To Be Held This Weekend, 78 Percent Would Vote"]

[Text] Bratislava—From 23 June to 4 July, the FOCUS agency carried out a representative public opinion survey, according to which 78 percent of those polled will definitely or probably participate in the coming parliamentary elections. These potential participants in the elections replied as follows:

Imagine that elections were to be held this weekend. For which party, movement, or coalition would you vote?

	Percent
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia-Farmers Party of Slovakia	27.6
Party of the Democratic Left-Social Democratic Party in Slovakia-Green Party in Slovakia-Farmers Movement	14.9
Christian Democratic Movement	9.4
Democratic Union-National Democratic Party	8.8
Slovak National Party	8.8
Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement-Coexistence	8.0
Democratic Party-Party of Entrepreneurs and Tradesmen	7.1
Association of Workers of Slovakia	6.8
Hungarian Civic Party	0.7
Christian Social Union	0.6
Others	1.6
Undecided	3.8
Did not reply	2.0

Name personalities in contemporary political and public life whom you trust the most.

	Percent
Vladimir Meciar	27.4
Michal Kovac	14.8
Jozef Moravcik	14.4
Peter Weiss	11.9
Vojtech Bugar	4.8
Jan Carnogursky	4.8
Ivan Gasparovic	4.8
Jan Luptak	4.1
Jan Slota	3.3
Jozef Prokes	2.7
Sergej Kozlik	2.2
Roman Kovac	2.1
No one	22.0

[The results of the FOCUS survey are also published by Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 8 July on page 2 and Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 8 July on page 1. The Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA report adds that only those politicians are included in the table who were trusted by more than 2 percent of respondents; the NARODNA OBRODA report adds that 900 respondents were polled by FOCUS.]

Agency Director Analyzes Recent Poll Results

AU1207170894 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 11 Jul 94 p 2

[Interview with T. Rosova, director of the Center for Social and Marketing Analysis, FOCUS, by Alena Gottweisova; place and date not given: "A Considerable Polarization of Opinions Among Citizens"]

[Text] [Gottweisova] How do you explain the steep rise in support for the Slovak National Party [SNS], which was recently given no chance at all of getting into parliament and now has 8.8 percent of the vote? This is quite surprising, especially when we consider that people are enjoying a kind of calm since the new government took office.

[Rosova] There are two reasons for this. Admittedly, people appreciate what has happened since the new government took office, but not all of them. The SNS had no chance of winning votes among those who appreciate this. However, here there is at least one-third who have a different approach. This offers some potential. As far as the increase itself is concerned, there are two factors that could influence it. The recent appearance by the SNS chairman on "Kroky" [television discussion program] could have made an impression on this electoral potential. At first glance, it was nonconfrontational as far as the form and not the contents of what he said was concerned. He was able to appear relatively

solid and reliable, especially in contrast to the former prime minister. Moreover, we know that television appearances have already had such an effect—specifically, the rise in support for the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] following the two appearances by ZRS Chairman J. Luptak. The topical situation surrounding the adoption of the signpost law is possibly more fundamental. It is necessary to take a look at the kind of media that influence this part of the population, and, moreover, the issue also involves how their values are oriented, values that are more deeply rooted in people who vote for parties of this type.

[Gottweisova] What is the basic orientation of the potential voters of the individual parties? In what way are they similar and in what way different?

[Rosova] The motives that the voters themselves cite are among the most typical pointers. Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] voters are characterized by their inclination toward radical solutions, authoritative personalities, and the national principle in policy. The national principle and a certain intolerance toward the ethnic minorities are prevalent in the case of the SNS. A social program prevails unequivocally among Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] voters, while Christian principles applied in policy are predominant among Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] voters. A pragmatic approach toward the economy and education as the values of a liberal orientation is apparent among Democratic Union [DU] and Democratic Party [DS] voters. Of course, there are parties where the group principle is more paramount. For example, among ZRS voters, the unequivocal reason for preferring it is that it supports the workers (at least, this is how the voters see it), or, among the Hungarian coalition parties, the issue involves representation for minority interests.

[Gottweisova] However, DU's influence is gradually increasing, and the rise in popularity of the DS-Party of Businessmen and Tradesmen [SPZ] is interesting. The KDH's popularity has also gone up a little. In comparison with the rise in support for the SNS and the stabilized support for the HZDS, could this be taken as an indication that the polarization of society is becoming more accentuated?

[Rosova] That is correct, and we see it from other indications, too, not just from the support for the political parties. The number of votes for the HZDS and the SNS is starting to resemble what it was in 1992, although, admittedly, it is lower. Those who do not support them are, from the point of view of their values, moving much more toward a single pole. There is no longer such ambiguity here. Certain values of democracy and advanced Europe are beginning to be more attractive. As far as the rise in support for the KDH is concerned, this falls within the framework of the fluctuation known over a longer period. For the first time, we have begun to survey the association between DU and the National Democratic Party. They have gone a little past the support expressed recently for the individual parties in the last poll; we had predicted this, however, on the basis of the results of the previous polls. Something similar has happened with the DS-SPZ. I am afraid, however, that if we were to collect data after what has happened in this party, the results would be completely different.

[Gottweisova] The possibility of a postelection coalition between the HZDS and the SDL is often mentioned in the mass media. At the same time, it was apparent from your interview with Radio Free Europe that the voters' base of these two parties is quite different ideologically—for example, in attitudes toward Western institutions. Do you envisage that such a coalition could be formed and could succeed?

[Rosova] It is not out of the question that the SDL leadership could somehow manage to change the views of its voters or motivate them toward such a coalition, but, at the moment, it is clear that the SDL voters' aversion to the HZDS has sharply increased. This is not mutual; HZDS voters would probably have no objections to such a coalition because the SDL is absolutely acceptable in their eyes. However, more than one-quarter of SDL voters are quite unequivocally opposed to the HZDS and to a coalition with it. The question is what this would invoke among the SDL's ranks because, moreover, it is possible also to include in this part the voters from the other parts of the left-wing coalition who equally do not share the inclination toward the HZDS. This would certainly cause considerable changes. On the other hand, we have already seen how the SDL leadership has managed to alter quite significantly the views of its voters' base, specifically in the case of the question of the Slovak Republic's entry into NATO.

Commentary Analyzes Most Recent Opinion Poll

AU1307161694 Bratislava SME in Slovak 11 Jul 94 p 4

[Commentary by Ondrej Dostal: "The Scene Is Crystallizing, the Forces Are Equalizing"]

[Text] The FOCUS agency carried out a representative public opinion poll at the end of June and the beginning of July, whose results immediately dealt a few surprises. The first of these is the continuing crystallization on the political scene, to which the formation of preelection blocs and coalitions in particular has contributed. In comparison with the previous polls, according to which only the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], and the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] were invariably guaranteed seats in parliament, a total of eight slates (of parties, movements, and coalitions) would get into parliament on the basis of the results of the poll conducted by the FOCUS agency. These slates would win up to 91.4 percent of the votes of those resolved to take part in the coming parliamentary elections. This means that the previously sizable cluster of more prominent parties with less than 5-percent support has regrouped into electable blocs or ended up in the category with less than 1 percent

of the vote. The Democratic Union [DU] (along with the National Democratic Party [NDS]), as well as the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], whose support fluctuates from poll to poll, were relatively successful this time. The Democratic Party [DS] has crossed the parliamentary threshold for the first time since the elections, and the Slovak National Party [SNS] has crossed it most likely for the first time since its partition.

Let us take a look, therefore, at what this would mean for the distribution of seats in the National Council of the Slovak Republic. The HZDS would have 45 deputies, the left-wing coalition (the SDL, the Social Democratic Party in Slovakia, the Green Party in Slovakia, and the Farmers Movement) 25, the KDH 16, the DU-NDS 14, the SNS 14, the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH]-Egyutteles 13, the DS-Party of Entrepreneurs and Tradesmen [SPZ] 12, and the ZRS 11. So, the current coalition parties, along with the Hungarian coalition and the DS-SPZ bloc, would have a total of 80 deputies in parliament. The opposition, which, given such a result, would probably be made up of the HZDS, the SNS, and the ZRS, would gain 70 seats in parliament. In this case, the nonleftist forces in the coalition should have almost twice the number of deputies than the bloc led by the SDL.

In view of the split within the DS, however, it is necessary to take into consideration the possibility that the DS-SPZ coalition will not get into parliament. The following calculation is not absolutely correct because the votes of the DS-SPZ voters would probably be distributed differently, but, purely mechanically, this would mean: HZDS 49 seats, the left-wing coalition 24, KDH 17, DU-NDS 16, SNS 16, MKDH-Egyutteles 14, and ZRS 12. In this case, the current coalition (plus its allies) would have 73 mandates, the current opposition would have 65, and the ZRS would have 12.

It is possible to deduce from the poll that the forces between the pro-Meciar and anti-Meciar part of the political scene are equalizing. The possible HZDS-SNS-ZRS alliance has, for the first time, even gained a slight advantage over the current coalition parties. Among other things, the postelection ratio of forces between the current parliamentary majority and minority also depends on whether the DS and the SPZ, the ZRS, and the SNS get into parliament and what kind of stance the ZRS adopts after the elections. So, the Luptakites could, under certain circumstances, become the force that determines Slovakia's future orientation.

Conference Confirms Deepening Split Within KSU

AU1307130494 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 11 Jul 94 pp 1, 3

[Afrticle by Eva Zelenayova: "The Council Will Decide About the Coalition, If There Is One"]

[Text] Tempus fugit, and part of the Christian Social Union [KSU] still intends to accomplish a great deal before the elections. First and foremost, it wants to do all it can to ensure that the KSU goes into the elections on the slate of the Slovak National Party [SNS]. The rest of the party is of the opinion that the SNS Central Council has decided to go into the elections independently and that there is nothing to discuss. Nevertheless, the part represented by KSU Deputy Chairman Bartolomej Kunc convened a nationwide conference in Bratislava on 9 July. Some 85 delegates took part in it. They included 23 members of the KSU Slovak Council (out of 85) and seven of the 11 Presidium members. They adopted a declaration in which, among other things, they state that they want to return to the KSU's original line and that they will strive for a joint course of action with the SNS before the elections. They called upon Chairman Jan Klepac and Deputy Chairman Viliam Oberhauser to resign. When the conference came to an end, we asked Viliam Oberhauser and Bartolomej Kunc for an interview.

[Zelenayova] What do you think about the conference and the fact that it expressed no confidence in you and asked you to resign?

[Oberhauser] The KSU is a democratic party that debates its orientation and, especially, possible coalitions. The signatories to the statement published in SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, in which they express their dissatisfaction with the situation in the KSU and the work of its leadership, organized a meeting involving people who have similar views. It is clear that their declaration supports their views. Meetings involving KSU functionaries are being held throughout Slovakia, however, and their views differ diametrically. The Slovak Council will assess the situation and will have to make a decision.

[Zelenayova] Criticism was expressed at the conference that the council should have convened once a month before the elections but that its members have not met since May.

[Oberhauser] I do not want to convene the council hastily, and the problem derives from this. The participants in the Bratislava conference agreed on 16 July as the date. The rest of us will determine our own date and whether to convene the council at all.

[Zelenayova] Nonetheless, the lists of candidates have to be completed by the end of July. Do you think 16 July is a realistic date for convening the council?

[Oberhauser] Either 16 or 23 July, if the other council members are also amenable. The SNS is willing to negotiate with us until 31 July.

[Zelenayova] Do you think the appeal from the conference participants for your resignation comes from the conditions set by the SNS?

[Oberhauser] I do not wish to comment on this.

[Zelenayova] What is your assessment of the conference?

[Kunc] First and foremost, it is not true that the SNS is insisting on the resignations of J. Klepac and V. Oberhauser. The issue for it is something else. It rejects them as negotiating partners because they made certain statements that really did not go down well either politically or socially.

[Zelenayova] Which ones specifically?

[Kunc] Perhaps you may recall that they called the SNS a chauvinist party; this was not to their credit. Yes, it wants to negotiate, but not with these two functionaries. Despite the resolution adopted by the SNS Central Council, it is offering to cooperate because, obviously, it has realized that it did not proceed altogether correctly. Now it is our turn. However, while J. Klepac and V. Oberhauser consider negotiations with the SNS to be unwarranted, we want to negotiate. Our council has not forbidden us to do this. After all, we will not pass muster in the elections on our own.

[Zelenayova] If the council meets on 23 July, is this still an suitable date?

[Kunc] A problem will arise because the SNS also has a council meeting on this date. If obstacles were to be placed, on behalf of the KSU chairman, in the way of convening the council on 16 July, they would be spurious and intentional, unfair and dishonorable, and also dangerous in relation to the party.

[Zelenayova] What is acceptable to the KSU, a coalition or participation on the SNS slate?

[Kunc] A coalition is not being taken into consideration at the moment.

[Zelenayova] Has the SNS offered you enough places on its slate for you to be able to form a parliamentary club?

[Kunc] Yes.

[Zelenayova] The participants in the conference are demanding that Messrs. Klepac and Oberhauser resign. Do you think they will?

[Kunc] This is an incredibly serious and difficult matter for them.

[Zelenayova] What are the KSU's prospects if they remain in their posts?

[Kunc] This will create problems for our negotiations with the SNS and for achieving a favorable result.

[Zelenayova] What if the council decides that the KSU should go into the elections alone?

[Kunc] We will try to convince the council that such a decision is wrong, and we will return to the decision made in April, according to which this same council resolved to enter into a coalition with the SNS. It is not the council's fault that this has not happened.

Social Democracy Head Outlines Party Objectives

LD1307152994 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] Yet another political entity has been added to our political scene since the beginning of the week. This entity is Social Democracy [SD], which came into being by parting from the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS]. So far, it has won the backing of 16 districts. Its strongest base is in Zilina, where its temporary headquarters are located. Vladimir Lach met with SD Deputy Chairwoman Alena Kunjakova:

[Begin recording] [Lach] Why did you decide to form the SD? What prompted you to do it?

[Kunjakova] It was the belief that what this party needs is to be based on a firm pillar of social democratic foundations under the leadership of Alexander Dubcek, who gave this party not only his name but also his beliefs and humanity.

The other main reason that prompted us to depart from the SDSS and form the SD was that an agreement was concluded with the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], which does not guarantee that social democracy as such could create an independent deputies' group, but that one group, consisting of the SDL, the Farmers Movement, and the Green Party, would be formed. This would mean a cessation of the party's identity.

[Lach] To what degree are you able to talk about SD policies and the party's prospects?

[Kunjakova] Because we are people living in society, outside the parliament, we know what bothers people most of all, and our policies are aimed precisely in this direction.

There is one more thing I would like to point out: Today, we shall compose a letter to all social democratic and workers' parties abroad telling them what compelled us to identify this party with social democracy.

[Lach] You mentioned workers' parties. Does this mean that you will be close to Luptak's crowd [Association of Workers in Slovakia]?

[Kunjakova] Yes, we have established contact with Mr. Luptak, too, because we think that addressing the working class today is what each side should be very pleased to do. But because, since 1992, political parties have failed to turn to the rank-and-file citizen, their policies are formulated in a way that ensures winning their support. But each citizen has to make up his mind about whom to vote for. [end recording]

Energy Enterprise Statement on Mochovce Plant

AU1307161394 Bratislava SME in Slovak 11 Jul 94 p 3

[Statement released by the Slovak Energy Enterprise; place and date not given: "A Public Statement"]

[Text] On behalf of the Slovak Energy Enterprise and its West European partners, we notify the citizens of this country that, within the framework of our program to improve nuclear safety in Slovakia, we intend to complete the construction of and put into operation the 1. and 2. Blocks of the Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant.

The Mochovce nuclear power plant is located 120 kilometers east of Bratislava in the Levice District. The project consists of completing the construction of and putting into operation the 1. and 2. blocks in Mochovce (each with an output of 440 MW). The construction of these blocks was interrupted in 1991 because of a lack of money. A considerable number of modifications will be made within the framework of the completion to ensure that the power plant achieves the nuclear safety standard required by Western norms.

The project will be realized within the framework of European partnership.

At the same time, we would like to inform you that, after the 1. and 2. blocks of the Mochovce nuclear power plant are put into reliable commercial operation, the two oldest blocks of the Jaslovske Bohunice V-1 nuclear power plant—its 1. and 2. blocks—will be shut down. This will represent a major contribution by Slovakia to improving nuclear safety in Europe.

Before the beginning of the completion work on the 1. and 2. blocks of the Mochovce nuclear power plant, a comprehensive assessment will be made of the nuclear power plant's impact on the environment. Its contents will be in harmony with international norms. The report on this assessment, along with other important documents, will be made available to the public for its comments. The details on the information procedure will be made public at a later date.

First-Quarter Economic Data Released

AU1307132794 Bratislava SME in Slovak 11 Jul 94 p 3

[Article by "SME, bn": "According to the Statistical Office, the GDP Will Increase Almost 1 Percent"]

[Text] Bratislava—At the 7 July session of the Council for Economic and Social Accord, the Statistical Office (SU) of the Slovak Republic presented the statistical report on the fundamental development trends in the national economy of the Slovak Republic in the first quarter of 1994 and the estimates for 1994. We selected some of the key data:

The development of the economy in the first quarter is characterized by a recovery of production output in comparison with the same period last year, which was to a great degree affected by its very low volume in the first months following the emergence of the Slovak Republic. The volume of gross domestic product [GDP] generated in the economy during this period amounts to 90.3 billion korunas, which, adjusted for inflation (in current prices), was 3.8 percent more than in the fourth quarter of last year and 14.8 percent more than in the same period of last year. Regarding individual branches of the economy, like in both the first and the fourth quarter of last year, the greatest share in the GDP again belongs to industry (33.9 percent), followed by services (with the exception of the financial services 18.9 percent, and, of this, transport and communication 9.5 percent); 5.6 percent of the GDP was generated in agriculture and 4.4 percent in construction. Only services maintained a continuing growth of the branch's GDP share (output growth) in comparison with both quarters.

Inflation, gauged by consumer prices, averaged 2 percent in the first quarter in comparison with December 1993 and had the tendency toward a reduction of the increase. The average monthly rate of inflation growth in the period January to March was 0.9 percent. These tendencies are also a result of the development in wages in the first quarter, when the average monthly salary of a worker in the national economy reached 5,581 korunas, or 9.6 percent less than in the fourth quarter of last year and 17.4 percent more than in the first quarter of last year nominally (1.7 percent more in real terms). The decline in nominal wages was accompanied by a growth in the productivity of labor in the GDP by approximately 4 percent (19.3 percent in comparison with the same period last year).

Considered macroeconomically, the average growth of the rate of unemployment—0.7 point to 13.3 percent in comparison with the fourth quarter (according to the register of the Labor Ministry, from 14.4 to 14.5 percent)—corresponds to overall economic developments. Final household consumption was nominally 2.1 percent lower than in the fourth quarter and declined by 9.8 percent in real terms. Expenditures on purchases of goods and services in retail declined by as much as 18.5 percent.

Defense Minister-Designate on Army Reduction

LD1307213094 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Excerpts] Prior to the hearing by the Defense Committee, Defense Minister-designate Gyorgy Keleti met outgoing Defense Minister Lajos Fur. Later he told the committee that they agreed that Fur will hand over his office and its affairs on Friday [15 July].

Gyorgy Keleti does not wish to change the country's defense principles. He considers a good foreign policy to be the best guarantee for the country's security.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Regarding the future of the Army, you called attention most of all to the Army's financial situation. You said that you also thought about a possible reduction of its size.

[Keleti] Primarily in respect of conscripts because we think we must keep the professional soldiers who constitute the backbone of the Army. We must also create the means to improve their living conditions so that they could live in circumstances that will stop them thinking about leaving their vocation that they chose years ago.

The conscripts' situation is different. The view of the chief of staff—with which I agree—is that within approximately 18 months the numbers must be reduced by some 10,000-12,000. This will also take place—it is expected—together with a reduction in the time conscripts will have to serve. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] By how much less will a conscript have to serve?

[Keleti] In think that in certain positions, for example those who serve as guards, the length of service could be fixed to be eight or nine months, while those who need training because they would handle some kind of battle technology equipment could expect an approximately 10-month long service obligation. [end recording]

Interviewed About Future

LD1307164594 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 13 Jul 94 p 7

[Interview with Defense Minister-Designate Gyorgy Keleti by Frigyes Varju; place and date not given: "Is the Defense Ministry in Crisis?"]

[Text] [Varju] You went to the Defense Ministry for the first time yesterday to begin taking over the duties and the office. What did you learn during the visit?

[Keleti] I did not go alone to the ministry. Andras Toth, the future political state secretary, Jozsef Feher, the future administrative state secretary, and Laszlo Bosics, retired general, accompanied me. In my opinion, a lot of material has been prepared for us in the ministry, and a seemingly correct handing over is taking place; the officials are trying to present a correct picture about the state of the army. A relatively orderly state of affairs emerged from the papers I studied. However, on the basis of information obtained from elsewhere, I know that the solvency of the Hungarian Army could get into a serious danger in this autumn: Training will have to be halted and very strict savings will have to be instituted for the army to be able to make ends meet from the budget this year. Some people told me about a budget deficit of about 6-7 billion forints, and this means that we will not have money to pay bills at the end of the year. And the officers are waiting for their wages, the conscripts must eat, and everyone needs electric power. All this cannot be paid without support from the budget. We will have to work out a crisis management program soon.

[Varju] In your opinion, what is the reason for the spectacular delay in handing over the Defense Ministry?

[Keleti] I waited at least 10 days for the outgoing minister to invite me. I think that, given the fact that Lajos Fur is still in charge of the Defense Ministry and he should have things to talk over with me, he should have invited me to him first. In my opinion, people should get used to the fact that a new minister might get into office every four years following elections. In other words, if Lajos Fur has something against me, and it seems that he has, he should overcome his reservations. He is the government's defense minister now, and should have done everything necessary to hand over his office.

[Varju] According to rumors in Parliament, the two of you are not on speaking terms. What is the reason behind this?

[Keleti] I do not know the reason. Probably the current situation is connected to the fact that, according to Fur, I walked out on them when I left the ministry in 1992 and gave up my position as spokesman. That is not true because, at that time, the conditions prevailing in the ministry made it impossible to work normally with the minister and several of his employees. However, I do not think I have said anything bad about them. It is true, however, that I have taken the floor several times in Parliament in debates connected with the army. But I did not use any information that should have not been used.

[Varju] You were one of the most popular figures in the army and on television at the time, thanks primarily to the Gulf war and the events in Romania. How did the old comrades receive you in the ministry now?

[Keleti] There are many rumors that the generals are not accepting me now because I am only a colonel. I can only answer to this that Lajos Fur is a junior lieutenant in the reserves. Some people claimed that the soldiers are afraid of me. It is out of the question that the new defense leadership is preparing for revenge in the ministry! I think it is part of a natural process that the top leadership of a ministry changes in the wake of new elections. Of course, we have not yet dismissed anyone; Lajos Fur himself signed the dismissals of nine or 10 leaders, and these dismissals become valid one day

before the new government gets into office. My basic opinion is that the internal structure of the ministry, a structure regulated by law, should be observed. However, according to this structure, the state secretaries and their deputies should select their own colleagues because the responsibility is theirs, and they know with whom they can cooperate.

[Varju] The previous coalition government started the organizational merger of army headquarters and the ministry. Do you plan to continue this process?

[Keleti] When we discussed the new government program with the agreement of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], I suggested that this merger order be made invalid. I think we must first clarify Lajos Fur and the previous government's motives in ordering this merger. Knowing the motives and on the basis of the experiences of the committee led by Rudolf Joo, we must decide whether this merger is justified or not. If it is justified, a government decision will emerge to implement it; at the moment, however, I do not think anything can justify this action.

[Varju] According to our information, the Russian debt toward Hungary continues to be considerable, and there is again talk of arms purchases in exchange for this debt. Would you support such a scheme?

[Keleti] I do not know how the negotiations are going. I intend to ask Lajos Fur about them, if I succeed in meeting him. I think, however, that in the current economic situation, it would be more beneficial to use the Russian debt for civilian purposes.

[Varju] But we might need the modern anti-missile system that the Russian side allegedly is agreeing to sell.

[Keleti] I already consulted military experts on this matter, after the Soviets offered to sell the S-300 system in 1988. The Hungarian defense establishment turned it down at the time too, because this system is too heavy for Hungarian technicians. It is difficult to move it and we might not be able to move it from one part of the country to another in case of a conflict. Naturally, there are also other technical reservations regarding this system; in addition, I would like to come to an agreement with the future finance minister, Mr Laszlo Bekesi, that the army refrain from purchasing this system in exchange for the Finance Ministry maintaining the real value of the army budget. At the moment, I think it much more important to see that the professional staff and army members are properly appreciated and do not have to struggle with subsistence problems.

[Varju] As far as I know, you would like to see a smaller army than the current one. Would this mean a considerable reduction in personnel?

[Keleti] We must definitely not touch the professional staff; it is a big problem that some 10,000 people have left the Army in the past four years. Because the Army cannot be financed from the budget with its current structure; in addition to structural changes, we will also have to reduce personnel. We discussed with the chief of staff the possibility of calling up fewer conscripts in August, some 2,000 less. We would repeat this reduction in February 1995 and, by February 1996, we would like to see a reduction of 12,000 soldiers in the army. This will probably require the abolishment of some units, but the duration of military service might be reduced.

[Varju] The outgoing government was pointedly trying to join NATO. Will the new leadership continue this strategy?

[Keleti] It is the firm intention of the social-liberal government to join NATO. The only difference between the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the SZDSZ is that the MSZP wants to ask the opinion of the people in a referendum at the end of this process.

Finance Minister-Designate Urges Restraint

LD1307133594 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] The hearings of the ministers designate in the parliamentary committees are continuing today. The future finance minister did not promise many nice things to the Budget Committee. Laszlo Bekesi said that next year will be a year of self-restraint. Laszlo Ulicska reports.

[Ulicska] Explaining his plans, Laszlo Bekesi told the Budget and Finance Committee that 1995 will be a year of self-restraint. The minister designate said that there have been positive economic processes in the past period—he mentioned export growth and increased agricultural and building industry output in this connection. However, overall, some four-fifths of the other results were financed by running up debts.

Laszlo Bekesi summed up the urgent economic tasks in three points. Concerning the unjustified outflow of extra incomes in recent years, he believes that there must be attempts to direct these toward savings. In his view, the effectiveness of savings can be increased if the 10 percent tax levied on resources is eliminated.

As the second step, he mentioned a reduction in the expenditure of state finances. According to Bekesi, an improvement of 50 billion forints can be achieved in this connection in the second half of the year, although this, to quote his words, will obviously involve painful measures. This means plans to reduce tax avoidance possibilities, plans to tighten up the collection of taxes and dues, and the future minister considers it possible that the increase in consumer taxes will be brought forward from 1995 to this year.

As the third factor to halt the deterioration in the balance, Bekesi mentioned the holding back of incomes which are not related to performance. He said that the financial rehabilitation of loss- making enterprises, without consequences, will be impermissible in the

future. To quote him, the wages paid out so far for these and similar purposes have already exhausted the funds for wage increases in 1995.

Biographies of New Government Ministers Published

94CH0337A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 25 Jun 94 p 4

["New Government Ministers"]

[Text]

Gyula Horn (Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]) Prime Minister

Born 5 July 1932 in Budapest. Parents: the late Geza Horn, and Anna Csornyei, workers. Married to Anna Kiraly. Education: was an instrument maker's apprentice from 1948 on. Graduated from vocational secondary school in 1949; from the College of Economic Sciences in Rostov, USSR, in 1954; and from the Political Academy in 1970. Became a candidate of economic sciences in 1977.

Employment: In 1954-59, clerk of the Turnover Tax Main Department in the Ministry of Finance. In 1959-61, staff member of the directly reporting Soviet Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; upon joining the diplomatic service, was stationed in Sofia in 1961-63 and in Belgrade in 1963-69. In 1969-83, staff member of, consultant to, and deputy department head within the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] Central Committee. Department head in 1983-85. State secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1985-89, minister of foreign affairs in 1989-90.

Member of the MDP [Hungarian Workers Party] in 1954-56, of the MSZMP in 1956-89, and of the MSZMP Central Committee in 1985-89. Member of the MSZP Policy Committee and MSZP chairman since 1989.

Elected to the National Assembly on the Somogy County list in 1990. Chairman of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee in 1990-93. Member of the SPIRI [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute] board of directors since 1990, and of the Council of Europe parliamentary assembly since 1991.

Awarded the 1990 Karolyi Prize. Published work: *Colopok [Piles].*

Gabor Kuncze (Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ]) Interior Minister

Born 4 November 1950 in Papa. Parents: Dr. Lajos Kuncze, chief of the department of internal medicine and hospital director, and Magdolna Maramorosi, a homemaker. Married to Katalin Fellegi, a secondary-school teacher of physics and mathematics. Education: graduated from the Piarist Fathers' Secondary School in Kecskemet in 1969; from the Construction Industry Advanced Technical School and the Miklos Ybl Technical College in 1974, as site engineer in civil engineering construction; and from the MKKE [Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences] Industry Section in 1988, as economist specializing in the organization and management of industry.

Employment: In 1969-70, laborer at the Varpalota [coal] mine, and surgeon's assistant at Veszprem Hospital. In 1974-83, technical clerk at the Budapest Municipal Water Works, construction foreman of the Central Hungary Utilities and Civil Engineering Construction Enterprise, inspector of the National Power Transmission Lines Enterprise, and superintendent in charge of the construction of the Danube Region Water Works. From 1983, head of the investment department and the main department of supply at the Enterprise for the Construction Industry's Mechanization; and from 1985, director in charge of economic affairs at the aforementioned enterprise.

Became a member of the SZDSZ in August 1992.

In 1990-94, elected to the National Assembly as an SZDSZ candidate, in Pest County's No. 12 election district. In May 1993, appointed to the National Assembly's Budget Committee and its Tax Subcommittee. In September 1990, deputy chairman of the IPU's [Inter-Parliamentary Union's] Hungarian-Austrian Friendship Section, and member of the Hungarian-German Section. The SZDSZ parliamentary group's spokesman on transport and communications, and subsequently the parliamentary group's leader. On 25 September 1993, headed the SZDSZ list.

Dr. Laszlo Lakos (MSZP) Agriculture and Food Minister

Born 31 August 1945 in Furta. Parents: the late Laszlo Lakos, a bookkeeper, and Gizella Farkas, a homemaker. Married to a schoolteacher. They have two daughters: Piroska, a university student, and Monika, a business-college graduate.

Education: Graduated from the University of Veterinary Sciences in 1968, and passed the examination for engineers specializing in business administration, in Godollo in 1985. Occupation: veterinarian.

Employment: With the Red Star Agricultural Cooperative in Korostetetlen in 1985-72 [as published]; and from 1972 on, chairman of the Arpad Agricultural Cooperative in Jaszkarajeno.

Member of the MSZMP and of its district party committee in 1968-89. Member of the MSZP since 1989.

Member of the National Assembly and of its Economic Committee in 1985-90 and 1990-94. Chairman of the Hungarian Rural Society.

Gyorgy Keleti (MSZP) Defense Minister

Born 18 May 1946 in Losonc [Lucenec]. Parents: Ferenc Keleti, an official, and Ilona Noszal, the manager of a clothing-industry plant. Married to Erzsebet Petik, a revenue service clerk. Their children are: Andrea, a ballet dancer; Gyorgyi, a model; and Katalin, a student.

Education: Graduated from the Ferenc Toldi Secondary School in 1964; from the Miklos Zrinyi Military Technical College and the Miklos Zrinyi Academy in 1969. Occupation: colonel in the Army reserve, and politician.

Employment: in 1969-70, company commander in the Vac Signal Regiment. In 1970, deputy battalion commander of the Signal Corps Training Center. In 1971-74, secretary of the unit's KISZ [Communist Youth League] committee. Staff member of the Defense Ministry's Youth Department in 1977-79, and of the Military Training Department in 1980-84. Head of a main department in 1989-90.

Member of the MSZP in 1969-89. Member of the MSZP since 1992.

Member of the National Assembly in 1992-94, elected in the by-election in the Kisber election district. Member of the National Assembly's Defense Committee.

Awards: The Hungarian Republic's Silver Cross of Merit, and the Hungarian Republic's Star Adorned With Swords.

Chairman of the board of trustees of the International Janos Bolyai Foundation for Children.

Dr. Pal Vastagh (MSZP) Justice Minister

Born 23 September 1946 in Nagyszenas. Parents: Pal Vastagh and Maria Tomasovszky, retired officials. Married to Erzsebet Fenyvesi, an English-Russian language teacher. Their children are Agnes (born 1967), Pal (1974), and Eniko (1989). Education: graduated in 1965 from the Canning and Meat Industry Secondary Vocational School in Szeged, and from JATE [Attila Jozsef University] Law School in 1971. A candidate of political science and law. Defended his dissertation, on the theory of the state, in Moscow in 1986.

Employment: In 1971-94, with JATE, Szeged. In 1989, with the Csongrad County MSZMP Committee. In 1990, with the county MSZP executive committee.

Was member of the MSZMP, its first secretary in Csongrad County, and member of the Central Committee and Politburo. Member of the MSZP Executive Committee and MSZP National Committee.

Member of the National Assembly in 1990-94, elected on the Bekes County list. Member of the National Assembly's Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Committee.

Laszlo Pal (MSZP) Minister of Industry and Trade

Born 5 September 1942 in Budapest. Parents: Tibor Pal, a retired printer and make-up editor; and Agnes Sved, a retired book agent. Married to an electrical engineer who is a foreign-trade manager. Children: Andras is employed in foreign trade; Katalin is a photographer.

Education: Graduated in 1966 from the Moscow Power Engineering Institute. Obtained a degree in industrial policy in 1982. Occupation: electrical engineer.

Employment: In 1966-69, with the Electric Power Industry Research Institute. In 1969-89, with the OMFB [National Technical Development Commission] and the Ministry of Industry. In 1989-90, state secretary. In 1990, with the Videoton Electronics Enterprise. In 1990, member of the National Assembly.

Member of the MSZMP in 1965-89; of the MSZP since 1989. Member of the MSZP National Executive.

Member of the National Assembly in 1990-94, was elected on the MSZP's national list.

Awards: the 1986 Lorand Eotvos Prize and the 1988 Janos Neumann Prize.

Member of the For Budapest Society's executive committee, and of the IPOSZ [National Federation of Trade Associations] advisory committee.

Dr. Ferenc Baja (MSZP) Minister of Environmental Protection and Urban Development

Born 4 July 1955 in Kecskemet. Parents: father, the late Ferenc Baja was a forestry-regulation inspector and an inventor; mother, a retired schoolteacher. Married to Szilvia Szilagyi, a secondary-school teacher. One child, Mark, was born in 1983.

Education: Graduated from the Karoly Zipernovszky Heavy Current Secondary Vocational School in 1974; from KLTE [Lajos Kossuth University], Debrecen, in 1982, having majored in Hungarian, adult education, and philosophy. Occupation: politician, aesthetician, and gallery director.

Employment: In 1977-82, with KLTE as cultural secretary; in 1982-83, with the Hajdu-Bihar County Enterprise for the Operation of Motion Picture Theaters; in 1982-83, with the Gyorgy Bessenyei Teachers College in Nyiregyhaza; in 1983-90, with the Nyiregyhaza Municipal Council as deputy head of the cultural department and subsequently as the council chairman's general deputy; and in 1990, director of the Nyiregyhaza Municipal Gallery.

Member of the MSZMP in 1987-89; of the MSZP since 1989. Deputy chairman of the MSZP.

Chairman of the Sosto International Art Colony for Medalists and Figurine Artists; trustee of the Hungarian Motion Picture Foundation; and chairman of the Eurocontour Foundation.

Dr. Karoly Lotz (SZDSZ) Minister of Transport, Telecommunications, and Water

Born in Budapest in 1937. Married to an economic analyst. Has three children.

Education: Graduated from the Franciscan Secondary School in Szentendre in 1963, and from Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences.

Employment: From 1963, economic analyst at the Chemicals Wholesale Enterprise, then head of a main department at the Materials Handling and Packaging Institute; from 1970, studied and worked in Great Britain on a United Nations scholarship; from 1975, consultant to UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization]-sponsored projects in Brazil, Mexico and Cuba, and at UNIDO headquarters in Vienna; in 1977-90, taught as temporary lecturer at the University of Economic Sciences; in 1987-90, consultant to certain World Bank-sponsored investment projects in Hungary; from 1985, deputy director for economic affairs at the Technical Development Enterprise. Was elected to the National Assembly as an SZDSZ candidate in 1990 (in Budapest's No. 31 election district, Csepel); member of the National Assembly's Economic Committee, chairman of the Subcommittee for Consumer Protection; the party's spokesman on industry and domestic trade matters; member of the SZDSZ parliamentary group's leadership.

Member of the Council of Europe committees for, respectively, economic development, and science and technology; since 1992, deputy chairman of the committee for economic development. Deputy chairman of the Hungarian Atlantic Council.

Laszlo Kovacs (MSZP) Minister of Foreign Affairs

Born 3 July 1939 in Budapest. Parents: Lajos Kovacs and Maria Fuchs. Married to Maria Eva Toth, head of a travel-agency enterprise's press department. A daughter, Dora, is attending secondary school. Graduated from Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences in 1968, and from the Political Academy in 1980. Occupation: economist.

Employment: In 1957-59, with the Medicolor Factory; in 1962-66, with the Kobanya Pharmaceutical Factory; in 1966-69, staff member of the KISZ Central Committee's International Relations Department, and head of that department in 1971-75. In 1975-76, consultant to the MSZMP Central Committee's International Relations Department; in 1976-83, section chief; and in 1983-86, deputy head of the department. In 1986-89, deputy minister of foreign affairs; in 1989-90, state secretary.

Member of the MSZMP in 1963-89. Member of the MSZP since 1989, party administrator, and member of the party's national executive committee.

Member of the National Assembly in 1990-94. Member of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee, and its chairman since 1993.

Awards: the Gold Medal of the Order of Labor, and the Star of the Hungarian People's Republic.

Member of the Hungarian United Nations Society's executive committee.

Dr. Magda Kovacs Kosa (MSZP) Labor Minister

Born 4 November 1940 in Budapest. Parents: the late Dr. Ferenc Kovacs, a physician; and Terez Kelemen, a retired teacher. Married to Levente Kosa, a mechanical engineer, assistant professor and department head at BME [Budapest Technical University]. Children: Judit (born in 1966) is a journalist; and Eszter (in 1972) is a university student. Education: graduated from Lorand Eotvos University in 1964, having majored, respectively, in the Hungarian and the French language and literature.

Employment: In 1964-72, taught at the Klara Leowey Secondary School, and simultaneously was a member of a team at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute of Literature that was researching Petofi and his period. In 1972-74, deputy principal of the Budapest Secondary School for Workers. In 1974-77, leader of the MLEE [expansion not given] in the 9th District [of Budapest]. In 1977-85, worked for the Teachers Trade Union, eventually as its secretary from 1980-85. In 1985-90, secretary of the SZOT [National Council of Trade Unions]. Member of the National Assembly in 1990-94, elected on the national list. Until 1992, member of the National Assembly's Immunity and Qualifications Committee; in 1992-94, deputy chairman of the Immunity, Qualifications, and Credentials Committee.

Member of the MSZMP in 1967-89; member of the MSZP since 1989.

Member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union's Hungarian-French friendship section, and member of the Political Science Society.

Dr. Gabor Fodor (SZDSZ) Culture and Education Minister

Born 27 September 1962 in Gyongyos. Parents: Arpad Fodor, an attorney; and Klara Revfalvi, retired.

Education: Graduated from Janos Berze Nagy Secondary School, Gyongyos, in 1981, and from ELTE [Lorand Eotvos University] Law School in 1987. Occupation: jurist.

Employment: In 1988-89, teacher at the Bibo Dormitory for Law Students, staff member of the Central European Research Group, assistant and subsequently professor of the history of philosophy, political philosophy, and ethics in ELTE Law School's Philosophy Department.

In 1988-93, one of the founding members of Fidesz [Federation of Young Democrats], its chief spokesman, member of its national executive committee, and shadow education minister. On 3 November 1993, left Fidesz and resigned his parliamentary seat.

Member of the National Assembly in 1990-93, elected on Fidesz's Budapest list. Chairman of the National Assembly's Human Rights, Minority and Religious Affairs Committee; member of the National Security Committee in 1992.

In 1990-93, member of the Council of Europe human rights committee.

Hungarian chairman of the International Save the Children Service.

Pal Kovacs (MSZP) Social Welfare Minister

Born in 1940. Graduated from Pecs Medical University in 1965. Physician. Worked in Dunaujvaros hospital and subsequently as district physician in Adony and Nagyvenyim. From 1985, head of the municipal health department in Dunaujvaros.

Member of the MSZMP, founding member of the Dunaujvaros Reform Alliance. Member of the MSZP.

Member of the National Assembly in 1990-94, belonged to its MSZP group.

Dr. Laszlo Bekesi (MSZP) Finance Minister

Born 31 May 1942 in Gyor. Parents: the late Dr. Laszlo Bekesi, a law graduate employed in the revenue service; and Sarolta Lenkey, a homemaker. One child, Aniko (born in 1971, from his first marriage) is a teacher. He is married to Dr. Judit Csehak, a member of the National Assembly.

Education: Graduated from the Revenue Administration and Accounting College in 1966, and as an economist from the University of Economic Sciences in 1970. A candidate of economic sciences in 1979.

Employment: In 1963-68, head of the Cegled District Council's budget group. In 1968-74, head of the Pest County Council's fiscal department, and the council chairman's general deputy. In 1974-80, deputy chairman of the Budapest Municipal Council. In 1981-85, the MSZMP Budapest Party Committee's secretary for economic policy. In 1985-89, deputy minister and subsequently minister of finance. In 1990-94, a member of the National Assembly in the MSZP parliamentary group; deputy chairman of the National Assembly's Budget, Tax, and Finance Committee; member of the European Communities Committee.

Member of the MSZMP in 1968-89; of the MSZP since 1989.

Awards: The Gold Medal of the Order of Labor in 1970, and the 1980 Gyula Lengyel Commemorative Medal in 1981.

Dr. Bela Katona (MSZP) Minister Without Portfolio

Born in Budapest in 1944. Both parents retired. Married to a commercial agent. One child.

Education: Graduated from Attila Jozsef Secondary School in Budapest. Received mechanical-engineering and engineer-economist diplomas from Budapest Technical University, and a specialized-economist diploma from BKE [Budapest University of Economics]. Gained the degree of doctor of economic sciences in 1984.

Employment: In 1967-85, with the Budapest Light Industry Machine Factory. In 1985-89, with the Budapest 13th District MSZMP Committee. In 1989-90, with the MSZP apparatus. From 1990 on, member of the National Assembly.

Was a member of the MSZMP. After the founding of the MSZP, a member of its national executive committee; and from December 1989 on, chairman of the MSZP's Budapest organization. Held both positions until May 1990. Deputy leader of the MSZP parliamentary group.

National Bank President Bod Pressured To Resign

94CH0339A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 22 Jun 94 pp 1, 6

[Unattributed interview with Hungarian National Bank President Peter Akos Bod; place and date not given: "I See No Reason To Resign"]

[Text] *In response to our report yesterday that, according to certain indications, the idea of pressuring the president of the central bank to resign, and of replacing him with Gyorgy Suranyi, was not so foreign to the parties conducting the coalition talks, Peter Akos Bod gave our paper an interview, in which he emphatically declared that he saw no reason to resign. He reminded us that in late 1991 the National Assembly had enacted the Law on the Hungarian National Bank by a large majority. And the very essence of that law was to make the central bank independent of the government.*

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] Does the rumor have any basis in fact that representatives of the parties forming the future governing coalition have called on you with an offer of an ambassadorial post, in exchange for your resignation as president of the Hungarian National Bank?

[Bod] That rumor is without foundation, and such an offer would make no sense. The National Assembly had enacted the Law on the Hungarian National Bank with a large majority in late 1991. The essence of that law is to make the Hungarian National Bank independent of the government. The guarantees of independence are that the government cannot give the central bank orders on matters pertaining to monetary policy, and the commission of the bank's president is not affected by changes of government. Here I have before me my letter of appointment, which reads: "Effective 9 December 1991, I hereby appoint Dr. Peter Akos Bod to a six-year term of office as president of the Hungarian National Bank. (Signed) Arpad Goncz."

I see no reason to resign. And it could hardly be in the future governing coalition's interest to appear greedy or disrespectful of the European idea of central-bank independence.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] What is the usual way of solving such situations in other European countries? Lately, governments of entirely different persuasion have come to power in several countries. Have also the top positions at the central banks changed with these governments?

[Bod] In most countries of Western Europe it often happens that the central bank presidents appointed to longer terms of office cohabit with governments of different political orientations. Where the central bank is also legally independent of the government, it is inconceivable that the government would pressure the central bank's president to resign. Poland is an interesting example. There a woman was appointed president of the central bank at the end of 1991. Then a coalition led by excommunists came to power. My Polish colleague is still working and attending cabinet meetings. After a leftist election victory in Greece, on the other hand, the president of the national bank resigned under pressure. But in the same wave of dismissals, the victorious party replaced also the chief executive of the national airline, the directors of the large state-owned firms, the police commissioner, and the incumbents in other important posts. As can be seen, there are several types of solutions in the world, depending on political culture and traditions.

Minister on Privatization, 'Strategy,' Future

WS1407104594 Poznan WPROST in Polish 17 Jul 94 pp 13-14

[Interview with Minister of Privatization Wieslaw Kaczmarek by Jerzy Slawomir Mac; place and date not given: "Quadrangular Arrangement"]

[Text] [Mac] You have made a decision on the privatization of cigarette plants. Meanwhile, there is a draft law waiting in the Sejm regarding the state's tobacco monopoly, which was prepared by a group of Sejm deputies of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. Their leader, Bogdan Pek, has announced that he will not give up on the idea, and he has been openly critical of your decision. Do you not think that your April statement was premature, I mean the one in which you said that, as for privatization, the coalition has already managed to "eliminate differences of views," whereas you are enjoying the confidence of the chairman of the Sejm Ownership Transformations Commission [Pek]?

[Kaczmarek] It would be hard for me to get involved in a debate with my colleague from parliament, who uses only generalities and arguments that could be described as patriotic/nationalistic rather than economic. When it comes to economic arguments, they speak unanimously against state monopolies. There are two groups of countries in Europe: those with state tobacco monopolies and those with free markets. France is in the first group and Great Britain in the other. In both cases, about 90 billion cigarettes are sold every year, which is slightly less than in Poland. In Great Britain, the state makes about $140 on the sale of 1,000 cigarettes, whereas, in France, that figure is approximately $70, or half the amount in Britain. There you see the cost of state monopoly.

Sejm Deputy Pek sees himself as a spokesman for the 70,000 tobacco growers in the country. I have spoken to them, too, and I know that only small-scale growers from the Malopolska region are opposed to having the tobacco sector privatized. Those growers have plantations that are smaller than the national average of 40 acres. The position taken by those who have larger fields is different; they can see a need for "running forward," which foreign capital guarantees. In addition, "Strategy for Poland," being a governmental document, does not foster the monopoly tradition. On the contrary, it is based on the concept of market economy.

[Mac] You are opposed to state monopolies, but the monopolistic trends displayed by the agricultural/food lobbying groups are very strong. You succumbed to their pressure when it came to sugar, and now we have Sejm deputies for PSL coming up with another idea, that of an alcohol monopoly. Your coalition partner has been taking increasingly more territory away from you.

[Kaczmarek] I do not think I lost on the sugar issue. After all, the holding companies are a success of some kind.

[Mac] They are the result of a far-reaching compromise. True, no countrywide structure has been formed, which sugar lobbying groups from the PSL demanded, but it is the agriculture minister who will be supervising the holding companies, and the companies will be able to dictate prices, which is not quite in accordance with the rules of a market economy.

[Kaczmarek] That is true. But we must finally get down to identifying those areas for which one is responsible. Sugar is a case in point. The Agriculture Ministry should be dealing with regulating the market, which is very unstable indeed. Regardless of whether we have good or bad crops, we always have disaster situations. Now, the ownership structure of the enterprises in that sector is a secondary issue. Such regulations were included in the sugar legislation thanks to the Ownership Transformations Ministry [MPW], which had initiated the law. We disagreed with the idea of lumping all sugar plants together, so the final outcome was to adopt the concept of regional holding companies, which, to some extent, are modeled after coal partnerships. I am not completely happy with that because there is a danger that the holding companies may perpetuate negative phenomena, just as is happening in the mining industry. Still, I do hope that the troublemaking elements will be deprived of influence.

It is quite a different story with the alcohol monopoly. Currently, four ministries deal with alcohol issues. The Industry and Trade Ministry issues trade permits, the Foreign Economic Cooperation Ministry determines import quotas, the Finance Ministry determines prices, and the Agriculture Ministry issues production permits. If the new structure is to free the ministers from all of these decisions by having the permit policies concentrated in just one office, be my guest. I can accept such a monopoly, provided that equal chances are given to everyone. I will, however, definitely oppose ideas under which only state-owned enterprises would be entitled to receive production permits.

[Mac] Does the need for continuous negotiations not imply a slowing down of the privatization processes?

[Kaczmarek] There is such a danger, but caution has its good aspects as well. The past eight months did not result in any privatization affairs, with or without quotation marks. By the way, I am not sure, but that in itself could be a problem for somebody.

[Mac] You must admit, however, that your predecessor was faster. Over the first six months, you succeeded in selling 16 firms, whereas Janusz Lewandowski sold 23 over the same period of time.

[Kaczmarek] But look at the financial results. The State Treasury gained 1.7 trillion zlotys [Z] from the 23 firms you mentioned, whereas the profit from "my" 16 firms amounted to Z3 trillion.

[Mac] But providing the state budget with revenue cannot be the only goal of privatization. You are assuming the finance minister's functions.

[Kaczmarek] That thought never even crossed my mind.

[Mac] You must admit, however, that at times you tend to deal with issues that are not really in your area of responsibility. Last Thursday, you presented a report in the Sejm on the government's behalf concerning the dispute in the Lucchini-Warsaw steelworks. You were not the one who was in charge of leading up to this "marriage," while the MPW does not even have its own representatives on the partnership's governing board.

[Kaczmarek] I regard the prime minister's decision to charge me with that difficult task as a sign of his confidence in me, even though I think it is the industry minister who should be dealing with the conflict.

[Mac] You are bypassed on other issues that are in your area of responsibility. Let us cite the example of excluding the Cegielski Plant [HCP] from the Popular Privatization Program. You used to hold a grudge over that against the prime minister and Minister Marek Pol.

[Kaczmarek] The prime minister is my boss, and he can make a decision on any issue. Those are the rules of the game. It is quite another issue that I think I should have found out about the HCP's appeal to the prime minister earlier, and in a different manner. The prime minister could have asked me about my views on this. It is a bad thing that I was informed by mail. I could raise a small grievance over that.

[Mac] The new finance minister enjoys enormous confidence on the prime minister's part, and he is striving to establish a grand ministry of the economy in which there may be no room for Democratic Left Alliance "liberals." Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko thought it necessary to get rid of [former Deputy Finance Minister] Wojciech Misiag, but he has nothing against Deputy Minister Ryszard Pazura, who comes from the PSL.

[Kaczmarek] I repeat: I refuse to comment on what is going on in the other ministries, and I am even more reluctant to answer questions that should really be addressed to Aleksander Kwasniewski. Now, when it comes to the economic center, I think Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko's intention included in the "Strategy" program is the following: The Finance Ministry is regarded as a ministry of the budget, taxes, and public debt; a treasury ministry, which would have the MPW as its basis, plus the MPW would be changing its function from a privatization agency and a seller to a manager and an owner of the national wealth, an economy ministry, with the Industry and Trade Ministry as its basis, and, finally, what I would call a ministry of international integration. That is exactly my understanding of the "superministry." It should be a quadrangular arrangement, supplemented by the National Bank of Poland.

[Mac] Still, as to which main center of the current arrangement is to be the future structures' cementing factor, that is debatable. Jan Olszewski's government also came up with the idea of establishing an economy ministry, but under that concept, it was the Central Planning Administration [CUP] that had the upper hand, whereas your plan does not include CUP. Right now, the Finance Ministry is the only one pursuing the goal with ironclad persistence...

[Kaczmarek] I value [Deputy] Prime Minister Kolodko very much for that.

[Mac] ...And what about personnel changes in the other ministries, including yours? Are they motivated by the need to implement the "Strategy for Poland" program? You seemed to get along fine with Deputy Minister Jerzy Drygalski for over six months, and now, all of a sudden, he has become a problem for you?

[Kaczmarek] I do not complain about cooperation with Deputy Minister Drygalski. We said good-bye to each other without being in an argument about anything. We also had been aware that this had to happen at some point. What can I say? Other political orientations prevailed, and that is a natural process. I am prepared for a situation where, if the political configuration changes again, my associates and I will be affected by the same thing.

[Mac] As for the current MPW, at what stage is it in the process of transformation, from being the "privatization man" to being the State Treasury's manager?

[Kaczmarek] I would say we have three-fourths of the road toward the goal behind us.

[Mac] Are you counting from September 1989 or September 1993?

[Kaczmarek] I would like for this to be counted from April 1994, which is when Prime Minister Pawlak made his decision on the commercialization of state-owned enterprises. We elaborated on that by adding the principles of managing the state-owned wealth, whereas Kolodko supplemented all of this with his slogan of an institutionalization of the State Treasury.

Entrepreneurs Comment on 'Strategy' Program

WS1307123694 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 13 Jul 94 p 13

[Article by Waldemar Kumor: "'Strategy' Under Fire"]

[Text] Economists, businesspeople, and politicians evaluating the government's economic program entitled "Strategy for Poland" are in agreement on just one thing: It is a good thing that a document of this type was written at all. A majority of them, however, think that "Strategy" is more akin to a political manifesto than a thorough economic analysis. It is written in such general terms than it can satisfy trade union activists and employers at the same time.

Economists who are members of the Council of Ministers' Economic Strategy Council met for a second time yesterday. The council is chaired by Professor Jan Mujzel. Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko, who is the main author of "Strategy," did not succeed in inviting famous figures to sit on the council (for instance, Leszek Balcerowicz, Janusz Beksiak, Witold Trzeciakowski, and Marek Dabrowski).

"Strategy" was yesterday being evaluated by economists from the Adam Smith Center, as well as by groups of businessmen from the following organizations who were invited by them: The Entrepreneurs Convention, Business Centre Club [preceding three words in English], the Polish Business Council, and the Confederation of Polish Employers.

You do not argue with a mathematician who uses, instead of specific figures, terms such as "a lot" or "the least possible," said Jeremi Mordasewicz of the Business Centre Club. It is a strictly political document.

"It makes my hair stand on end when I read in 'Strategy' about the idea of introducing employee councils in privately owned companies," said Danuta Piontek of the Entrepreneurs Convention. "There should be a very clear provision in there regarding respect for private property."

Still, despite the criticism addressed at "Strategy," all major organizations of entrepreneurs support the government's program. Businesspeople explain it this way: We will cooperate with any government and any finance minister.

Mieczyslaw Wilczek, a former industry minister in Rakowski's government and currently a private entrepreneur, says: "It is a good thing that a document such as this was written. Some say it is too optimistic. Well, it would be hard to expect it to be pessimistic."

According to Wilczek, the government should first of all resolve the issue of the "Bolshevik trade unions": "We are their hostages," Wilczek complained.

He also joked that he will not be worried if a press report appears saying that "after yet another hunger strike, a few of the striking workers will die." "In Poland, currently, strikes look like this: A few strong guys get together and get a suntan," Wilczek said.

Meanwhile, economists are bothered first of all by the government's centralist tendencies. Even Professor Jan Mujzel, chairman of the government's Economic Strategy Council, admitted: "Too much attention was devoted in 'Strategy' to predicted measures by the state administration and not enough said about human entrepreneurship."

"'Strategy' is deficient because of too many righteous objectives—decreasing inflation, decreasing unemployment, decreasing the foreign debt, increasing wages and retirement pensions," says Professor Jerzy Eysymontt, a Sejm deputy for the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms.

Professor Adam Lipowski of the Polish Academy of Sciences' Institute of Economics and former Privatization Minister Janusz Lewandowski fear for the fate of privatization. In their view, the government is stressing the idea of commercialization of enterprises too much. That was useful a few years back. "One can imagine that the old *nomenklatura* will fill posts on the governing boards of these firms, and it will not be interested in privatization," Prof. Lipowski said.

Lewandowski warned: "The government is distorting the idea of privatization. It is being talked about only as a potential source of revenue for the state budget." Professor Jan Winiecki added: "Some processes in the economy are taking place on their own, and we do not need any 'Strategy' thing for that. But the political pressure applied on this government by potential voters makes the government want to manage the economy in a centralist way."

Defense Issues in Constitutional Drafts Viewed

WS1307070094 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 11 Jul 94 p 3

[Article by Jan Forowicz under the "Views, Positions, Opinions" rubric: "Stressing Defense Needs; Seven Constitutional Drafts"]

[Text] All seven constitutional drafts that have been made public contain provisions pertaining to defense issues and the way supervision over the Armed Forces should be exercised. Every draft stresses not just the Army's defense function, but also the role of military structures in a democratic political system.

Style and Content

Different phrases are used in the drafts, but the contents often remain the same. Authors of the various drafts, coming from the left wing (a product of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]), the Belweder, and the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN], never turn the country's security into a bargaining chip. Let us take, for instance, the issue of the constitutional obligation of citizens to defend the motherland. In the Solidarity draft, the duty to defend the Polish Republic is among the most important tasks citizens have to perform. The draft also stresses the mandatory nature of serving in the Armed Forces. The Belweder in turn writes: Every citizen is under an obligation to participate in the defense of the Republic of Poland. The draft coming from the Freedom Union [UW] is in a similar tone. UW writes: Defense of the Polish Republic is a duty of every citizen. And then they go on to say that military service is mandatory.

The authors of the KPN draft used a different style: All citizens are under an obligation to actively participate in

defending the Polish Republic in a way that is a consequence of a statute of parliament or of a sudden need. The authorities representing the Polish Republic's common interest have a right to summon anybody to defend the motherland, the KPN emphasizes. The draft coming from the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and the Union of Labor [UP] approaches the issue in a more laconic manner: Defense of the Polish Republic is a duty of every citizen. Peasant activists immediately add: Whoever cannot perform military service for reasons of conscience can be summoned to perform substitution service.

The Armed Forces' Task

The SLD draft defines those tasks the following way: The Armed Forces guard the Polish nation's sovereignty and independence, as well as the state's security and peace. Then the draft adds: The Armed Forces are politically neutral.

The KPN proposes that the new constitution contain a provision saying that the Armed Forces are an organ of the Republic of Poland that remain under the supervision of the Sejm and that they guard the Republic of Poland's security and sovereign rights. KPN members deprive soldiers of their electoral rights for the duration of their service, and they also forbid them to be members of political parties or trade unions. They also subject soldiers to the jurisdiction of military courts and courts of honor. So as to compensate for this kind of deprivation of full rights to participate in public life, those citizens who are in the Armed Forces could avail themselves of "honorary privileges." KPN members want the details to be included in a so-called basic law.

Supervisory Powers

Differences between and among the drafts begin to emerge once we get into the issues of the powers of supreme authorities vis-a-vis military structures.

The PSL/UP, Solidarity, and Belweder drafts designate the president as the commander in chief of the Armed Forces, without providing any further details, while the UW writes: The president is commander in chief of the Armed Forces, and then it says: The president exercises his supervision through the government and the national defense minister. The SLD draft approaches the issue in even broader terms than that: The president is the supreme commander in chief of the Polish Republic's Armed Forces. During peacetime, he exercises supervision through the national defense minister and the chief of the General Staff [SG WP]. During times of war, the president appoints and recalls the main commander. So only the KPN makes it clear in its draft that it wants the country's president to be the Armed Forces' commander in chief at all times.

An extraparliamentary organ charged with security issues also appears in the constitutional drafts. The authors of the draft coming from Solidarity say that the president is the head of a Defense Council of the Polish Republic, whose powers and mode of proceedings would be defined by an act of parliament. The Belweder uses a different name in its draft: The president is the head of the Defense Committee of the Republic of Poland.

Who Will Be Over the SG WP Chief?

The drafts unanimously charge the president with appointing and dismissing the SG WP chief, but Solidarity wants the president to do so on a motion by the prime minister, who would consult the defense minister before filing such a motion. During times of war, the president would make the SG WP chief the head commander, and, at the same time, he would become his direct supervisor. The Belweder suggests that the president be empowered to appoint and dismiss deputies to the SG WP chief, as well as commanders of the branches of the Armed Forces and of military districts, on a motion by the defense minister and after a consultations with the SG WP chief. The UW clearly strengthens the position of the national defense minister in its draft. The president, in consultation with the national defense minister, appoints and dismisses the SG WP chief, while he does the same with regard to deputy SG WP chiefs, commanders of the branches of Armed Forces, and district commanders, on a motion by the defense minister.

The SLD speaks about appointment and dismissal of the SG WP chief by saying that candidacies would be proposed by the prime minister to the president. On a motion by the national defense minister, the president would appoint and dismiss deputy SG WP chiefs, as well as commanders of the kinds of Armed Forces and district commanders. For wartime, the president would appoint and dismiss the chief commander. Details concerning supervision in peacetime, as well as principles for cooperation with the defense minister and the SG WP chief, would be determined by an "organic statute," which, the SLD stresses, would mean a "stronger" statute than normal.

KPN Members—The Most Radical

Also on the issue of appointments, the KPN uses quite a different style. The party says that appointing and dismissing the chief commander of the Armed Forces (for wartime) and a general inspector of the Armed Forces (for peacetime) is the president's personal prerogative. According to the party, it is precisely the president who should determine the Armed Forces' internal organization, by issuing appropriate decrees. Still, there is a limitation imposed on the president's freedom to make decisions: In his decree, the head of state would have to define a way for the document to be countersigned (which means validating a legal act through the signature of another high-ranking official).

Furthermore, the president would decide about the use of the Armed Forces to defend the country. During peacetime, he would perform supervision over the Armed Forces through the national defense minister,

while, during wartime or threat of war, he would do the same through the Armed Forces' chief commander. KPN members emphasize that the main inspector of the Armed Forces [sentence incomplete as published]

SLD Chairman Kwasniewski Interviewed

MM1407093794 Opole NOWA TRYBUNA OPOLSKA in Polish 7 Jul 94 p 6

[Interview with Aleksander Kwasniewski, Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] chairman, by correspondent Ryszard Dzieszynski; place and date not given]

[Text] [Dzieszynski] Is the campaign preceding the approaching local self-government elections an introduction to your own presidential campaign?

[Kwasniewski] I believe that there is no point in talking about the presidential campaign at this time. It is true that Lech Walesa has already indicated his intention to run for president, but this may be because, as one story says, during the move from the Belweder to the Namiestnikowski Palace, a copy of his old presidential program was found somewhere in the back of a safe or at the bottom of a desk drawer, and anyone who has had a good look at it will realize that Walesa's original program could not possibly be implemented in just five years. At least 10 would be needed. So it is obvious that Walesa should remain president for another five years. At the moment, Walesa is looking everywhere for new people to vote for him. We, on the other hand, still have lots of time before we decide to start a presidential campaign. The SLD has not yet made a decision in this matter, and I have not done so, either, although I know that I top the ratings and am aware that I owe this to our electorate. So, if you need an answer to give to opinion pollsters on this matter, you can quote what I have said just now....

[Dzieszynski] What is your constituency? At the SLD's campaign meetings, gray-haired audiences prevailed. What will happen to them in several years' time?

[Kwasniewski] Well, yes, thank you for your concern. I understand that you wish them all to live to be 100, and we accept your wishes with hope, faith, and...love. However, let us cite a certain well-known politician with whom I met after the 1991 parliamentary election. I said to him, "Thank you, Mr. President, for speaking so firmly against us just two days before the election. This brought us an additional 1-2 percent of votes." His reply was: "I predicted that—your 10 percent—but your electorate will eventually just die out." In September 1993, we met again following the next parliamentary election, and so I asked him: "Well? Not only have our voters not died out, but also their number has actually doubled." "I predicted this," was his answer, "that's right. You have twice as many voters now." But, to look at it more seriously, analysis of the voting pattern indicates that we now have decidedly more votes from young people and women, which is a result that makes me very happy. After all, you cannot realistically assume that you have gained 2 million votes from just one age group. And, as regards the older segment of the electorate, the distribution of sympathies is quite even within it. Analysis of the previous parliamentary election shows that the Alliance "Fatherland" [Porozumienie "Ojczyzna"] received the largest proportion of votes in that age group. The SLD took only third place with them. In any case, all of these figures are just estimates as long as the voting is secret and as long as the voters are not required to declare their age in a special box on the ballot. But it is a fact that we are attracting more young supporters now. We can definitely see an appreciable increase in their numbers. They are visible in many different forms of activities carried out in support of our party. A young members' group is active within the SLD. So what if few young people come to our meetings? That is a general phenomenon that is not restricted to the SLD. While it is true that few young people come to our meetings, on the whole these meetings are still quite well attended. Elsewhere, the situation is quite the opposite: Few young people come to meetings, just as few people of any age come to them on the whole. We have a program that appeals to the younger people, just as its presentation appeals to them. We are not a group of pompous leaders, politicians who preach sermons. Nor do we believe we are perfect. We practice a healthy humility toward our voters, and we do not indulge in "megalomummy" [reference to Democratic Union's nickname, "Democratic Mummy"] attitudes.

[Dzieszynski] Why did the SLD assume responsibility for the economic sectors in Waldemar Pawlak's Cabinet even though everyone knows that they promise exceedingly hard work that does not bring quick success?

[Kwasniewski] Let me answer this question with another story. After Mikhail Gorbachev curbed alcohol sales in the Soviet Union, two elderly Russians meet and strike up a conversation. "That Gorbachev, he must have taken leave of his senses with the vodka ban," the first one says. "Well, I would not worry," the other man replies, "after all, we have already drunk our fill, have we not?" But the first man holds his ground: "Well, yes, we may have, but I feel so sorry for the young ones...." And so, seriously speaking, the side that wins the election cannot avoid taking responsibility for the affairs of the state. After all, we did not take part in it as if it was some kind of parlor game. When we won the election, we strove to set up a majority coalition, which I believe is a very wise solution. We assumed responsibility for the economy as well as social welfare affairs because these areas require urgent solutions; besides, we believe that we have the right people, who can produce such solutions because they are experts in these fields.

[Dzieszynski] Opinions have been voiced in left-wing circles that the SLD leadership fails to make proper use of the intellectual potential of its electorate....

[Kwasniewski] I believe that the potential you mention should be tapped to its maximum capability. It is time to revise the old saying that claimed that it is not your high school grades that will make you a success but your

sincere intentions and your aspirations alone. The time has come when we must concede that it is no longer our sincere intentions or our high school grades that will ensure our success. Certainly, the importance of education and the pursuit of knowledge are often marginalized today. But how are we to convince a boy in the fifth grade of primary school that he has no chances of becoming president unless he finishes high school and college? The tensions created by the free market and the shift toward business pursuits in our compatriots' interest have caused a situation in which the ethos of striving for knowledge and education has become eroded. The resulting gap in knowledge and education cannot be filled with advice from consultancy experts or with the creation of successive scientific councils. This creates a partly fictitious situation, although those experts and specialists certainly have an important role to play—to a certain extent. However, it is undoubtedly most important to ensure that all those who can contribute to the development of modern, progressive, and inventive economic ideas are involved in running the state's economic and political systems. We are extending a helping hand to all those who would like to join in the task and help us formulate and realize our programs. However, there are often situations in which the other side must show initiative, too. We want to create a strong intellectual background to the economic system. I believe that the end of the century brings us more questions than answers. The answers are hard to find in a single system of ideological and political values. We witness a kind of eclecticism in the realm of values nowadays, and, in fact, every intellectual proposal must draw on a variety of sources: Christian, non-Christian, socialist, and liberal. It is only then that we can aspire to producing answers to the questions posed by the end of our century.

[Dzieszynski] During the election campaigns, as well as later, circles close to the SLD claimed that the public is insufficiently informed about your activities....

[Kwasniewski] We are all interested in seeing freedom of expression and information flourish in Poland. This has, to a certain extent, been possible to achieve as far as the press is concerned. After a certain amount of experimenting, everyone now knows which paper stands more to the left and which more to the right. Actually, because there are precious few papers of the left-wing persuasion, the choice is really between which paper stands less and which more to the right. Thanks to the emergence of very strong competition from such private radio stations as the RMF or Radio ZET, as well as other, local radio stations, we now have a situation of real pluralism in the realm of radio broadcasting. Consequently, we now have a more multidimensional presentation of the picture of our public life and can count on receiving better information all around. On the other hand, it is certainly true that there is a problem with the public television service, created by the absence of competition and the tremendous "impact potential" enjoyed by that medium. I really do not insist that television offer me, as a politician, extended screen time in its programs. I can manage the publicity very well by myself. The same goes for my political party. On the other hand, I do insist that television present a true picture of the configuration of political views in our society, whose members do, after all, pay their license fees. We cannot have a situation where 2 million people who vote for the SLD and pay their TV license fees do not receive any information about what is happening within the SLD because the public television company has no interest in it. On the other hand, a group of less than 5 percent of the electorate who voted for an insignificant party that lost the election receives regular information about its favored party in broadcasts that are put out daily, or even sometimes twice a day. And we are not interested in getting brief "slots" with information about our party put out as stopgaps so the TV directors can later say to us: "What are you complaining about? We did give information about you. We told the viewers what you were doing, how you recently voted in the Sejm, and so on." The problem really does not lie here. It is the duty of a public television service to take into account the interests of the voters, audiences, viewers, and license payers, according to how they all placed their votes. There must be precise and clear information about the SLD, the Polish Peasant Party, the Union of Freedom, the Union of Labor, and other political groups. On the other hand, it is not television's brief to lick the wounds of those political groups that lose in elections. Nevertheless, we still think that something good can come out of every wrong. If I am seen on television only very rarely, my voters begin to wonder whether Kwasniewski is still alive, whether perhaps he is on a weight-watching diet and not doing very well with it—and then they are more inclined to turn out in large numbers at our meetings so they can take a look at me for themselves. I am, of course, joking here, but I believe that our public television service has a considerable obligation to society, and I expect that the Polish Television Board of Directors and the Polish Television Programming Council will analyze the problem from the angle I have indicated here. Rather than wonder how to meet politicians' expectations, they should see to it that they discharge their obligations to us—the viewers who duly pay their television license fees.

ΩEffect of German Drug Law on Poland

94P20936A

[Editorial Report] The weekly of the Polish Bar Association has published a discussion of the implications for Polish counternarcotics efforts of a ruling by Germany's highest court that reduces the chances that anyone in Germany will be prosecuted for personal use of narcotics. In the 4 June issue of PRAWO I ZYCIE, journalist Joanna Anczura noted that Polish authorities and drug counselors fear that liberalization of narcotics-law enforcement in Germany could contribute to increased access to and the use of drugs in Poland.

Anczura reported that the April decision by the German Federal Constitutional Court, while not officially legalizing drug usage, does permit prosecutors to refrain from prosecuting those found in possession of "soft drugs," in cases that do not involve "large amounts" and in which "the interests of a third party are not threatened." In addition, in determining whether to prosecute, in each individual case "the personality of the perpetrator," the perpetrator's willingness to participate in therapy, and the likely threat posed to society by the perpetrator are to be taken into account. Anczura contended that the court's decision amounted to a de facto legalization of "soft drugs," further complicated by the fact that German law does not define the distinction between "soft drugs" and "hard drugs."

The definition of what constitutes a "large amount" of narcotics is another problem, Anczura wrote. Currently, the distinction is made independently by each of the German federal states (laender), and definitions vary significantly from one state to another. North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, recently published instructions for prosecutors that allow possession of "up to 10 grams of hashish or marijuana and up to .5 grams of heroin, amphetamines, or cocaine." In Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, possession of as much as 30 grams of hashish, 5 grams of cocaine, and 1 gram of heroin have gone unpunished since 1993 and 1992, respectively. While the federal court ruling included a requirement that the federal states coordinate their definitions of large and small amounts, Anczura noted that the recent trend has been an increasingly lenient interpretation of the cutoff between large and small amounts.

She warned that Poland will have to monitor developments in Germany carefully because greater availability of drugs in that country could spill over the Polish-German border. She quoted Marek Kotanski, who runs a network of drug treatment centers, as predicting that German liberalization of drug-law enforcement will have "tragic consequences" for Polish young people because "high-quality narcotics" are likely to become "an easily obtainable commodity." And Jerzy Kirzynski, press spokesman for the office of the national Chief of Police, told her that Polish authorities indeed expect increases in both the availability of marijuana and hashish in Poland and the use of Polish territory for smuggling activities. Kirzynski warned, however, that "any courier caught on Polish territory will be viewed as a criminal and will be punished according to Polish law."

Council Reaffirms Non-Proliferation Commitment

AU1307161194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] Today a meeting of the country's Supreme Defense Council took place under the chairmanship of President Ion Iliescu.

As the first issue on the agenda, they examined and sanctioned the reports of the National Defense Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and the Romanian Intelligence Service regarding the fulfillment of the 1993 equipment plan, as well as prospects for 1994.

They found that the 1993 activities in the field of equipment were intended to cover the urgent needs for equipment and the maintaining of the minimal production capacities in the defense industry. The council appreciates that the allotted funds were directed with priority to the important sectors in the domain of defense, public order, and national security.

For the year of 1994 the council sanctioned the goals established by the restructured equipment plans in compliance with the funds allotted from the budget. Taking into consideration that not all needs could be wholly covered, the council recommended that—as soon as additional financial resources are found—the Romanian Government should examine the possibility of augmenting the funds allotted from the budget for 1994.

In the same context they sanctioned the program of equipping the law-enforcement troops of the Ministry of Interior over 1994-1996 and the orientations until the year 2000. The program stipulates the ensuring of the principal categories of military technology, equipment, and specific devices, as well as the replacement of worn-out and outdated ones, in concordance with the attributions, tasks, and the missions of that institution.

During the meeting they also examined the stage reached in the implementation of the decision of the 14 December 1993 meeting of the Supreme Defense Council, regarding the restructuring of the defense industry. They emphasized that upon the recommendation of the council, the Romanian Government, by Decision 75 of 28 February 1994, set up the Government Commission for the Restructuring of the Defense Industry, which until now has established the principles of the restructuring and has elaborated the draft law on the protection of the patrimony and personnel of the defense industry, which is to be forwarded to the Romanian Parliament. The main objectives of the draft bill is the ensuring of the integrity of the necessary patrimony in the defense industry and the social protection of the specialized personnel working in it. They decided that at the next meeting of the Supreme Defense Council the Government Commission should present for approval the final program of the restructuring of the defense industry, which should also take into consideration the agreements reached on 27 June 1994 by representatives of the government and the leaders of the trade unions in the defense industry.

The council emphasized that the restructuring of the defense industry should also result in the setting up of certain functional structures able to ensure the unitary coordination of research, the assimilation of products, and the delivery of weaponry and military equipment products, taking into consideration the needs of the national defense system, as well as the specific circumstances of the process of Romania's integration within European and Euro- Atlantic bodies.

They approved the proposals made by the national Defense Ministry on the development and modernizing of the system of informing and warning the population, as well as of the shelters for the protection of the civilian population when required.

The Supreme Defense Council examined the stage reached in the elaboration of the individual program of partnership between Romania and NATO for the year 1994, pointing out that on 7 and 8 July, at NATO headquarters, a Romanian delegation negotiated the final form of the document. The individual partnership program is based on NATO documents establishing the unitary conception, the objectives, and the forms of the Partnership for Peace, as well as on the presentation document handed in by Romania on 28 April 1994. The individual partnership program, in its final form, is to be submitted for sanctioning to the Supreme Defense Council and the NATO Permanent Council. Each year, on the basis of mutual agreement, the partnership program between Romania and NATO will be re-examined and updated.

On the basis of a briefing presented by the state minister and foreign affairs minister, the council approved the proposals on Romania's participation in peacekeeping missions within the framework of international bodies—the United Nations, the NATO, the CSCE, and the West European Union. The council reasserted Romania's readiness to participate with military troops both in peace-keeping missions—observing the principle of non-participation on the territory of neighboring countries—and in other international humanitarian actions to eliminate the consequences of natural catastrophes.

Taking note of the current situation and agreeing with the measures taken regarding the research and production of certain toxic combat substances, as presented by the national defense minister [Gheorghe Tinca], the Supreme Defense Council reasserted the declaration that the Romanian state does not possess, does not produce, and will not acquire, in any way, nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological weapons and cooperates on international plane for the non-proliferation of such mass destruction weapons and of their delivery systems.

In the conclusion of the meeting the council examined other current issues in concordance with its competence

as stipulated by law, says a communique sent to us via fax from Romania's presidency.

Melescanu, FRG's Kinkel Sum Up Security Talks

AU1307164494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] As part of the visit that he is paying to Romania today, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel held a meeting at noon with Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu. The agenda of the meeting included the process of Romania's integration in European structures as well as international issues, such as the implementation of the plan for stability and security in Europe, the support granted by Germany to regional roundtables that are going to take place and its involvement as moderator in those events, the Partnership for Peace and its role within the North Atlantic Alliance, and relations with the CSCE, the United Nations, and the future World Trade Organization.

Here are the statements made by the foreign ministers of Germany and of Romania, Klaus Kinkel and Teodor Melescanu, after the meeting that they held at the headquarters of the Romanian Foreign Ministry:

[Begin Kinkel recording in German with superimposed Romanian translation] This is my first visit to Romania in my capacity as foreign minister. This country is important for us from a bilateral viewpoint, and in my capacity as president of the European Union, it is certainly interesting to see how Romania can be integrated into this union. Through the association accord that has been signed, one can say that Romania is in the entrance hall of the union. We will do all we can to assist Romania to integration as we help the other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

We have proposed that at the first meeting of the council, which will be held on 18-19 July in Brussels, we will hold an initial orientation talk to see what road these countries should further travel along. We also agreed on this at the Council of Europe meeting in Essen—I am talking about the European Council within our presidency—thus within the presidency, we should evaluate the possibility of achieving a final result for this integration, according to the vision of European Union. We also wish to have the opportunity to meet more often with these countries in Brussels and Luxembourg when we are talking about political issues of common interest.

The other point, certainly important for Romania, is eventually to become a member of NATO with full rights. Romania was the first country to join the Partnership for Peace and it is member of the NATO Cooperation Council and of the CSCE, so it is quite close to this prospect.

I have worked for our common interests in the political, security, and economic area in order to avoid creating new gaps now between us and Russia and in order to attract that country to this new European structure. In the area of economy, Russia has signed a cooperation accord with the European Union, while, as far as the security architecture of the European Union is concerned, Russia has also signed the Partnership for Peace with NATO. It is also in the interest of the Central and Eastern European countries, and thus of Romania too, that Russia should be attracted to this European architecture in order to avoid creating new gaps, as I have already said before.

The last idea is that Romania can rely on Germany's bilateral and multilateral support, but, this is within the framework of mutual assistance. [end recording)

[Begin Melescanu recording] It was an extremely rapid and extremely concrete discussion, as is Minister Kinkel's style. Thus, it was a very direct discussion that included the issues that we each raised and immediate reactions to those issues. Our major interest, and here I have received a very clear message, was Germany's support for Romania's integration into European structures, in its quality as president of the European Union, and Germany's support for the economic, political, and social developments and transformations in Romania.

We have received a very favorable but extremely categorical reaction from Minister Kinkel, with the very clear meaning that the very great efforts ahead continually rest with Romania.

We also discussed—again very rapidly—some international issues of mutual interest such as stability and security in Europe, application of the stability plan, and Germany's support for regional roundtables that are going to take place and its involvement as moderator in those events. We also discussed issues connected with NATO and Partnership for Peace, the importance of this initiative for the gradual and nondiscriminatory progress of all countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states toward NATO. Finally, in general terms, we talked about the CSCE and about our cooperation within the United Nations and within the future World Trade Organization, whose headquarters we hope will be in Bonn. (end recording.)

Vacaroiu Tells Kinkel of Need for Investors

AU1307184894 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] Romania's Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu met today with Mr. Klaus Kinkel, federal minister of foreign affairs and vice chancellor of Germany. Emphasizing the particular importance of this visit for the course of bilateral relations, Premier Vacaroiu indicated that Romania has an acute need of foreign investors, among them German investors enjoying great confidence. The prime minister also mentioned that, mainly in industry, Romanian-German cooperation could be very profitable owing to long-standing traditions.

Another issue of great importance raised by the Romanian premier was the need to include Romania in European Union's program of financing certain infrastructure works.

In turn, the guest emphasized that, from an economic point of view, the situation in Romania is considered in Germany as positive. Mr. Kinkel stressed that one of the reasons for his visit to Romania is to identify ways in which Germany and the European Union can grant more efficient assistance to Romania. He also assessed that the economic representation that Germany will open in Bucharest is aimed at promoting Romanian-German business relations with greater efficiency. Similarly, the German foreign minister said that Germany grants all possible support to the process of Romania's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

Also today the German foreign minister was received by Mr. Ion Iliescu at Cotroceni Palace.

Kinkel: Conditions Unfulfilled for EU Entry

AU1307203394 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] After today's meeting at Cotroceni Palace between Romanian President Ion Iliescu and Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Chancellor of Germany Klaus Kinkel, presidential counselor Traian Chebeleu told journalists that the meeting was assessed by both sides as a positive expression of the wish to develop bilateral relations.

The head of the German diplomatic corps expressed his country's desire to support Romania in the process of transition and democratization. During the dialogue it was assessed that Germany currently represents Romania's major economic partner. The head of the Romanian state, through Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, sent President Roman Herzog an invitation to visit Romania at the earliest possible date.

Before the reception at Cotroceni Palace, Klaus Kinkel, federal minister of foreign affairs and deputy chancellor of Germany, and Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu held a news conference.

The guest stressed the positive results of the meetings that he had held today with Romanian officials, that is, with Prime Minister of the Romanian Government Nicolae Vacaroiu, the presidents of the two chambers of the Romanian Parliament, Oliviu Gherman and Adrian Nastase, and with Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu.

Referring to Romania's integration into European structures, the federal deputy chancellor noted that the economic progress registered by Romania will contribute to the acceleration of this process, but, unfortunately, not as rapidly as desired, because there are still some conditions that have to be fulfilled.

In the same context, the German dignitary affirmed that Romania has not been and will not be forgotten and said: We wish to help Romania both in bilateral relations and within the European Union.

For his part, Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu expressed satisfaction with the way in which the talks with the German dignitary had unfolded and with the important political and economic message that Kinkel conveyed to Romania.

Similarly, the Romanian foreign minister repeated that the support that Germany provides to help the integration of the Central and Eastern Europe countries into European structures was important.

Government Condemns Disregard for Law in Cluj

AU1307195394 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] A communique we have received from the spokesman of the Romanian Government reads as follows:

In connection with the recent declarations issued in Cluj, regarding the opportuneness of archaeological excavations in Union Square, the Romanian Government expressed its decision to forward this problem to a specially set-up commission that would find a solution to it. Any attempt by some local factors to disregard this decision, regardless of their reasons, represents a violation of the authority of state institutions, designed to disturb peace and public order.

Personal ambitions and interests cannot be allowed to discredit the general interests of Romanian society when it comes to social peace and harmony.

Regarding with the action of civic disobedience that took place on 7 July in Cluj-Napoca, the Romanian Government regards it as an act that defied the legal order. The Romanian Government cannot accept civic disobedience because it signifies disregard for the notion of democracy. There are sufficient ways for political forces to express their opinion without resorting to defiance of the rule- of-law state. Any other action at variance with the democratic framework of the rule-of-law state signifies a violation of the law and will be punished accordingly. The laws of the country are in the interest of all citizens and they will be applied with impartiality by the competent authorities regardless of the race, ethnic origin, or religion of those who violate it, reads the communique of the Romanian Government.

Izetbegovic, Juppe, Hurd Stress Border Integrity

AU1307193294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Report by Senada Cumurovic]

[Text] After visiting Zagreb, ministers Juppe and Hurd today spent almost two hours in Sarajevo discussing the contact group's plan with representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities. Following this, President Alija Izetbegovic was the first to address journalists:

[Begin recording] To put it succinctly, we told them that there is a certain degree of accord on our side as regards advocating the acceptance of the contact group's plan in the assembly. But we said that we would not accept it with enthusiasm. Namely, we believe that the plan is bad, but we shall nevertheless propose its acceptance because we believe that all the other options are worse.

We also told them, moreover, that we are doing this, but there is one condition that, in our opinion, is beyond discussion, that is, it cannot be a topic for negotiation and is not debatable, namely, that Bosnia-Herzegovina must remain within its internationally recognized borders and that the plan must clearly confirm its sovereignty and integrity. We pointed out the plan's weak points, primarily what could be considered its moral defect [words indistinct] namely, that it has allowed certain regions, cities, and places in which the Serbs have committed genocide and ethnic cleansing to remain temporarily under their control. I say temporarily because we believe in the integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage indistinct] That is why we are going to vote for the peace option, because we believe that integration forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina will surface in peacetime, provided, of course, that Bosnia-Herzegovina survives as an independent and [word indistinct] state. We have reviewed the possibility of the Serbian side giving a [words indistinct], that Milosevic accepts the plan and Karadzic rejects it, either for tactical reasons or out of the conviction that (?the war should end). We have proposed to the contact group that in this case they should (?test) the sincerity of Milosevic's positive answer by demanding the immediate deployment of observers on the Serbian side of the border and the mutual recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. That was, in a nutshell, the topic of our talks. [end recording]

French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, who together with his British colleague [words indistinct], assessed today's Sarajevo meeting as successful and thorough.

[Begin Juppe recording in French with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] I wish to express satisfaction with what President Izetbegovic has said. We shall continue with our efforts to convince all of the sides of the necessity of accepting the plan, since the acceptance of the plan will lead to an atmosphere that will enable further progress. We have acknowledged one of the fundamental preoccupations and that is that Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain integral in its internationally recognized borders. The international community must see to it that these borders are observed. That is one of the points of the plan that we shall stress in the coming negotiations. If the plan were to be accepted on 19 July, then the international community could turn to peace and the reconstruction of this destroyed country, as has been the case in Sarajevo for several months now. [end recording]

British Minister Douglas Hurd also addressed the journalists.

[Begin Hurd recording in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] We came here today as representatives of Great Britain and France for two reasons; first, because our ideas regarding this issue are the same, and second, because Britain and France are the countries that have provided the greatest number of UN troops for Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have stressed why we consider the contact group's plan to be a balanced plan, and the best possible plan for attaining real peace. This plan is sometimes described as being a partition plan, but that is not so. The plan secures the integrity of these borders, supported by constitutional arrangements that can be revised once the issue of Sarajevo is solved. We are now going to Pale, after which we shall go on to Belgrade. We shall step up efforts in both of these places to show that this plan is necessary, and that its acceptance is imperative both by the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia, because in this way not only Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina [words indistinct], but this whole region will be protected against the return of this savage war. [end recording]

As far as questions are concerned, most were addressed to British Minister Hurd. For example, how he sees the Serbs giving back a part of the territory that they have occupied. We shall exert strong pressure on both Pale and Belgrade to give back around a quarter of the territory that is under their occupation, Hurd said. According to him, this is their sacrifice to this plan. If Milosevic accepts the plan and Karadzic rejects it, will the international community consider this to be a positive or negative answer? Hurd said that if things turn out in this way, then Milosevic will have a great responsibility of making his "yes" accepted universally. Will the arms embargo on the Bosnia- Herzegovina Government be lifted if the Serbs reject the plan was the question put to French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe. He said that the Serbs' insistence on a negative answer could lead to the lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government. In that case, said Juppe, we would not contest this decision, which would require the corresponding UN resolution. At the end of today's press conference, President Izetbegovic wished to clarify the two possibilities of the Serbs' acceptance or rejection of the plan.

[Begin recording] If they accept it, then they are recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state and will withdraw from 20 percent of the territory. If they reject it [words indistinct]. [end recording]

After talks in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, the French and British Foreign Ministers Alain Juppe and Douglas Hurd went on to Pale.

Bosnian Serbs To Decide on Division Plan

LD1307193694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1908 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] Belgrade, July 13 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb vice-president Biljana Plavsic said Wednesday the Bosnian Serb parliament would rule Monday on the Bosnia division plan drafted by an international 'contact group'.

In an interview with the local radio in Jagodina, central Serbia, Plavsic said leaders of all Serb lands should sit down together before July 19, by which date the Bosnian warring sides should declare themselves on the plan, to debate the issue and resolve it 'in the optimum way' appropriate to its gravity to the future of the entire nation.

'I have always been in favour of a global solution to the Serb question but, unfortunately, we are still far from it,' she said.

Plavsic added the Serb side would tell foreign ministers Alain Juppe of France and Douglas Hurd of Great Britain that making maps before a constitutional solution had been found 'is a very dangerous and frivolous gamble with the future of the Serbian people.'

Juppe and Hurd have arrived in the Bosnian Serb centre of Pale in an effort to talk Bosnian Serb leaders into accepting the 'contact group's' plan for a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, under which the Moslem-Croat federation should get 51 percent of the territory, and the Bosnian Serbs, 49 percent.

The Bosnian Serbs currently control 70 percent of the territory.

Plavsic said that 'the proposed division plan refers to the Moslem-Croat territory as a state and to the Serb territory only as Serb territory, which is a dangerous trap which we must avoid.'

'Independence and total separation is not the same thing as an association with a former or an existing federation,' she explained.

The Bosnian Serbs demand that the Srpska republic be either an independent state or form some kind of tie with the Yugoslav federation of Serbia and Montenegro.

The Bosnian Moslems and Croats, acting under strong U.S. pressure, met in Washington on March 18 and signed an agreement to form a binational federation, which should eventually form a confederation with neighbouring Croatia.

Karadzic Criticizes Contact Group Peace Plan

AU1307165194 Paris AFP in English 1626 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Report by by Christophe de Roquefeuil: "Bosnia's Serbs Hostile to Peace Plan"]

[Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, July 13 (AFP)—Bosnia's Serbs on Wednesday [13 July] criticized the latest international peace plan, telling the British and French foreign ministers it failed to recognize what the Serbs see as their rightful place on the world map. But they did not reject it altogether. Leaders of the Croat-Moslem Federation on the other hand told British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and his French counterpart Alain Juppe that they could accept the plan, despite some misgivings.

After a tense 90-minute meeting with the two European ministers in the Serb stronghold of Pale, near Sarajevo, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic said he was "unable to accept" the blueprint because it failed to give his side "an international persona."

"I do not understand why we should be forced to live in the same state as our enemies," Karadzic said.

Karadzic was apparently objecting to the fact that the plan, based on partitioning the republic along ethnic lines, would maintain Bosnia as a single state with its existing internationally recognized borders.

Falling short of rejecting the plan outright, he said the Bosnian Serb assembly would vote on the blueprint on Monday—a day before the deadline set by the international community for the parties to agree on the plan—and that legislators would be entitled to make up their own minds.

Countries in the so-called contact group on Bosnia—Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States—have demanded a response by July 19 on the plan, which gives the Croat-Moslem Federation 51 percent of the territory against 49 percent for the Serbs, who currently control 70 percent of the land.

Juppe told reporters the Serbs did not appear "very open" to the plan and had "multiplied their objections" to it.

But he said their reservations centred on constitutional measures—the degree of autonomy to be held by the Serbs in the future Bosnia-Herzegovina—rather than on the partition of the territory.

Hurd insisted that the contact group would refuse to renegotiate the plan even if it were believed to be "not perfect."

But he added: "Arrangements are not a problem."

Asked to comment on the possible lifting of an international arms embargo on the Moslems in case of a Serb

rejection, Hurd said this was a last-minute option. "It comes at the end of the road."

Britain and France have warned that such a move, which could intensify the war, would almost certainly lead to a withdrawal of their troops from the country. The two nations are the largest contributors to the UN force in Bosnia, with 8,500 soldiers between them.

Rejects Independent Bosnia

LD1307143894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1347 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] Sarajevo, 13 Jul (TANJUG)—Talks between Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, and French and British Foreign Ministers Alain Juppe and Douglas Hurd ended in Pale today. The meeting was devoted to the contact group's plan for the partition of former Bosnia-Herzegovina into 51 percent for the Croat-Muslim federation and 49 percent for the Srpska republic.

As President Karadzic said after the talks, Juppe and Hurd explained what acceptance and what rejection of the contact group's plan will entail.

"They conjured up a terrifying scenario of a prolonged and devastating conflict that could even spread beyond the boundaries of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina if the plan is rejected," Karadzic said.

"We listened to all this carefully, but we also made it clear that this war started precisely because of Serb fears of Croat-Muslim domination and because of our refusal to accept an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. We did not—and will not—accept this state," the Srpska republic president pointed out.

"If we do establish ties with it, we will do so only as an internationally recognized state, and this provides room for compromise," Karadzic added.

Juppe and Hurd declared that they came to elaborate on the contact group's plan and to point to all the consequences acceptance and refusal would imply.

Juppe stressed that refusal would carry a great risk, for this would mean the escalation of the war.

SDS Asks Contact Group To Complete Proposal

LD1307212194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2046 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] Sarajevo, 13 Jul (TANJUG)—The Main Committee of the Serbian Democratic Party of Serbian lands [SDS] said this evening that before the Contact Group resumed its discussion on the peace package all previously announced documents must be completed and made available to the leadership and people of the Srpska republic.

In a statement for the public published after a session in Pale, the Main Committee assessed that the Contact Group had not completed the work consisting of four previously announced documents: The map of territorial delineation, constitutional organization, an agreement on the permanent cessation of hostilities, and a resolution on the abolition of the economic sanctions against the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and the Serb people in general.

"The Srpska republic delegation in Geneva was only presented with a proposal on the territorial delineation between the Srpska republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation. However, neither is this proposal by the Contact Group complete. No reasonable and justified reasons were given for their omission to divide the wider area of Sarajevo and to address the issue of an access to the sea for the Srpska republic," the statement says.

"In addition to the fact that these incompletely drafted maps are largely unfavorable for the vital interest of the Srpska republic, the SDS Main Committee deems that before a further discussion of the peace package all documents must be finalized and made available to the leadership and the people of the Srpska republic."

"In case the Croat-Muslim side, with the support from the international community, which also includes the lifting of the arms embargo, decides in favor of continuing the war, the Serb people in the Srpska republic will be ready for decisive defense of its right to survive."

"A new situation, if it arises, will involve the introduction of a state of war, a complete Army mobilization, war economy, and the examination of unification with the republic of Serb Krajina and other Serb lands," the statement says.

The SDS Main Committee expressed its great gratitude to his holiness Patriarch Pavle and the Holy Bishops' Assembly of the Serbian Orthodox Church for lending their support to Serb efforts to reach a just solution and end the civil war on the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Karadzic: SDS Debate Continues

LD1307212994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2049 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] Sarajevo, 13 Jul (TANJUG)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic [RS], said this evening that the main committee of the Serbian Democratic Party of Serbian Lands [SDS] has assessed that the entire package proposed by the Contact Group should be carefully studied in order to see what the Serb side would gain and what it would lose, and that everything should be done to save the peace process.

Karadzic said during a break in the session of the SDS main committee in Pale that a serious and well-argumented debate is under way, in which the RS negotiating position is being upheld for the most part.

The RS president stressed that it is necessary in the peace process to continue work on resolving certain important

issues, such as constitutional arrangements, the question of Sarajevo, the RS outlet to the sea, and, finally, the question of the maps.

If all this is resolved satisfactorily, it will be much easier to begin tackling the maps in bilateral contacts with both the Croat-Muslim side and the Contact Group, so as to find an acceptable solution, Karadzic said.

The RS president spoke about the second point on the agenda of the SDS main committee's session—internal policy. He pointed out that it should be ascertained how the state is functioning at present and how it would function in the event that the peace process breaks down, that is, if the war drags on, due to the continued support of certain international factors for the Muslims.

In case the Muslims begin arming themselves, we should decide whether to declare a state of war, proclaim total mobilization, and regiment the entire nation into combat units or work brigades, Karadzic explained.

If we are forced to fight for our survival, we will decide what the state can and must do to ensure the survival of the nation, the RS president concluded.

Hurd Warns Serbs Against Rejecting Peace Plan

LD1307134894 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe and British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd held talks with the leadership of the Srpska republic in Pale today. They discussed the contact group's plan for the territorial division of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, under which the Croat-Muslim Federation would be given 51 percent of the territory and the Srpska republic 49 percent.

Hurd and Juppe arrived in Pale after their visits to Zagreb and Sarajevo. They have left for Belgrade for talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

We clearly told the Serb leaders that the response to the contact group's offer for the division of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina can only be yes or no, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said today following the talks with the state leadership of the Srpska republic in Pale. M. Juppe and I have the same views on the crisis in Bosnia. France and Great Britain have supplied most soldiers to the UN Protection Forces, and we believe that this plan is an opportunity for everyone to gain something. If the occasion is missed, the chances for a peaceful solution to the crisis will be gloomy, Hurd stressed at a press conference. The British foreign secretary stressed that during the talks the Srpska republic leadership was told of the consequences of their possible rejection of the contact group's plan.

Refugees Discuss Plan With Juppe, Hurd

AU1307193894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] The Association of Refugees and Displaced Persons of Bosnia-Herzegovina has written to British and French Foreign Ministers Douglas Hurd and Alain Juppe warning them that the latest proposed maps are giving the Serbian aggressor what they have spent years creating: houses, apartments, territories where the Bosniaks have lived for centuries. We appreciate your efforts to achieve a just peace in our state, and we shall be grateful for your efforts to defend the basic principles of civilization in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, always keep in mind that in Pale and Belgrade there are those [words indistinct] ideas that have led to fascism, collocutors that can only respect force, and that do not know the words democracy, freedom, human rights, or civilization. This is stated in the letter addressed to the foreign ministers of France and Great Britain by the Association of Refugees and Displace Persons of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Zubak, Iranian Ambassador Discuss Peace Plan

AU1307195494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] President of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Kresimir Zubak today received Mohammad Ibrahim (Faheryan), ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the course of the sincere talks, President Zubak informed His Excellency about the position of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation leadership toward the contact group proposal for the latest territorial organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina and their peace plan as a whole. President Zubak expressed his gratitude for the comprehensive help provided by the Iranian Government and its citizens to Bosnia-Herzegovina. He called for a more comprehensive inclusion of the Iranian economy in reconstructing the country. Ambassador (Faheryan) supported the just, mutual struggle of the Croatian and Bosniak peoples, and particularly stressed the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation's constructive approach toward finding acceptable political solutions. [Words indistinct] stressed the Iranian ambassador and said that the Iranian Government would support any solution that will be accepted by the people and the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ambassador (Faheryan) on this occasion officially invited President Zubak to visit Iran.

Zubak Discusses Demirel Visit With Ambassador

AU1307195894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] President of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Kresimir Zubak today received Turkish Ambassador to

Bosnia-Herzegovina Sukru Tufan. In these talks President Zubak was informed about the progress of preparations for the visit of Turkish President Suleyman Demirel to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

President Zubak expressed gratitude for the comprehensive effort of the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish people in providing aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina during the aggression and expressed hope that Turkey would remain one of the main factors in finding a lasting and acceptable solution for our country. The peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina expect the Republic of Turkey to lend support in reconstructing the country, based on the mutual economic interests of the two countries, stressed Zubak. He hailed the tripartite meeting of the Republic of Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia as yet more evidence of the lasting and sincere connections of the three peoples and governments. Ambassador Tufan promised that Turkey would extend special help to Bosnia-Herzegovina in all respects, particularly as regards the reconstruction of Sarajevo and Mostar.

Pale Radio Reports Inter-Muslim Clashes Raging

LD1307135694 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] Fierce clashes between 5th Corps members loyal to Alija Izetbegovic and forces of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia [APZB] resumed today. According to Velkaton Radio based in Velika Kladusa, the fiercest clashes are raging in the areas of Pecigrad, Liskovac, Trzac, and Golubic. Both sides have suffered casualties. Muslim Radio in Bihac, loyal to the authorities in Sarajevo, has confirmed that intense clashes are underway and that APZB forces have resumed their offensive in the Cazin area.

Abdic Demands Special Powers for Canton

AU1307140994 Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovene 12 Jul 94 pp 32,33

[Interview with Fikret Abdic, president of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, by Igor Mekina in Velika Kladusa; date not given: "Grandfather"]

[Text] [Mekina] Why did you actually decide to proclaim autonomy?

[Abdic] We decided to do this when we saw that the Muslims started fighting the Croats even though the war with the Serbs was not over yet. We wished to create a sort of framework that would allow us to sit down at the same table with the Croats and the Serbs and negotiate a separate peace with them. We have done so and then the 5th Corps [of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] attacked us. Their intention was clear from the very beginning. They wanted to suppress our autonomy in blood.

[Mekina] They deem your decision illegitimate in Sarajevo.

[Abdic] Come on, Izetbegovic is citing the decisions of a rump assembly of a bygone country that no longer has a quorum for work and does not include one of the constituent peoples, while we are supported by the legal Bihac communal assembly and our decision is based on the will of two thirds of the people who had decided for autonomy prior to the attack by the 5th Corps. It is ridiculous that the United States and the European mediators now acknowledge the legitimacy of Izetbegovic and numerous other politicians whom I defeated at the elections or won more votes than they did while they are denying me legitimacy even though I won the highest number of votes. At the same time, they are even proclaiming that they are the true champions of democracy.

[Mekina] Therefore, you were not ousted?

[Abdic] Only the people who have voted for me and elected me to this post can replace me. The truth is that the Sarajevo authorities tried to replace me during the coup, however, they will not succeed.

[Mekina] Why did you not try to resolve the dispute through negotiations?

[Abdic] We have tried it on numerous occasions, however, they sent an army against us that started killing civilians. [Bosnian Prime Minister] Haris Silajdzic, whom some consider a more moderate politician, together with Rasim Delic [Army Commander] and without the decision of the Bosnian Presidency—and, therefore, in violation of the provisions of our Constitution—ordered the use of force against the autonomous province of western Bosnia while at the same time he would not make one step without Alija Izetbegovic. These gentlemen also do not respond to our written offers to sit down at the negotiating table.

[Mekina] Why did the European mediators not condemn the attack on your autonomy?

[Abdic] Beside helping to spread the war, the European Union did not do anything. Humanitarian aid is only another word for charity. This international charity is now directly helping the war as the people evidently will not stop fighting for as long as they can live well off it. Of course, it is possible to wage a war from hotels, luxurious aircraft, and super luxurious cars, even for 20 years if need be. It is a lot harder for the ordinary people, though, who have only two wishes—to be able to feed their children and not to have grenades falling on them. We do not want much more either. For this reason, we cannot come to terms with the fact that, because of a more or less remote possibility that due to unusual combination of circumstances we might end up in a sort of Serbian federation in the future, the soldiers would now kill 300,000 Muslims, 10,000 Croats, and some 2,000 Serbs here. The other option for us is obviously death because do not forget, we are surrounded by six Serbian corps—the Knin, Lika, Banija, Kordun, 1st Banja Luka, and 2d Banja Luka Corps—while we have only one corps in the entire province, which has in the meantime even

attacked us. Initially, 27 poorly armed policemen defended us from them and then we raised an army in 15 days and trained it sufficiently over the next two months to be able to defeat this corps.

[Mekina] Do not you find the reaction of the Sarajevo authorities understandable, bearing in mind that your autonomy and separate peace with the Serbs are weakening the position of the Muslims, because they allow the Serbs to transfer their forces and use them against other Muslims on other parts of the front in Bosnia?

[Abdic] If this war were static, you would be right. However, we started from the position that this war must end somewhere and that it would be best if it ended precisely in Velika Kladusa. Why? In Velika Kladusa and in the nearby Serbian towns such as Vojnic, Slunj, and others there was not a single verbal, let alone armed, conflict between the peoples in history. If we were to accomplish peace here, following this example, we could restore peace throughout the entire autonomous province and then throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Your question, of course, hides another trap. If you claim that our separate peace with the Serbs and the Croats is "a betrayal" with which we help to strengthen the attacks on other Muslim enclaves, this means that separate peaces in Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and other towns are equal "betrayals," as a result of which the attacks on our province are being lined up. However, despite this, it seems to me that what lie behind the appeals for an all-out war, are primarily selfish interests and plain envy in the style of "let the neighbor's cow die too." Those Bosnian politicians who were not capable of reaching peace in other regions naturally wish that the war would also continue here, they are simply bothered by the sight of a peaceful and undestroyed Velika Kladusa. At the same time, this is the territory that is separated from central Bosnia with a 40- to 250-km-wide Serbian encirclement. For this reason, a policy like that in central Bosnia is not possible here. Furthermore, there is a danger that this region would be sacrificed and exchanged for other territories.

[Mekina] Then you find it probable that the Bosnian Government would exchange your enclave for some territory in central Bosnia in the negotiations?

[Abdic] Izetbegovic might have had such intentions, however, not even the Serbs care about such a deal, precisely for the sake of good cooperation with us.

[Mekina] However, is not your proclamation of autonomy the first step on the way to autonomy within a sort of alliance of the Serbian lands? Would you accept such a position in the future?

[Abdic] You always come out with the gloomiest of possibilities. All of you, and the others who condemn us, are convinced that this is an alien, a Serbian idea. However, the truth is that we have realized it ourselves. The Serbs do not want to have a military zone here and the Croats want peace for the sake of the local Croats who might lose out in the conflict. It is enough to create autonomy on the basis of such interests.

[Mekina] Can you, therefore, survive as a sort of Luxembourg or Liechtenstein?

[Abdic] We can. As a duty free zone between various countries. So far, our ultimate goal has been a union of republics within the Bosnian state. The only border that Bosnia-Herzegovina has and where the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is written, the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, is the border of our province with the UN Protected Areas. In central Bosnia, the Muslim territories border on the territory of Herceg-Bosna, where Croatian flags are flying.

[Mekina] You, therefore, do not believe in the Washington agreement?

[Abdic] The agreement was signed in such a way that the international mediators assumed the role of stern fathers who reprimand naughty children playing in a sand pit. First they pulled the ear of the first, then the ear of the other, and then spanked them both and said: "Be good now and kiss each other," seemingly ending the dispute. Nothing has essentially changed in the relations between the Croats and Izetbegovic's Muslims, and I would, therefore, not be surprised if this agreement would fail, too. However, even if we remain a canton within the Bosnian union, we will demand some additional rights that are not envisaged for other cantons for the time being. Primarily the right to greater economic freedom, the right to independent regional integrations, and the right to decide about peace and war....

[Mekina] But these are the fundamental rights of a state?

[Abdic] Of course. It is unacceptable to us that somebody in Paris would, out of the blue, one day decide that we are fighting the Croats and the Serbs. There have never been any interethnic disputes in this region and we will not allow any in the future!

[Mekina] Does this mean that you will take your future into your own hands and proclaim a state?

[Abdic] First, we must complete what we are facing now and after the war we will see what to do. Of course, it will be our people again who will decide about our fate—at a referendum.

Report Views New Appointments in HDZ

AU1307172094 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 11 Jul 94 p 9

[Report by S. Lovrenovic: "New President—Dario Kordic"]

[Text] Mostar—The Third Assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] adopted the report about the work of its central bodies, the new statute of the party, and the Program Declaration. Discussions were long and hard, so the Declaration

was accepted with 26 votes against, but voting and elections were overshadowed by a storm raised over putting up candidates for party leadership.

Everything seemed to be in order while signatures for candidates for party president, vice president, secretary general, and members of the Central and Auditing Committee were collected, but when the chairman read the list of candidates, people started giving up, so the list was eventually reduced to only one candidate for the president of the party. At that point, Chairman Dario Kordic, who was very embarrassed as he was the only remaining candidate, urged all other candidates not to withdraw their names. After consultations in the party, the only one who appeared to be convinced was Ivo Lozancic, who reluctantly accepted his candidacy for president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ. Kresimir Zubak, Mijo Tokic, and Mariofil Ljubic did not want to do that at any cost.

Some discontented delegates said all that was a "comedy" or that it "reminded them of evil spirits of the former Central Committee of the League of Communists," hinting at possible pressure on certain candidates who gave up the candidacy they agreed to only some ten minutes earlier. Even the party president, Mate Boban, intervened and called for more understanding for party discipline and consideration for the difficult war-time situation in which the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ is the only relevant political organization of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He also endorsed the candidacy of Dario Kordic for party president.

Endorsement of the candidacy of Ivo Lozancic saved the democratic procedure, but not everybody was satisfied. Delegates from Siroki Brijeg, who supported the candidacy of Mariofil Ljubic, said they would make a formal complaint to express their dissatisfaction.

The 365 delegates at the Third Assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ voted by secret ballot and elected Dario Kordic as president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ for the following period by 221 votes, while the opposing candidate Ivo Lozancic only got 100 votes. With 190 votes, Pero Markovic was elected secretary general, while 147 deputies voted for his opponent. Srecko Vucina, Bozo Rajic, Jozo Maric, Ivo Lozancic, and Tomislav Obrdalj were elected vice presidents.

[Box, p 9]

Dario Kordic's Resume

Dario Kordic was born on 14 December 1960 in Sarajevo. He graduated from the Sarajevo Faculty of Political Sciences (Department of Journalism) and, save for the time he spent there, he lived in central Bosnia all his life. He is married, with two children. His wife and children were with him in Busovaca throughout the war. He worked as a journalist until elections in 1990, when he became the head of the Defense Office of the municipality of Busovaca.

He is one of the founding fathers of the Busovaca HDZ; he was its secretary and in 1991 was elected president of the Municipal Committee of the HDZ. At the Second Assembly of the Bosnia- Herzegovina HDZ he was elected vice president of the Bosnia- Herzegovina HDZ. Furthermore, he was vice president of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna since its establishment.

In Busovaca, he organized the defense of the Croats in the Lasva Valley. He held the rank of colonel until the latest cease-fire, when he became HVO [Croatian Defense Council] reserve brigadier. At the time of the most fierce fighting in the Lasva Valley, he was appointed assistant to the head of HVO Supreme Headquarters.

[Box, p 9]

Statement by Newly Elected Head of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ: "Most Qualified to Highest Functions"

Mostar—I would like to thank you for your confidence in me; it is an honor. My appointment shows that you also have confidence in all those who put their personal interest aside and devoted their work to the interest of the Croatian nation. It was an honor for me to be on the list of presidential candidates together with Mr. Ivo Lozancic, my friend of long standing, Croat knight, and brother. I expect to be assisted by the presidency, secretariat general of the Central and Auditing Committee, but most help will come from the Zagreb HDZ center and our President Franjo Tudjman.

I would like to thank Mate Boban, our former president, who was extremely successful in leading the party and who contributed to a successful conclusion of this assembly. His views and appearances prove that he was and still is a great politician and Croat.

I will do my best to preserve in peace all that we achieved in the war, for that must not be lost. I will devote myself to finding peaceful means for expanding our political activities to other areas. I will see to it that the most qualified people are appointed to highest functions, but that they are absolutely loyal to the party. I will do my best to uphold the original goals of the Washington agreements and of the Federation Constitution and make sure that they will not be changed at the expense of the Croats. We will also provide for families of our dead soldiers as well as for disabled veterans. Our most important task will be to enable the Croats to return to their homes.

[Box, p 9]

From the Program Declaration

Mostar—The Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ is a national party gathering all strata of the Croatian nation and other citizens; its program is based on principles of Christian democracy. The Bosnia- Herzegovina HDZ is an integral part of the Croatian Democratic Community.

Basic goals and tasks of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ were determined by the program tasks and goals that were adopted at the First General Assembly of the HDZ. In addition to the basic goals and tasks, the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ also has special goals and tasks:

1. To realize the right to self-determination and realizing the nation-building quality, independence, and sovereignty of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a state community of constituent nations;

2. To protect all rights of the Croats on the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of its internal organization, as well as to apply highest international standards in safeguarding human rights and political freedom;

3. To create the conditions to prevent the massive exile of the Croats from Bosnia- Herzegovina, to enable Croat refugees and emigrants to return to their homes, and to develop a wholehearted cooperation with Croatian emigration;

4. To protect and promote national, political, cultural, religious, and other rights, as well as to protect, rebuild, and preserve the cultural and historical heritage of the Croats throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Box, p 9]

Ivo Lozancic's Resume

Ivo Lozancic was born in 1958 in Perkovcici, a municipality of Zepce. He is married, with two children. He is an electrical engineer. Before the war, he worked in the Zenica Ironworks. He has been a member of the HDZ since the party was established in Croatia. He was elected president of Zepce HDZ Municipality Committee even before the war. At the time of most fierce fighting in the area of Zepce, he was the commanding officer of 111th XP Brigade of the HVO. He holds the rank of HVO brigadier. He is presently the president of the Municipal Council of the Croatian area of Zepce, Maglaj, and Zavidovici and a member of the Presidential Council of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna.

Zubak Views New Administration, Constitution

AU1307114994 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (Europe Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 30 Jun 94 pp 5-6

[Interview with Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Life Has Not Waited for the Constitution"]

[Excerpts] This interview with Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was conducted just several hours after the end of the constituent assembly's last session and the election of the government that will be performing a dual function. Thus, the first question referred precisely to the tasks that are to be completed in the process of setting up the federal administration.

[Zubak] The government, with all its accompanying services, should be completely set up in the next period. It is expected to define its work program and the means necessary for its realization. At this stage, I think the greatest portion of work is to be done by the government. What we have defined so far is the first and crucial phase, whereas the following phase includes the setting up of the judiciary. After that, we will work on analyzing—that is, constituting—the system of diplomatic-consular missions. At the lower levels, we should continue with further elaboration and implementation of the constitution. However, it is difficult to tackle certain questions because we still do not know the definite boundaries of the federation, which does not mean that we cannot start resolving certain issues and that we should wait until we finally establish the definite borders of the federation.

[OSLOBODJENJE] During the two-day assembly session, an impression prevailed that there still exists mistrust between the representatives of the two peoples. Such an impression could possibly be a result of frequent breaks and consultations between deputies in their clubs. What should be done in order to overcome this cautiousness, and what moves could contribute to the development of a better atmosphere between them?

[Zubak] That is your personal opinion. I do not think there has been any mistrust. What you have noticed is quite normal. We had the same situation in former assemblies, while it is also quite customary in countries that are not at war. When a new government is established, and thereby also new relations, there are many different interests. I think that we have relatively easily agreed upon the new cabinet. The fact that there are still limits and restraints is more a consequence of the deputies' psychological state rather than an expression of different political views of the situation. After battles that were extremely severe in certain regions for both peoples, our joint work in the assembly is going quite well, and I personally think even faster than I expected. Second, a large number of Croatian deputies stay in Sarajevo only for a short time, which is quite different from the possibility of our being here all the time.

[OSLOBODJENJE] In the course of the recent talks in Geneva, which has been underlined in the reports for deputies, full harmony of the attitudes of the Bosniak and Croatian members of the delegation was quite prominent. Is this atmosphere of companionship present also in the federation's bodies?

[Zubak] As of now, the president and the vice president are functioning. I can say that Ganic and myself have not had any differences in political views or assessments thus far. The federative government is just being set up. There will probably be some restraint, lack of understanding, or reserve in the beginning. Yet, after a certain period of time, maybe a month or two, and once people get to know each other better, everything will take a normal and regular course.

[OSLOBODJENJE] You said that one of the obstacles to a quicker harmonization of views among the representatives of the Bosniak and Croatian people is the Croatian deputies' short stays in Sarajevo. Local public opinion, however, is that, after becoming president, you too spend very little time in the capital of the federation. We have also seen that Jadranko Prlic left Sarajevo only several hours after being elected deputy prime minister.

[Zubak] As far as I am concerned, I plan to stay a little longer this time. Then I am leaving for Germany on business, and I also have some work to do in Herceg-Bosna. One should work both here [in Sarajevo] and in Herceg-Bosna so that issues that we agree upon on the federal level can be more securely and efficiently implemented on the level of Herceg-Bosna. Each subsequent stay in Sarajevo will be longer; therefore, one should not have any reserve.

[OSLOBODJENJE] What is the status of Herceg-Bosna in the federation? Is it still functioning as a state within a state?

[Zubak] That question has been raised many times. It has been resolved by the constitution, and Herceg-Bosna as a term denotes its transitional administration—that is, until the constitution of the federation is entirely implemented, particularly at the cantonal and regional level, Herceg-Bosna will function. However, so far, in many spheres of life and work, we have made a whole range of protocols and agreements by which some questions are regulated and by which laws of Herceg-Bosna and those of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina are fully harmonized, and probably now those of the federation. The stronger the federation grows, the weaker Herceg- Bosna will be. I think there is a lack of understanding regarding Herzez-Bosna, to which the media are also contributing. We cannot simply cross out Herceg-Bosna now and say it does not exist any more. That would be a total anarchy because the federation has not stricken its roots yet. What would happen if we abolished the government or some other administrative bodies? Who would govern the region then? Second, many questions that we settled there [in Herceg-Bosna], the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has not yet managed to settle, and it will also take time for the federation to do that. Concretely, pensioners in Herceg-Bosna regularly receive monthly compensations—those are not pensions but rather compensations—adding up to 50 German marks [DM]. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has not done any such thing yet. The average salary of our soldiers amounts to DM300; some of them receive even more. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has not been able to do this for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, while the federation will not be able to either. Besides, all the soldiers are extremely well supplied with provisions, while the families of the fallen receive the same monthly compensation as all other soldiers do, which also applies to the wounded. We cannot say that Herceg-Bosna no longer exists. From now on, they all belong to the joint Bosnia- Herzegovina Army, where everyone receives a salary amounting to DM2. This is impossible. We have to gradually consolidate things to improve the standard of living in the Army, and not just there. It is not just the matter of a political attitude toward Herceg-Bosna, I am speaking about concrete problems. [passage omitted]

[OSLOBODJENJE] The government is facing a great task. Are the candidates put forward by the Croatian people really ready to cooperate?

[Zubak] I am quite positive that the cabinet we have proposed has both the authority and knowledge to work on implementing the constitution, and I am even more positive that its members' knowledge and quality will make certain that decisions adopted will be implemented in the field. That is my answer also to the question why Prlic and some other people, who are also officials of Herceg- Bosna, are involved in the federation. Precisely because those people are the best warrant that what we agree upon on the level of the federation will also be implemented.

[OSLOBODJENJE] How much time do you feel is needed for the federation to really start functioning?

[Zubak] Those who think that now is the time for improvisation and hasty actions are wrong. When the constitution of the federation was drafted, I said that a six-month deadline for transitional solutions is unrealistic. That is not a deadline after which the federation ceases to function. If we are not able to implement everything in six months, we will agree to extend the transitional period. One should take it step by step in order to dodge any sort of improvisation so as to avoid incidents that might cause the whole process to retrogress. I do not think that refugees should return now, even though this is being demanded by many people. How are the refugees supposed to return when very few conditions for their return have been met? It is better that they hold out just a little while longer. Then we can plan and work on their return.

[OSLOBODJENJE] The Croats and the Bosniaks have reached an agreement. Still, it is not a final settlement for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. What remains is to find a concept that would possibly appeal to the Serbs.

From a political point of view, is it realistic to expect that Karadzic and his like-minded will accept to remain in Bosnia- Herzegovina?

[Zubak] In addition to other things, two principles can be drawn from the communique of the contact countries: that Bosnia- Herzegovina remains within its existing borders and that its territories will be rearranged. At this stage, the international community will certainly not tolerate any kind of dissolution. I do not know whether the future complex community will be a transitional solution in terms of Bosnia-Herzegovina's strengthening or whether the Serbs as constituent people will try to accomplish its right to secede during the transitional period. You know that, among many political agreements that have been reached so far, there is also one signed by Izetbegovic, specifying that after two years, the

Serbs have a right to decide in a referendum whether they will remain within Bosnia-Herzegovina. We leave the possibility open for the Serbian people to join the federation, and whether the situation will unfold in that direction or otherwise is hard to predict. I personally would like to see that Bosnia-Herzegovina remains within the existing borders, but this does not depend only on us.

[Box, p 4]

[Zubak] Mostar is where the severest clashes between Bosniaks and Croats took place. It is also where we will meet with the greatest number of problems, while endeavoring to restore trust and life. It has nothing to do with possible reserve toward Hans Koschnik and the plan worked out by the European Union. Rather it has to do with the current frame of mind among both ethnic groups. There is still apprehension; people will still weigh up, contemplate, and analyze how good or bad a proposal is. However, after the latest round of Berlin talks, I think the process will evolve much quicker. I believe that, with the reconstruction of the town's infrastructure, life will begin to revive, as well as mutual trust. You can see it growing day by day. It has started with the individual, crossing daily from one part of the town into another, and now the number of such passages is increasing. It is better that this sort of opening up proceeds step by step rather than suddenly.

As for Mr. Koschnik, he is not going to influence political solutions. During his administration, all the conditions for normal life are supposed to be created.

UN Rejects Blame for Refugee Situation

AU1307174094 Paris AFP in English 1704 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] Zagreb, July 13 (AFP)—UN spokesmen on Wednesday [13 July] rejected criticism that the UN Protection Force was to blame for the lack of progress in negotiations between Croatia and separatist Serbs on the return of Croatians to their homes. Such criticism by the Croatians was "unfair," said Jaque Grinberg, a spokesman for UN special envoy to the former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi. His comments came as Croatians displaced by the Croat Serbs have blockaded all the UN checkpoints in Croatia, accusing UNPROFOR of being ineffective and biased in favour of the Serbs. The UN force is deployed in the Serb-held regions.

The Croatians, of whom 260,000 fled their homes, plan to blockade the UNPROFOR headquarters here Thursday as part of their protest. "UNPROFOR is not the obstruction to further progress" on the returnee issue, said Grinberg. He pointed to the "major achievement" of a cease-fire signed on March 29 under UN auspices between the Croatian Government and Serb representatives of the self-proclaimed Serb republic of Krajina which covers a third of Croatian territory. He noted that economic and political negotiations were due to follow, but "it is a question of the will of both parties." "Technical difficulties" had held up the talks which were due to have started on June 17, he said.

UNPROFOR spokesman Michael Williams said that "the conditions don't exist yet for the resettlement" of displaced persons, and that "solid guarantees" for their security were required. Williams also ruled out reports that UNPROFOR would pull out of Croatia before the end of its mandate on September 30. The renewal is to be debated by the Croatian parliament in special session on Saturday. The Croatian Government is threatening to refuse to renew UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia unless more is done to bring Krajina back under Zagreb's control. Serbs seized the land in the war that broke out in 1991 between Croatia and Serb-dominated Yugoslavia after Zagreb declared independence.

Blockade Escalation Threat

U1307171194 Zagreb HINA in English 1604 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Unattributed report: "Session of Association of Croatian Refugees"]

[Text] Zagreb, 13 Jul—The executive committee of the Association of Croatian Refugees and representatives of the county associations of refugees supported at today's session in Zagreb a protest rally which is to be held from 09:00 to 20:00 hours tomorrow in front of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] HQ in Zagreb. Refugees will keep blocking UN check-points in Croatia until the United Nations, UN Security Council, Croatian Government and Parliament give firm guarantees that the Vance plan will be implemented, as well as resolutions on the return of refugees to their homes, said the Association. If we do not receive the guarantees, we will start blocking UN logistic bases in Croatia, said the source.

UN Base Blocked

AU1407110594 Zagreb HINA in English 0829 GMT 14 Jul 94

[Unattributed report: "Refugees Block UNPROFOR Base in Zagreb"]

[Text] Zagreb, 14 Jul—About a hundred refugees blocked the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] base in Zagreb, Selska Street, at 9 a.m. Thursday. This peace protest was organized by the local association of refugees and it will last until 8 p.m.

According to Julije Skeletic, the head of the association, refugees are protesting against UNPROFOR's inefficacy and they want to bring attention to difficulties of the life in exile and the problem on missing and detained members of their families. Refugees in Zagreb have the same requests as refugees throughout Croatia.

Croatian government minister Juraj Njavro, the refugee from Vukovar, visited refugees this morning in order to support their peace protest.

Turkish President To Address Assembly 16 Jul

AU1307162194 Zagreb HINA in English 1251 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Unattributed report: "Turkish President Demirel To Address Croatian Parliament"]

[Text] Zagreb, 13 Jul—Speaker of the Croatian Parliament Nedjeljko Mihanovic convened a solemn session of both houses for Saturday, July 16. Mihanovic announced that the members will be addressed by Turkish President Suleyman Demirel. The solemn session will begin at 12:30 hours Saturday. An emergency session of the House of Representatives had already been called for 10:00 hours Saturday. The only item on the agenda is UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia.

Position of Serbs in Croatia 'Deteriorating'

LD1307191294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1814 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] Belgrade, July 13 (TANJUG)—Human and all other rights of Serbs in Croatia are increasingly violated, says the Belgrade-based Association of Serbs from the Republic of Serb Krajina and Croatia.

Association President Mihajo Vucinic said Wednesday the position of Serbs in Croatia was deteriorating still further, because they were exposed to the "Croatian national policy aim—the disappearance of Serbs from the Croatian territory".

Serbs in Croatia have no political rights, they are economically and physically jeopardized, so they can do nothing else but move out, said an appeal sent by the association to public figures in Serbia.

14,000 Serbs have been killed, over 300,000 Serbs expelled, 8,000 of them evicted from their homes and 3,000 Serb-owned houses have been blown up, since Croatia's violent secession from the former Yugoslav federation in 1991.

These numbers showing the exodus of Serbs can only vaguely indicate personal tragedies the Serbs have been experiencing in the conditions of the organized state terror, the association said in its appeal.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, special rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, in late February accused Croatia of violating human rights and committing terror over Serbs.

The Croatian committee of the Helsinki Watch organization said earlier this July that the Zagreb regime had not stopped violently evicting Serbs and former Yugoslav Army employees from their flats, even announcing more evictions.

Vucinic said the Serbs in Croatia had no right to use their language and Cyrilic script, they had no religious, civil and political rights. The position of Serbs in Croatia is unbearable in the situation when military factor grows stronger, he said.

Vucinic also said Croatian mass media had a devastating influence on forming the Croatian public opinion.

Croatian public opinion is extremely anti-Serb and a slogan "Serbs, damn you, wherever you are" is back again, Vucimic said.

Serbs Protest Army Helicopter Overflights

LD1307161294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1524 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] Vukovar, 13 Jul (TANJUG)—Croatian Army helicopters overflew the territory of the republic of Serb Krajina in the Otok-Komletinci-Njemci direction on two occasions today, the press centers of the main headquarters of the Serb army of Krajina and of the Slavonija-Baranja Corps have reported.

The report also said that the command of the Slavonija-Baranja Corps has lodged a vigorous protest on this with UN Protection Forces representatives, warning that the recurrence of such incidents will be dealt with energetically.

Despite the cease-fire agreement and several conclusions by the mixed commissions, the report says, Croatia is again carrying out provocative military activities in the Slavonija-Baranja Corps operational zone.

Serbs Launch Infantry Attack on Mount Dinara

LD1307173894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] Early this morning Serbs launched a surprise infantry attack on positions of the Croatian Army in the Mount Dinara region of the Sinj hinterland. They also tried to smuggle in a reconnaissance and sabotage group. Blaz Peric reports from Sinj:

[Peric] The enemy attack was repelled owing to the timely action of Croatian defenders. On this occasion two members of the enemy paramilitary formations were probably killed, while several were injured. This unsuccessful action by the enemy was supported by antiaircraft guns fired from strongholds in Obodina, Keman, and Opcenjak; two Croatian defenders were wounded.

A report received from the political department of the Croatian Army's Split operational zone says that all three strongholds are supposed to be under direct UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] control—according to the Zagreb agreement—while heavy weaponry used by the enemy on this occasion should have been withdrawn to 10 km from the demarcation line.

UNPROFOR representatives were at once informed of the attack; they went to the scene of the incident during the day. Near the location where the enemy paramilitaries were found UNPROFOR representatives discovered a rucksack, a silencer for an automatic rifle, five antipersonnel mines, two rounds of ammunition for an automatic gun, Motorola radio equipment, and other items, including UN food rations.

President Gligorov, Ministers Talk With Farmers

AU1307172294 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 13 Jul 94 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Agriculture Has Prospects"]

[Text] Bitola, 13 July— Yesterday President Kiro Gligorov visited a number of villages in the region of Bitola, accompanied by Eftim Ancev, minister of agriculture, forestry, and water supply and Gjuner Ismail, minister of culture. They were invited by the Bitola Association of Individual Farmers. President Gligorov first visited the village of Mogila, where he was met by a large number of farmers who celebrated a great religious holiday yesterday, thus they were free of duty.

Talking about the achievements and prospects of Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] agriculture, President Gligorov said that it can be further promoted and that it has a prospect of being sold on foreign markets. The inhabitants of this village introduced the president to its achievements and its agricultural records, but they also informed him that there is no water supply or telephone line in the village. President Gligorov promised that he would do his best to solve their problems, as well as those of other villages who are trying to solve the daily problems related to their engagement in agricultural production. Accompanied by a number of farmers of the individual and state sector, President Gligorov also visited a number of other villages in the Pelagonija region. He visited the villages of Budakovo, Trap, Dedebalci, and he stopped to talk to farmers. In the village of Dedebalci, President Gligorov also said the following: "We are a country which should involve special efforts for the promotion of agricultural production, but in order to achieve this, first of all, we need peace. Macedonia has shown the world that it can survive and that it wants to foster peace and we must struggle with all our forces to maintain it. Although being in the Balkans, Macedonia has its face turned toward Europe."

After that President Gligorov visited "St. Bogorodica" Monastery near the river Crna Reka, in the vicinity of the village of Novaci. This monastery is under construction and it is the only such in the Pelagonija region. He was cordially met by the people there, as well as at the canning factory where he was shown the process of sour cherries fabrication and the canning of other products. During his stay with the farmers of Bitola, President Gligorov visited "Zito-Bitola" where they are collecting the wheat of this year's harvest. There he was informed about the harvest of wheat and some other possibilities for further investments in the agricultural area.

In the afternoon President Gligorov attended the promotion of a new periodical NOVA ZORA in the village of Kukurecani.

European Census Experts Reject Criticism

AU1307185094 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 13 Jul 94 p 4

[Report by S. L. : "Sanctions—After Data Control"]

[Text] Two nights ago, at midnight, the census of the population, households, apartments, and farms in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] was completed. This is the first phase of the irregular statistical endeavor, Census 94. Viewing the situation at this juncture, the State Census Commission detected some irregularities in the implementation of the census. Such irregularities were noted in Kumanovo, Gostivar, Kicevo, Struga, as well as in some Skopje communes like Kisela Voda, Karpos, Cair, Centar, and Gazi Baba, where the methodology for carrying out the census was not fully applied, as well as Article 38 of the Law on Census related to the identification documents and citizenship certificates.

According to Jela Markovska, secretary of the State Census Commission, Article 4, related to persons who should be included in the census was also not respected, and the same happened with Article 30, which defines the appointment of census officers from the different nationalities, according to which the census officer is obliged to inform the people that they have the right to use the Macedonian language or one of the languages of the nationalities—Albanian, Turkish, Vllach, Romany, and Serbian. Beside these irregularities, the Commission also noted activities of some political parties, that is the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity], the NDP [People's Democratic Party], and the Democratic Alliance of Turks, who politicized the census in some communal assemblies. It was also noted that some citizenship certificates had irregular signatures and stamps, without record numbers, and the same situation was noted with copies of citizenship certificates. It was also found out that the expert group had cooperated with some political parties, contrary to the memorandum on the interpretation of the census; that they had contacts with members of communal commissions of different nationalities, and that they were giving opinions and proposals that did not coincide with the law. They had also engaged interpreters who do not understand the professional terminology, as well as others who intentionally provided incorrect interpretations.

As far as the punishment for such irregularities is concerned, Markovska explained that at this stage this cannot be a subject for discussion because the second phase of the census is forthcoming, which will monitor the quality and quantity of the data. If the assessment is that there are bases for punishment, the punishment regulations of the law will be applied, providing for a fine of two to 10 salaries for companies, banks, saving houses, security associations, financial organizations, citizens' associations, in the event they did not provide any data or presented incorrect data about their employees. On the other hand, a person refusing to give

data or who has given incorrect data, or refused to take part in the census as a census officer, as an instructor, or controller, without justification, will also be fined one-tenth or half of his salary, or be put in prison for 60 days. The same sanctions will be applied to persons who leaked confidential data and did not act lawfully.

As Markovska said, if necessary, there is the possibility of implementing Article 57 of the Law, which provides for a repetition of the census in some census zones where irregularities have been noted. However, at this stage it is still not possible to give precise answers about the places where this measure can be applied, not until all data are gathered in the second phase. Moreover, according to Markovska, we cannot say that the number of the people included in the census will make the census a success, because a summary of the data is expected to take place in which the number of the citizens abroad will have to be calculated, and 30 days are needed for this operation.

[Box, p 4]

Over 90 Percent of Tetovo Citizens Registered

[Text] The census ended in Tetovo and its commune two nights ago at midnight. The adding up of the total results is now taking place. As president of the Communal Census Commission Sakir Aliti said that according to partial information over 90 percent of the citizens in this region have been registered. The census has been completed in over 95 percent of census zones in Tetovo, while the census has been only partially completed in the remaining five percent, for subjective reasons.

Yesterday, some citizens came to the Tetovo Assembly asking for registration, although the deadline was over. They were registered but not taken into consideration for the census, because the deadline must be respected in Tetovo, too, and the Tetovo Communal Census Commission was informed in writing that the census was to end on 11 July, at midnight.

According to Jovan Mazganski, a state instructor, the Census 94 was completed in all 280 inhabited census zones in Gostivar, as well as in some 30 uninhabited census zones. Today census groups have been formed to control the census in 13 census zones.

The communal instructors completed and controlled the documents received from census officers. Today they are expected to indicate the population, household, apartment, and farm figures in the region of Gostivar, as registered in the census.

[Box, p 4]

Groundless Criticisms by State Census Commission

Yesterday a statement was released in which it was said that the International Expert Group, appointed by the Council of Europe and the European Union to provide assistance to the Macedonian Government for the implementation of Census 94, was unpleasantly surprised and worried about some conclusions made at the session of the State Census Commission held on 11 July 1994.

The Expert group wants to inform the Macedonian public with this statement that the only reason for its presence here is the successful implementation of the Census throughout the country. With this goal, the Expert Group was entitled to access all people included in the census. The activities of the Expert Group and the Observer teams were always respectable and impartial, and in conformity with the law.

The group intends to continue its work regardless of the groundless criticism. The group found support in the warm reception of all the households it has visited throughout the country, the statement said.

New Government Secretary 'Unofficially' Appointed

94P20949B Skopje VECER in Macedonian 20 Jun 94 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Lence Sofronievska, Government Secretary"]

[Text] Lence Sofronievska, who has served as an adviser to the government of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], has been unofficially appointed secretary of the government.

Educated as a magistrate, Mrs. Sofronievska was a member of the presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Macedonia during the era of Jakov Lazarevski. She assumes the position of secretary of the government, which was vacated when Josif Talevski became a judge on the Constitutional Court.

Sofronievska's name has recently appeared in connection with the affair of the duty-free shops. The opposition asserts that her husband and the husband of Minister Without Portfolio Gordana Siljanovska acquired premises for duty-free shops preferentially before other candidates via "connections" with the ministry.

VMRO-DPMNE Deputy Chairman Interviewed

94P20545A Skopje PULS in Macedonian 18 Feb 94 pp 7-9

[Interview with Dosta Dimovska, deputy chairman of VMRO-DPMNE, by Sinisa Stankovic; date and place not given: "A Duchess From Skopje"]

[Text] *Dosta Dimovska, former Marxism professor and current deputy chairman of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], discusses the role of women in Macedonian society and politics; her love for poetry and philosophy and her "immunity" to Marxism; "cutting away" the historic past of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]*

from the ruling government's garnishes, the Macedonian's instilled hunger to disclose his own political positions; her understanding of the concepts of coexistence and international cooperation; Assembly Chairman Stojan Andov's deficit of good manners; the sins of the government; the leftwing parties and President Gligorov in the era of independence of the Republic of Macedonia; the role of the police in the splitting of the VMRO-DPMNE....

Believing that there is an equal sign between patriotism and nationalism in Macedonia, Miss Dosta Dimovska says that in Macedonia there is no national xenophobia or effusion of chauvinism, that the Yugo-nostalgists are the product of cheap Serbian propaganda, and that the policy of equidistance is being applied inconsistently.

[Stankovic] Why did you become attached to the VMRO-DPMNE when you became active in politics?

[Dimovska] To become a member of the VMRO-DPMNE in 1990 when it was heresy to think of an independent and autonomous Macedonia, that was more than audacious. Only the memory of the name [word indistinct] was introduced like a boogieman for individuals, and the authorities thereafter saw the VMRO members as enemies of the state who should be imprisoned or banned. For any patriot, it is a great challenge and an immense joy to participate in the establishment of an independent and democratic Macedonian state. It also ushered in a strong intellectual challenge. Some of my friends and longtime colleagues who espoused nationalist themes participated in creating the program goals and fundamental principles of the party. Thus, it was not by chance that we found ourselves in the same party and with the leader of the VMRO-DPMNE with whom I became acquainted in 1987 at a poetry-reading. I am personally convinced that the important changes which are essential for our country can be made above all by the young, honest patriots who, in this time of movement from one system to another and of the establishment of their own state, accept their participation in politics as a mission and as a duty toward their own nation.

[Stankovic] Does the deputy chairman of the VMRO-DPMNE still write poetry?

[Dimovska] I am the author of two books of poetry. The second is coming out in a few days, although it was offered to publishers several years ago and had was listed on the schedule at the "Kultura" publishing house, but because of the director, who was a member of the Central Committee of the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia], it was removed with the subterfuge that there were insufficient resources for publishing it. Fortunately, I found more understanding at the "Makedonska Kniga" publishing house, which does not divide authors according to their party preferences. In the past few years, however, I have not found much time to write because interesting and important events are happening every day, and some entail consequences, so my existence is being swept along just keeping myself on top of them. But, I am taking notes on the events of this time, and I hope that more tranquil times will come in which I will be able to prepare my notes for publication.

[Stankovic] In your opinion, what kind of place do women have in Macedonian society and politics in comparison with world practices?

[Dimovska] Under the previous regime, a policy of representation by ethnic quotas was conducted in the institutes, and the CK [Central Committee] of the SK [League of Communists] also stipulated what percentage of women should be represented in those same bodies. In my opinion, that is humiliating to any woman and brands her as unequal from the beginning. A woman in a multiparty system should participate in the labor market, in the marketplace of ideas, and in the political struggle as an individual on the same basis that men do. But unfortunately, in our environment, the public involvement of a woman is still viewed with suspicion, unlike in the Western countries where civic values and standards are dominant. For example, the United States is represented in the United Nations by a woman, Madeleine Albright, whom I admire personally, and, until recently, the British Government was led by Mrs. Margaret Thatcher. Even in Turkey, such changes have taken place that the government could be led by a woman. The VMRO-DPMNE is the only party in Macedonia with a woman in the top leadership, which is one reason, among others, why the party is said to be working like a European-style democratic party.

[Stankovic] Are you impressed by the unofficial title—the duchess [vojvotka]? What is the private Dosta Dimovska like?

[Dimovska] The title, duchess of Skopje, is not welcome to me, it would have been as if someone had called me the duchess of Windsor. Private? I must tell you that in the past three to four years, I have reduced private life to a minimum to the benefit of politics, and for that I have found support and understanding from my relatives and friends. Otherwise, I have lived in a one-room apartment, like a student's room, full of books, records, and tapes, artistic drawings and Macedonian folk art and crafts. There, sometimes, when I have time, I invite my close friends and relatives over for gourmet specialties that I make myself. I am also a passionate friend of nature and music, and I often read historical and political works and poetry.

[Stankovic] When they attack you because of anticommunism, they are most often recalling your professorial period when your specialty was Marxism....

[Dimovska] Since my youth, my preoccupation has been poetry and philosophy, and so it remains today. I was stimulated to study the so-called "pure philosophy," not Marxism, but Indian philosophy, Nietzsche, and Hermann Hesse. But in the meantime, they abolished the

gymnasia [classical high schools], introduced the so-called tracked education, and banned philosophy. On the basis of a directive from the CK of the SKJ [League of Communists of Yugoslavia], Marxist instruction was introduced at all levels. Thus, generations of philosophy professors who were trained for one thing taught another, that is, Marxism. That still did not free them from the so-called contamination and prescribed responsibility. And when there is no possibility of choice, an individual is, in a certain sense, guilty for what he was able to do, and not for what he could not choose. In the past few years, I have not put my name to any work or article in the field of Marxism. In the conditions created by a multiparty system, in which there is freedom of choice, my own personal choice as a political party is the VMRO-DPMNE. As a philosopher, I feel closest to Plato, Nietzsche, Camus, and Heidegger.

[Stankovic] What knowledge of Marxism did your former student Branko Crvenkovski demonstrate?

[Dimovska] I never was the teacher of the prime minister. It is true that I taught in 1980 at the "Georgi Dimitrov" Gymnasium, but not in his class, and I do not know why he expressed such a lie on the parliamentary rostrum. But, currently, they are trying to discredit political opponents with tales from the past. It is the same thing with the chairman of our party, Mr. Georgievski, whom they accuse of everything, although he did not participate in power and could not have been "contaminated."

[Stankovic] Why did the VMRO-DPMNE, in expressing its anticommunism, deny the significance of the NOB [People's Liberation Struggle] in the postwar development of Macedonia, when the NOB was, afterall, a positive force from the standpoint of the development of national consciousness?

[Dimovska] Those words alone show your personal attitude. For me, it is a fact that the historical past in Macedonia serves as the regime's decoration, while we, as a party that favors democratization in Macedonian society, are not able to judge it. My own, as well as the party's, position is that during the 50 years since the war, Macedonia was in a state of colonial subjugation to Serbia, with a delaying effect on development in all areas, ranging from the economy to culture. The entire *nomenklatura* went through Belgrade's personnel sieve. That self-restraint was made possible with the treachery of the same Macedonians led by Lazar Kolisevski and Vidoe Smilevski who, in addition to the "purge" of the Macedonian patriots conducted by Cento, prevented the unification of Macedonia and the establishment of an independent state. The legacy of that life can now be seen. Macedonia did not achieve what it could have had it been a united and sovereign state. The totalitarian regime allowed the communists to rule with the most brutal methods of repression, coercion, and the liquidation of those who thought differently and of their political rivals. In a Stalinist fashion, they were stamped out; we did not even dare to talk about those trials in public. Even today, through the VMRO-DPMNE's GLAS and DELO, the public is learning about the repressions, the condemnation of the ideas of the VMRO and of Macedonian sovereignty, and of the thousands of sentences for the so-called verbal misdemeanors. Patriotic feelings were prohibited and declared to be hostile to the interests of Serbo-communism. The national economy, culture, media, science, and even sports were marginalized, prescribed according to the "ethnic key" by Belgrade and through Serbianizing standards. To maintain itself in power, the former regime, as a totalitarian system, introduced mechanisms of installing fear; the consequences of this can still be felt today. Even now, the individual is afraid to state his own opinions publicly or to decide immediately for himself on political matters.

[Stankovic] Of whom, or of what, are the inhabitants of Macedonia currently afraid if they express their political positions?

[Dimovska] It seems to me that the fear was so instilled in the souls of the people that mechanisms of self-constraint were built into the conscience of almost every older person. Only self-willed people who kept a distance from the government could withstand such pressure. Especially at the time when plurlaism was introduced in Macedonia, the individual was afraid to abandon the old regime; he had reservations. And today, at a time of economic crisis and increasing technological surpluses, when repression from the political police exists, a person is afraid for his future. That, unfortunately, very often does not concern the intellectuals except for those honest excommunicates. But the others calmly sit apart as passive spectators while the state is formed and other people pull out the hot chestnuts. Only the conformists preserve the positions they acquired.

[Stankovic] Why do you often have a negative attitude toward Macedonian historiography?

[Dimovska] Considering that everything was measured by the ideological magnifying glass of the CK of the SKJ, historical sciences were under strict control by the regime. We had taboo terms, people, and events; retouched photographs of politicians who were not present at the event in question; falsifications made for the benefit of the ruling party and its political decor. This "improved" course of events and VMRO personalities are subjects to be studied, while the "nonapproved ones" are erased. Unfortunately, such conditions persist even now. We have counterarguments, but are few in numbers. It is never the task of the historian either to wipe clean or to impute things in history; he should present the objective situation, without pretentiousness and without interjecting personal political opinions. The individual alone will judge. His is the freedom of choice and of thought. He does not need intermediaries for the truth. How much should someone take the trouble to retain a monopoly of information about the truth in the era of computers, of mass communications which have created a global village, of the free circulation of people and of ideas? Any concealment of facts is impossible and

anachronistic. All over the world, you can freely retrieve original documents that are relevant to Macedonian history on any library's computer screen; for incomprehensible reasons, these documents are not yet available here.

[Stankovic] How would you define the concepts of nationalism and national consciousness in the Macedonian context?

[Dimovska] For me, patriotism, the love of the fatherland, and nationalism are identical. Nationalism in small states is not dangerous; it is not threatening. Nationalism is necessary for such a state's existence. It is essential for the survival of that people and state as the selfconsciousness about a sense of belonging and ties to a certain collective character, without which it would be like an amoeba, an undifferentiated cerebral mass lacking rules to identify its own in the world. The individual, as well as reality, are multilayered structures. We cannot ourselves prescribe even the concept of man; that concept is too broad and is empty without other attributes, without genes, a national language, culture, national sense of belonging, without one's own fatherland. In fact, the western countries that have had more than 200 years of democratic experience have equated national with civic; without a national state, it is not possible to establish a civic democracy.

National consciousness is suppressed every day at least by the Serbo-communist regime. A systematic enslavement of the conscience of the Macedonian was accomplished with 90 percent Serbian literature, press, and radio and television programs. We shall paraphrase Goce Delcev, who warned that, of all kinds of slavery, the most dangerous is the enslavement of the conscience. If the conscience is enslaved, there is no salvation for the nation. The representatives of Serbian propaganda in Macedonia know this very well, and every day, they strive to insert this systematically. The results of this pressure are still felt today. That is why our commitment is to be the national conscience in order to take care of the national history, language, culture, and economy. While we esteem our own nation, we can equally cooperate with other states. Nothing requires that we be unnoticed or that there is a right to deny our existence.

[Stankovic] Does national xenophobia exist in Macedonia? Are there outbreaks of chauvinism?

[Dimovska] I do not think that we have the phenomenon of national xenophobia involving attacks on national minorities in Macedonia. Likewise, there is no deep-seated hatred toward the nationalities. As a national party, in our conduct up to now, we have not been a cause for any outpouring of chauvinism or a widening of hatred with attacks on the nationalities. We have certainly criticized strongly the policies of some parties of the nationalities, especially those of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] and the NPD [People's Democratic Party] which have propagated the idea of federalizing Macedonia. In this context, there are pretentious statements, even from President Gligorov, that those in power in Macedonia deserve credit for peace. Peace in Macedonia is not created or decided upon by a single individual; all political subjects play a role in it. But, indirectly, it appears that someone wants to give credit to just one group. We can freely say that we, as a party, have tried to the extent that it was within our power, to ensure that interethnic conflicts that could escalate into a war did not arise.

[Stankovic] What do you think the concepts of interethnic cooperation and coexistence mean?

[Dimovska] The VMRO-DPMNE is in favor of respecting the rights of the minorities in accordance with international conventions and documents nad for minority rights in accordance with international norms, but we will not allow ourselves to be threatened in our own country, or that they should direct their efforts to threaten Macedonia, or that a paramilitary group be formed to carry out ethnic cleansing of Macedonians. The leadership of the PDP should accept that fact that, as the majority nation, the Macedonian is the constituent people in the Republic of Macedonia. Albanians cannot dispute our right and demand the status of a nation in two states. Considering the numerical aspect, they can only have the status of a minority. Any kind of attempt to establish territorial autonomy or to federalize Macedonia only worsens interethnic relations in the Republic of Macedonia. Unfortunately, such an anti-Macedonian policy of the PDP leadership is strengthened by the support it receives from the leftist parties and the state leadership whose own rule depends upon a coalition with that party. Perhaps you have noticed how much fear existed among the leftist parties before the convening of the PDP Congress, the SDSM even greeted the Albanian Ramadan, counselling the PDP membership to support the tendency in the leadership that was trying to remain in the coalition government.

The invented terms that were in the style of the old regime, such as "coexistence," are commonplace, but have no meaning for me. We can discuss the degree of civic freedom and liberties, the rights of the majority nation, the rights of the minorities, and the respect for the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Macedonia. All this hocus pocus—"ethnic keys," "proportional representativeness"—are just illustrations of the ideological type of the state leadership and the government. In keeping with totalitarian practice, problems were covered up with mystification, with new ways of speaking and terminology, with the aim of postponing any resolution of the problems, so that they could manipulate the individual, to waste time with political campaigns to prolong the rule by the heirs to the totalitarian regime.

[Stankovic] What is your appraisal of the recent period of sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia? To the extent that there have been failures, who do you think is guilty of them?

[Dimovska] The paradox facing us is that the leftist parties, with the SDSM in the lead, at the time of the elections, called for a reformed socialism and for a federal Yugoslavia in their political programs. This was also the postiion of President Kiro Gligorov. The same ones, who by usurping the electoral results with a so-called putsch of the democracy, grabbed power. At the time when they had to carry out decisions, to take steps to form a sovereign and independent Republic of Macedonia, they were unprepared. They still had a federal way of thinking and a predominant orientation toward Yugoslavia. Such a situation has brought Macedonia uncompensated damanges in the process of gaining its sovereignty.

The greatest is the responsibility of the chief of state, President Gligorov, who re-established the entire control of the government, controlling both the so-called expert government and the political government. For that, we have piled up examples and have talked about it in parliament many times, but unfortunately, the mechanism of "a delicate dictatorship" still functions in Macedonia. the VMRO-DPMNE was the only party which, during the elections, introduced a program for an independent Macedonia with its own army, currency, seal, flag, passports, customs system, control over airspace, international represntation, membership in the U.N. and in NATO, etc.. But, other forces in the course of events took our program goals, and tried to carry them out, like a magpie which decorates itself with foreign plummage. So that, it was not by chance that the preparations that Macedonia had to make at that time were delayed in comparison to Slovenia or Croatia which foresightedly anticipated their independence. Gligorov and the government allowed the Serbs to empty our coffers. Serbia took away a large amount of our currency reserves which they used directly to finance the war. The delayed release of Macedonians from the Yugoslav People's Army was meant to facilitate direct participation in the war on the Serbian side—during which we suffered 43 casualties and a large number of physically and psychologically injured people. Gligorov and Izetbegovic created an unclear policy with Europe and the United States. Such ambiguity, which in essence is supported by Macedonia, also clouded the referendum question that was concocted by Gligorov and held. The process of international recognition was very late in being raised and was initially undertaken by people who carried out foreign policy and who made big mistakes and putrid compromises (the greatest damage is that it is accepted that one should negotiate about things which no one negotiates, such as the name of our country), and now we hear that they have made other "compromises" which are detrimental to our people and state. For a long time, the world was not informed about conditions and the yearning for independence in Macedonia. The state leadership avoided restoring national unity—the state president began as the president of citizens from leftist parties, and not of the citizens who had decided in favor of Macedonian national parties. A common strategy on the part of political entities concerning national interests was not re-established. The JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] was allowed to take away armaments for which the Macedonians had saved for decades, that is, we were robbed. The government in power has prolonged the decision on the systemic laws which are necessary for completing the state system. With the delay in the privatization law, it has allowed the theft of capital, and it now legalizes that theft with this law. It did not permit the transformation of the police; the police still function like party police for the benefit of the SDSM. It did not advance laws for the transformation of the educational system. There are still monopolies in all areas; the most drastic is the monopoly exercised in the sphere of information and radio and television broadcasting. The government has obtained new credits and incurred debts for Macedonia, but no investments. Unacceptable and unworkable taxation decisions have been proposed. There have been inordinately severe violations of laws and of the constitution, as well as of the rights of citizens. The government led by Kiro Gligorov is striving to reduce democracy to mere decoration....

[Stankovic] What is the role of the VMRO-DPMNE in introducing the policy of equidistance and in the splitting into pro-foreign factions in Macedonia?

[Dimovska] The VMRO-DPMNE is a party of national unity. We appreciate the fact that the divisions of Macedonians into Serbophiles, Bulgarophiles, or even among Macedonian-Muslims, Macedonian-Catholics, and Macedonian-Orthodox must cease. National unity must be accomplished on the basis of two key goals: an independent Macedonian state and the introduction of European-style democracy. For the leftist parties to rule, however, the destruction of the Macedonian national parties is necessary, as is the coalescing with the parties of ethnic groups that openly violate the constitution and laws, working for the federalization of Macedonia. The people in power, who successfully passed Belgrade's personnel tests and who with all the political moves in the recent period supported and assisted the policies of Milosevic and of Serbia, now talk about the so-called policy of equidistance. I do not believe them considering how intensively they forced relations in all areas only with the northern neighbor, with all convenience for the import of goods with lower bids, cheaper telephone services in comparison with the other neighboring countries; the influx of professors from Belgrade to Skopje university in large numbers; the unimpeded encroachment of artists; despite the embargo, the distribution of the Serbian press and the unhindered trade of all kinds of goods, especially gasoline. If someone suggests cooperation on equal terms with neighbors or the circulation of the Bulgarian press and literature, he is considered suspicious and is accused of being an enemy. By the same token, why have cultural exchanges with other neighbors not become obsolete? It is very obvious this forcing of concerts of Serbian songs, the so-called Yugonostalgia. For me, it is understandable that Miladinov's "T'ga za Jug" [famous 19th century poem] should be recited and recognized, but it is not comprehensible that

Balasevic's "T'ga za Jugu" [Serbian poem] should be. At the time when the Macedonian state was being established, that they should have imposed colonial manners toward the Macedonian, that is more than villiany.

The VMRO-DPMNE is for cooperation and good-neighborliness with all. It is for free circluation of people, goods, and ideas. As a member of the UN, it is necessary to respect the resolutions imposing an embargo on Serbia in order to avoid assisting in the war and war crimes by violating the embargo. But we cannot, as a state, have an equal relationship with those powers that deny the existence of the Macedonian state and people, those who demonstrate bellicose intentions. The relationship should be based on reciprocity toward us and on mutual respect. Cooperation with Greece is equally important, but Greece's blackmail, that as a condition for cooperation the name, flag, constitution, and so forth be changed, is unacceptable. The contention and denial of the basic rights of Macedonians who live there is also unacceptable. They number over one million. We appreciate the assistance of Bulgaria in recognizing our state and hope that with the introduction of democracy in both countries, any person will be allowed to affirm his national identity, just as he desires, even as a Macedonian. And in both countries, there must be a stop to the politics of the cold war era and to the use of such terminology in order for a complete normalization of relations to occur. Relations with Albania must be based on noninterference in ther internal affairs of Macedonia in political life, on respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, and on respect for the rights of the minorities on a reciprocal basis.

[Stankovic] What are the reasons for the splits in your party (Bitola, Prilep, Ohrid, Skopje...). From what part of the membership are the various parties with new variations on the name VMRO formed after such splits?

[Dimovska] The fact is that the VMRO-DPMNE, as the largest party in the Republic of Macedonia, has its own local and opstina [township] committee in every place inhabited by Macedonians. It is also true that multiparty life in Macedonia has existed for only three years, so that it is not simple to establish a strong political organization at every level, to liberate people from old habits, to have functioning democratic mechanisms in a European-type party. Differences of opinion on specific questions in the party are a normal phenomenon and should not be suppressed. On the other hand, the so-called political police, which is under the control of the Social Democratic Alliance, does everything, literally, to weaken or destroy our party. This includes applying that recently revealed scenario and its Stalinist-style methods. If you analyze the so-called divisions in some committees, you will see that they have unfolded exactly according to this same scenario. The methods of Frckovski's police are transparent; the state functions best in the sphere of repressive measures, threats, oppression, and in staging political trials of our members. If you compare this situation with those in the former socialist countries, you will notice that similar scenarios have occurred with the opposition in Bulgaria and in Serbia. They behave according to the same schooling and use similar methods of ruling. the government forms some parties with derivations on the VMRO name with the aim of creating confusion in the electorate and of preparing the grounds for outlawing the name of our party. It is very interesting that these small parties, some of which do not have even 10 members, are finding themselves in the same predicament. You see, we—the party with the largest membership—must operate in these conditions. The the question arises: where do such parties derive the means for their loud advertisements in the media. When you examine the past of some of their leaders, you will see the consequences of the ever-present police of the old regime. In one way or another, they were connected with it.

[Stankovic] But, all of those people were in the top leadership of the VMRO-DPMNE. Why did you not reject them at the time if you realized their ties to the police?

[Dimovska] It is easy to ask that question in hindsight. As an opposition party, we did not have access to the documents as the government did. We had to find out slowly and independently.

[Stankovic] What is your appraisal of the work of the Macedonian parliament and of your work within it? You are frequently engaged in vehement verbal duels with Chairman Andov....

[Dimovska] In fact, this is the first multiparty parliament in the Republic of Macedonia, and it is an honor to be a member of it. Moreover, the fact that the membership is elected by the people makes their decisions historically significant. Above all, they act for the sovereignty of the Macedonian state. But, unfortunately, the domination of the leftist parties in parliament and their coalition majority create conditions for manipulating the work of the parliament which has Andov as its head who, in my opinion, publicly acts to devalue parliament as an institution by his behavior. The same could be said about the ineffectiveness of the parliamentary functions and about the obstructions by the opposition, forgetting those who are the most directly responsible: the so-called chairmanship that participates in planning poorly prepared sessions, that summons sessions before committee debates have been concluded, that evades setting a precise agenda because of what emerges from the leftist parties' caucus, and then, after 40 days without convening a session, proposes an agenda with more than 70-80 topics. The opposition cannot be responsible for the lack of convening of sessions or for their incompleteness, for the failure to pass laws and make decisions because, simply, it does not participate in a coalition with a parliamentary majority. To anyone in the world, whoever lives in a country with a parliamentary democracy, this situation is abundantly clear. For the ineffectiveness of each institution, the most responsible person is the one who heads that institution. And that is not just the case with parliament. For the past three years, the

chairmanship has avoided proposing new rules of procedure; the representatives use the procedural rules adopted in the delegate system. The coalition idiosyncratically and spontaneously suggests procedural rules and votes to suit their interests at the moment. Verbal duels with Mr. Andov occur because I cannot endure such rude manners, his interruptions of representatives. We must therefore approach the rostrum in order to yell at him about topics for discussion. I think that this is a deficiency in democratic manners and of general culture on his part.

It seems to me that in participating in the work of the parliament as a representative of the VMRO-DPMNE, contributing to the formation of the Macedonian state, often, and on many questions, even with representatives who support the government's position. Understandably, we have differences, and we have sharp verbal duels, but outside the assembly chamber, as a woman and a political opponent, I am respected by my political opponents. In the coming parliament, I hope that there will be a large number of women as representatives, that the parties will follow the example of the VMRO-DPMNE, which has the largest number of women as representatives, that is, a total of three. As a party, we will put forward a greater number of women as candidates in the forthcoming elections. I am convinced that we will win a majority in parliament, and with that, the first VMRO government in Macedonia will be formed.

Democratic Party Deputy Chairman Interviewed

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[Interview with Democratic Party Deputy Chairman Tortevski by Sinisa Stankovic; place and date not given: "Even the Moral Victor Is a Loser!"]

[Text] *Although he says that he does not want to be an exorcist and resemble television inspector Katani, the young 36-year-old lawyer and one of the founders of the League for Democracy, after the television appearance in which, with varying success, he voiced the attacks by his present party (the Democratic Party) against the republic authorities and their "winking" at criminal actions, has become a central figure in political commentaries—both positive and negative. After his education in the Georgi Dimitrov secondary school in Skopje, "with not very glorious success," he graduated from the Skopje Law School with a "relatively high average." That allows him, however, to have in his biography the statement that he was a member of the Macedonian League of Communists and to be employed after graduation as a professional associate in the Skopje District Court. After working there briefly, at age 28, in 1986, he became the youngest lawyer in Yugoslavia, which he considers an indication of his unique boldness and his desire to find himself in a free profession and to earn a better living. Today, in addition to legal work, he is very active in commerce as well, and is afraid of those who want to go down in history at any cost.*

[Stankovic] How and why did a lawyer and businessman, until then not prominent in politics, become one of the founders of the first party to compete with what was until then the sacred League of Communists?

[Tortevski] Politics has always interested me, but my involvement in it began in 1990 when the parties started to be formed. The first attempt to form a political party was made by Professor Djordje Marjanovic, and I, by signing the statement, became one of the founders of the League for Democracy. The main reason for that step was disagreement with the reality and with the people who were in power then. Professor Marjanovic's charisma also played a role in this. I was familiar with the content of his professional report, which caused a whole avalanche of reactions from the authorities, and I supported him. In the League... the main thing is that there was a circle of sympathizers (in the beginning it was a broader circle of people, who, with the increase in the number of parties, then dispersed in accordance with their choice of options)—in addition to Prof. Marjanovic, Bogomil Djuzel, Slavko Petrov, Srecko Arsovski, Radovan Cesmadziski, Jovica Ugrinovski, Jovan Panovski, Emil Anastasov... people with whom we simply did not have to talk in order to know who thought what.

[Stankovic] Why did those like-minded people decide to make their party a collective member of the newly formed Democratic Party?

[Tortevski] We felt that the battle for changes in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] was not evolving in the best way. During a relatively long period, the fundamental thing to us was that what we were saying should be intelligent, and we were satisfied if some of our demands and proposals were accepted. Nevertheless, when we realized that something was missing, we decided ourselves that what the League was missing was a bitter struggle for power, which the voters also sought. Most of the League's leadership are professionals in their fields, and they did not seek any particularly big opportunity in politics, but the struggle for power has to be crucial to a party. Although in all of the polls we showed a continuous improvement in our standing, we ourselves felt that we could not get far that way.

[Stankovic] Who voted for the League at that time? The prevailing view is that you were excessively elitist for current Macedonian politics....

[Tortevski] It is hard to answer this question, especially since a rumor was spread that we were a party of lawyers and doctors (something which our competitors tried to promote as a shortcoming on our part), although we thought that only the elite could get Macedonia out of the crisis. In a way we were not able to keep constantly denying those "explanations" of our elitism and closed nature. The main thing was that most of the voters did not want to vote for a party that did not give them an immediate chance of participation in ruling. One cannot

expect sympathizers to work hard without that kind of challenge and motive, but they are precisely the ones who should be mainly involved in the work, especially in small towns. Nevertheless, in contacts with our voters, we concluded that these were people who understood us and agreed with our goals.

[Stankovic] Does that mean that in Macedonia, playing the card of populism is more profitable than, let us say, elitism?

[Tortevski] It has been demonstrated in all the postcommunist countries that one can get into power most quickly and easily by playing the card of populism, but the consequences later on are very serious. Democracy certainly cannot be based on that card. Since we realized that it really was necessary to participate in ruling in order to achieve any changes whatsoever, and we thought that a merger of Macedonian parties had to take place (since Macedonia certainly does not need 60 parties), we decided to take that first step. It coincided with Mr. Petar Gosev's inability to carry out his ideas of changing the system in his party at that time, and even before that the League had respect for him because of his political activity, through which Macedonia, for the first time, truly became a political entity in the Yugoslav region. In the League itself, there were people who wanted to fight harder for power, and without this kind of step, we would have lost them. I think that the step we took was a good one, and we are still advocating the ideas that we had then—but now we have a chance of seriously influencing political life in Macedonia.

[Stankovic] Isn't there a conflict now within the Democratic Party, precisely because of the League's legacy, between two visions of the party's work and its future? Is there an arbitrary division between civil and national options?

[Tortevski] I do not share that feeling, but if anything like that does exist, it is quite normal. We cannot all blend into one opinion, and if we wanted absolutely like-minded people, we would have stayed in the League.... Macedonia is too small to have a party of exclusively like-minded people. There are no differences perceived with respect to what is "national" between the former members of the League... and those who were not members, since the League also reacted strongly to issues of national interest. That is acknowledged even by the parties that call themselves national ones, and some others even call nationalist. Even when we support a civil state, we think that it is a high national interest for Macedonia, and that the very dilemma between civil and national is a false one.

[Stankovic] How do you view the phenomenon of the Skopje Law School as a permanent "nursery" for personnel for all the political *nomenklaturas*?

[Tortevski] We as a state have constantly suffered from titles, and we have imposed upon ourselves a view that the title itself also means great expertise that can also be used in politics. That is how it also happens that all the personnel from the Law School also get their chance in politics and from time to time are in power: from the postwar period, through the "liberals" and Gogovski's government, to the present. It really is a phenomenon that except for Prof. Marjanovic, there are few people from the Law School who have not spent some time in power, but probably his time will come too.

[Stankovic] How do you explain the fact that we always have lawyers, experts, in the state leadership, but we can't build a law-governed state at all?

[Tortevski] It does not depend on the textbooks. We all know the definitions of how it can and should function, but the main question is the personal attitude toward it of those in power, i.e., whether there is a true desire to have a law-governed state function. There is no one in Macedonia who sincerely does not support a law-governed state, but everyone probably thinks that he has a right to violate some law just once, or even an ethical or moral standard—and when everyone individually exercises that right, we naturally get a non-law-governed state. We simply are not used to having responsible authorities. We do not accept the principle that what I allow myself, I also have to allow others, and that what I demand from others also applies to me.

[Stankovic] During the campaign period before the by-elections in Skopje electoral district 103, DELO accused the Democratic Party of "flirting with the current authorities in order to avoid a media witch hunt." You were even accused of buying "the old political prostitutes in journalism." What was the media's attitude toward your party in these elections?

[Tortevski] I think that the media did not pay enough attention to the elections themselves, which were otherwise vital just as an opinion poll on the parties, since that place did not mean anything to anyone, nor will the deputy—it will probably be Zore Temelkovski—be able to do anything. The elections were a useless waste of money and energy, since I think that this last Assembly session will never finish with this composition (the coalition partners will not dare to settle the issues put before them, and so it is very likely that after the electoral laws are passed, there will no longer be a quorum), and in practice the newly elected deputy will not even get into the Assembly. I think, however, that these were elections for a deputy in the republic Assembly, and that the media should have paid at least as much attention to them as to the Ukrainian elections, for example. Although the media also have a fear that promoting individual candidates will elicit accusations from the other side, it was strange that neither MTV nor the Skopje A-1 television channel showed the candidates who got into the second round, while several hours before the campaign blackout began, both the prime minister and the defense minister, who are members of the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia], were guests on both MTV and A-1. I don't think it's necessary to respond to the accusations about buying

journalists, and DELO could accuse us of anything but flirting with the authorities, since I think we are their harshest critics.

[Stankovic] On one hand, serious criticisms were made after the elections in the 103d about the impossibility of democracy's coming to life in this region, but on the other hand, you were frequently declared the moral victors. How would you comment on that?

[Tortevski] I don't like the words "moral victors" very much, since ultimately, that still means a loser, and I am not a person who likes to lose. Nevertheless, the fact is that we are the moral victors because after the scarcely eight months that this party has been in existence, it won that many votes in a competition with the three coalition partners, which also had the support of the news media. Furthermore, that was with a relatively unknown candidate, who was elected precisely by our municipal branch that covers the 103d. With respect to the possibility of democracy in Macedonia, we would not have fought for it at all if we had not believed in it. We really are "inspired" by the way that the ruling party always finds new possibilities for new votes. Just analyze what happened in the two rounds of the recent voting. Since the Constitutional Court did not concede that the voters had to be identified (unfortunately, it did not have the enough courage to annul the first round), in the second round, in response to our request, it avoided the possibility that those who had possession of the voter lists could use them to increase the number of their adherents by 700-800, but nevertheless the electoral district was expanded by several streets. Procedure was violated by the very fact that the residents of those streets were not allowed to vote in the first round, and so some people voted once and then some other people voted in the second round. The coalition has an excuse that it always uses: "Whoever loses has the right to get mad"—and we, in the end, congratulated the winner. We believe, however, only in democratic means of change in Macedonia, since allegations that the authorities cannot be overthrown by democratic means are truly dangerous.

On the other hand, the coalition partners showed their skill in the pamphlet that they dropped into the mailboxes of the voters in the 103d. It said that whoever voted for the coalition candidate "supports President Gligorov's policy." That reminds me very much of the anecdote about the biggest fan of the Sloga soccer club in Skopje. In response to a question about how he justified the claim that his favorite club was the best in the world, he regularly answered, "Sloga beats Balkan, Balkan once beat Vardar, Vardar beat Zvezda several times, and Zvezda once beat Real, which is the best in the world. Consequently, Sloga is the best club in the world!" According to the same principle, pressure was also exerted in favor of the coalition candidate!

[Stankovic] In view of the results in the 103d, can one expect the opposition to merge in the upcoming elections?

[Tortevski] We do not have an official party position on that issue yet, but the fact that the opposition won the most votes in this electoral district also showed our real strength, and ranked us higher as a party—especially in the eyes of the leadership of VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity], which, I hope, will realize that we are the strongest opposition party at this time. We will have to discuss that issue, and I think that it is very important for the present coalition to be removed from power, even if it wins the next elections again, since the consolidation of one party in power over a long period of time cannot do Macedonia any good.

[Stankovic] Although your debate with the SDSM representative, Nikola Popovski, was only watched by viewers on Skopje TV's A-1....

[Tortevski] That is not true—another 18 private TV stations broadcast the film of that debate, which really is good.

[Stankovic] After that debate, it was an open question whether you think that there really is organized crime in Macedonia, and that representatives of the republic's executive branch are involved in it.

[Tortevski] Such a characterization per se is dangerous and serious, and a great deal of time is needed to find evidence of it. Actually, I could not present evidence of such an organization now, but of course everything is not clean. I don't want people to get the impression that I am now some sort of exorcist, but as a person critical of the authorities, I will always advocate responsible authorities and a situation in which the people in power will behave perfectly during their term. Personal profit has to be left for some other time, and the office has to be conducted honestly.

[Stankovic] Although during the debate you stated that your purpose was not to present dirty laundry, that is what most of the discussion looked like to the viewers....

[Tortevski] Probably, but whenever I give a certain example of negative behavior, please believe that I don't have anything against that person. I am a friend of most of the people I mentioned on TV, and with respect to some of them, I have a very high opinion of their expertise. That is particularly the case with Minister Siljanovska, but I think that the way in which her husband received a license for a duty-free shop is absolutely impermissible—impermissible from moral and political standpoints. People in office have to freeze their desire for profits and privileges while they are "ruling." Unfortunately, no one is immune to such desires, and in our country people react even more hysterically when cases with full names are indicated. Just remember what the previous Italian government was accused of, but in our country, unfortunately, there are still taboo topics, and people still talk about negative elements evasively. I do not perceive the party struggle as exchanging compliments and talking up one's sleeve, and I think that all the

names that I mentioned in the context of certain unacceptable actions can only benefit from that. If what I said is not true, they can only benefit, and if it is, at least they will not repeat their mistakes, if they are aware that they are subject to some sort of control.

[Stankovic] But according to your assertion, what is involved is about half a billion dollars transferred to private pockets—all in the name of the state and national interest, and according to some assertions, that figure can even be doubled. Why isn't anyone being held accountable for that?

[Tortevski] Simple mathematics can prove that the amount is accurate—if the state, under these difficult conditions, managed to earn $120 million, and all those who know even a little about the oil business know that the state was left almost empty-handed (which is also confirmed by Mr. Popovski from the SDSM, who stated that private businessmen "skimmed off the cream"). Perhaps assertions about some sort of organized crime cannot be stated, but this is all certainly being done with the government's blessing. Thus, with individual firms having privileges in the profitable business with our northern neighbor, centers are being created—for the time being only centers o financial power, but in the near future, of political power as well. Imagine what a political campaign will look like if several hundred thousand dollars have been invested in it.

[Stankovic] To what extent have the Serbian partners really been able to dictate to the government the conditions (read: firms) with which they will explicitly cooperate in the trade in fuels?

[Tortevski] It is a fairy tale. I do not consider trade with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] to be smuggling, for the simple reason that with our legal standards, it will be hard to find arguments for anything like that. A UN resolution really does exist, but according the legal principle of extreme necessity, which rules out responsibility for a harmful consequence if the perpetrator has been forced to do it, Macedonia was put in the position of violating the embargo or drowning—i.e., not smuggling, but extreme necessity. The international community is not even trying to cover our enormous damages, and we have to survive. The profits from such activities, however, should have been strictly controlled and should have ended up in the state treasury.

[Stankovic] Doesn't part of the pie—the forced violation of the embargo—however, belong to the government?

[Tortevski] There are indications that Macedonia profited considerably. Ultimately, if the money was collected by private businessmen who are citizens of Macedonia, the money will be in circulation in it and will serve its interests. Unfortunately, during one period enormous money was earned only by Serbian and Greek firms, which cooperated directly, using Macedonia only as a transit area.

The government has to find an answer to the question of how much private interests have been concealed behind state and national interests. Perhaps the state interest was to obtain electricity in exchange for oil, but the state still left that vital product, worth $500 million, to private businessmen, which is intolerable. Western donor countries, feeling pangs of conscience about the historic precedent and everything that they are doing to us in setting conditions regarding Macedonia's name and symbols, are giving us what one might call certain symbolic amounts, but their representatives here are received at the highest level. Or here is an even more drastic example: Mr. Soros, after giving us $2.5 million to purchase corn, felt at liberty to tell us in front of our president that our flag was wrong! Thus, in exchange for $2.5 million, we listened to lectures like school children, but let $500 million slip out of our hands!

[Stankovic] Can the numerous possibilities for bribery and corruption to become part of the way of life here even be avoided?

[Tortevski] As soon as there is a lot of administration and bureaucracy, there also have to be many channels for giving bribes. It can only be avoided through comprehensive liberalization and rigorous control. Above all, possibilities for giving bribes have to be avoided institutionally. It is incredible stupidity to ban residents of the FRY from exporting fuel in auxiliary tanks out of our country. I was a witness when one customs officer punctured the tank of a car belonging to a traveler from the FRY, but a simple calculation can prove that Macedonia profits from that business. Hungary, for example, opened about 40 gas pumps at all the border crossings, at which lines of FRY citizens leave the Hungarian treasury 80 pfennigs for each liter of fuel purchased. And Hungary is not violating the sanctions. But we puncture tanks! With prohibitions like that, our customs officer can fall into the temptation of letting someone through in exchange for 100 German marks [DM], and the circle is opened.

[Stankovic] It seems that almost all the media explosions in the last two years have involved the Ministry of Internal Affairs. What is your position on this issue?

[Tortevski] It is certainly one of the most sensitive ministries at this time, and a ministry which, unfortunately, assumes too many powers that it does not have. The government is either giving the Ministry of Internal Affairs permission to do this, or else it is tacitly permitting it. By whose authority did the money from the first free shops that were granted go into the Interior Ministry's acount? While the problem with the last five free shops was more of an ethical one, in the case of their predecessors the issue was the special account to which the money was transferred. The cars are a separate story. I really cannot stand the sight of a Mercedes whose front license plate says "Police," and which is worth DM280,000. Now, when someone donates DM2 million to us poor people, he is received by the president, but the Interior Ministry has in its fleets an automobile that is

advertised in Great Britain with the sentence, "If you are crazy enough to spend 95,000 pounds, buy it!" This should not be interpreted as party propaganda, but I think that it is intolerable for the state services to have such automobiles at this time. Let's not even talk about the serious crisis, the workers unemployed because of bankruptcies, the foreign exchange depositors.... But it really is dishonest to spend several million marks on automobiles. A Berlusconi who also has such an automobile at home can afford it, so why let his personal comfort decline? In our case it is politically tasteless, like the modernization of the Interior Ministry motor pool with Volkswagen Ventos. The question for a political and economic assessment is whether it really is essential for the necessary modernization of the motor pool to be done with such expensive automobiles. The Interior Ministry is also interfering intolerably in other things: How can one justify the fact that it has been left to the police to supervise the oil trade?

[Stankovic] As a lawyer, how do you view the confusion over the courts' jurisdiction or lack of it in the scandal over the "All-Albanian Paramilitary Army"?

[Tortevski] Ever since the beginning, this scandal was accompanied by a definite desire to suppress it. Even your newspaper forgot about it after the first harsh article on this subject. I think that the current authorities did everything possible to cushion the scandal, which could have made its position worse in many respects. If the identities of all those involved in this scandal had been made public, the government would have had to resign. Unfortunately, those responsible succeeded magnificently in extricating themselves from the scandal—through the delay in arresting Mithad Emini, which also evoked reactions and disgust in the public prosecutor's office, through the watering down of things that made the judicial bodies' work more difficult, etc. The story with the courts' jurisdiction is the same thing. I don't want to downplay any court, but if we make a comparison with the so-called "bombing" group from a few years ago (which placed symbolic explosive devices in several places in the city, at a time when they were certain that there would be no consequences or casualties, in order to make the Macedonian public understand the issues that were being kept quiet—Macedonia's position in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the position of the Macedonians in Greece), which was tried and sentenced to long prison terms, in a closed trial in the District Court—the present scandal, in which the defendants are being put in a privileged position through the transfer of jurisdiction to the Municipal Court, also really raises many questions. Above all, the seriousness of their crime is being reduced. Why?

[Stankovic] Both the Democratic Party and you personally are harsh critics of the temporary name under which we were admitted to the UN....

[Tortevski] That is correct, since that concession did not gain anything except a profound insult.

[Stankovic] But do you think that anything practical, aside from satisfying national pride, would have been achieved by being insistent and refusing to accept the condition for admission to the UN? Regardless of how hypothetical a question it is, can you give us an answer as to what really would have been gained by not accepting the conditions?

[Tortevski] It is not a matter of national pride, but rather the consequences of too facile an acceptance of the artificial name, the kind of consequences that we already have in Australia, where Macedonians are being rechristened. Just our consenting to discuss that subject created an opportunity for many people to point out to us what we should call ourselves. One cannot bargain over some things! What is most dangerous in the whole affair is the fact that someone dared to weigh the benefits of accepting or not accepting the temporary name. Who were those who sat and made such a decision, and who gave them a mandate for anything like that? The temporary name is slowly becoming a permanent one, since it is not clear to everyone that we will have to bear it until the problem with Greece is resolved, and it will probably never be resolved. We have not yet clarified what that acceptance means. It is clear to me that it is an ordinary waiting period—until the adoption of some new name. Talking about that subject would take us to extremes, but the essence of the dispute with Greece is not over the name, but rather Greece's desire for a common border with Serbia, and for a situation in which Macedonia, as part of some federation or confederation, would not have its own foreign policy. I simply think that accepting the artificial name did not change anything.

[Stankovic] Nevertheless, we are a UN member now, which opened up the doors of the world financial institutions for us, and that also played a role with respect to Macedonia's security....

[Tortevski] Bosnia was admitted to UN membership too, and now they are partitioning it. I am convinced that the issue of Macedonia's sovereignty was already settled by the American signal given to President Milosevic when we weren't UN members. Even without membership, I think that we would have received some financial aid. It is precisely for that reason that I think that the loss is bigger than the gain. Our only alternative is to insist on our constitutional name and to continue the negotiations with Greece. of course, I am not denying everything that President Gligorov has done in foreign policy, which is encountering sympathy in the world, but I think that they agreed too easily to change our name.

[Stankovic] What are your views of Macedonia's future diplomatic activities?

[Tortevski] There is a saying that what was born has to be rocked, and so even if something changes in the upcoming elections, it would not be desirable, and it would even be very difficult, to take a step backward. Macedonia has to continue on its own course and let all its neighbors know its strategy.

[Stankovic] What would that mean in practice for Macedonian-Greek relations?

[Tortevski] Insanity does not have borders, and it usually escalates. The hysteria reigning in Greece means that they still have not overcome the complex of being a small people in a world framework. Samaras is now bringing up another dangerous issue for Macedonia—a referendum on the name—but in my opinion this has to do with Greece's complex, which was also emphasized by Mitsotakis in one interview with the statement about Greece being "our powerful southern neighbor." Anyone who talks aloud about his own power has to be asked about his complexes. And what kind of power is that in comparison with Greece's other neighbors, for example Turkey? In any case, time will be needed for the euphoria to subside. We are in a difficult encirclement, which even in the future ensures us that the valves will be shut off and that there will be possible blackmail if there are certain changes on the political scenes in Albania and Bulgaria, but we have to prove that we are not threatening anyone and that we will persist in our own course.

[Stankovic] Doesn't that imply, above all, an internal consolidation of relations?

[Tortevski] What should particularly concern us is that it will be very difficult to avoid foreign influences in Macedonia. The Albanian parties that are sharing power in Macedonia, in order to solve their own problems, are turning to Albania. Certainly there will be influences from Bulgaria and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but a state and national strategy will have to exist in regard to them. From that standpoint, I am afraid of the imposed census, since I am not certain what those who are imposing it intend to do, and whether they have a strategy of their own, depending on the number of Albanians in Macedonia, however large it is. In particular, I think that something is being prepared among certain members of the Albanian parties. If the arrested Emini was the "moderate faction," according to everyone's opinion, what will we do with the "hard-line faction"? I am not convinced that the daily arrests of groups smuggling weapons reflect ordinary smuggling, and that they are not mutually related. The arms and drug smuggling that has been uncovered, however, is only the tip of the iceberg. It is precisely for that reason that I am so pessimistic about the future. Some of the Albanian leaders, I believe, will try to radicalize relations, although I hope that people's consciences will start to function and that things will not end tragically. Nevertheless, the Bosnian lesson, in which there are no winners, will perhaps neutralize interethnic radicalization in Macedonia. Otherwise we would all be losers, and that would also lead to many "saviors" from outside. I am still very frightened, however, by the people who want to go down in history at any cost, and who are not capable of estimating the number of victims that would be necessary for their "immortalization."

Drnovsek, Valentic 'Satisfied' With Talks

AU1207152794 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 9 Jul 94 p 2

[Report by Romana Dobnikar Seruga: "Drnovsek and Valentic Did Not Raise Unrealistic Expectations"]

[Text] Brdo, 8 July—Slovene and Croatian Prime Ministers Drnovsek and Valentic are evidently satisfied with their comprehensive talks. Despite this, they did not wish to raise any unrealistic expectations or additionally agitate the public in both countries at today's news conference.

They did not want to announce the signing of a new agreement at the meeting that will take place in Zagreb on 22 July, and Dr. Janez Drnovsek, replying to a question on this, only said that their views "have come very much closer" and that they would try to resolve the main problems over the next few days and weeks. As for details, that is to say, "the utmost limits of adjustment," they did not wish to discuss this because they supposedly both have to check them out "at home" first.

It is significant that Valentic indicated that the Croatian side favors dealing with the remaining three most sensitive and open problems, that is the questions surrounding the Slovene-Croatian border, the debt of the Zagreb branch of the Ljubjanska Banka, and the ownership of the Krsko nuclear power station, "in a package."

The Slovene and Croatian delegations at the lower state level will meet several more times over the next two weeks and the prime ministers of both governments will be in telephone contact all the time so as to be able to resolve possible obstacles in the preparations for the Zagreb meeting as they arise.

The Slovene and Croatian prime ministers will also attend the meeting of the Central European Initiative in Trieste next Friday. Regarding the issue of the Ljubljanska Banka, which is very important for the Croatian Government because it is facing great pressure from public opinion, which believes that it has so far been too soft in its actions, the talks, according to Valentic, again managed to resolve numerous open problems. The Croatian prime minister believes that the problem of the Krsko nuclear power station will be the easiest to solve of the remaining three.

LDS To Discuss 'Housing Affair,' Coalition

AU1407082094 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 12 Jul 94 p 2

[Report by Dejan Pusenjak: "Party Will Grow Stronger After the Housing Affair"]

[Text] Izlake, 11 July—The most prominent officials of the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia [LDS] gathered in a hotel in Medijske Toplice for party consultations for the second time this year. Apart from some deputies and members of the party's caucus, the meeting (which was closed to the public) was also attended by Sports and Education Minister Dr. Slavko Gaber and Environment Minister Dr. Pavle Gantar.

Party President and Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek described the topic of today's meeting as a discussion, that is to say, an assessment of the current political situation. Among the most pressing matters that the LDS leadership discussed today, Drnovsek singled out the relations between Slovenia and Croatia and Slovenia and Italy, the relations with foreign commercial banks, and some laws that are expected to be discussed in the State Chamber in the near future.

The question of the coalition is not the most pressing one at the moment, Dr. Drnovsek said, even though it was discussed at the meeting. He announced that the LDS's reply to the conclusion of the caucus of the Slovene Christian Democrats, which called for the finalization of negotiations on a twofold coalition, will be known by September. As Drnovsek says, by then the LDS will also consider other options that would secure the stable functioning of the coalition. According to Drnovsek, at the moment there are no sufficient guarantees that a twofold coalition could truly secure a firm majority in parliament and, thus, the existent coalition is still topical for him.

As Drnovsek said, he also wanted to verify his opinion about the so-called housing affair at today's meeting. He said that some of the criticism will to be accepted and certain things will have to be changed. According to him, the housing sphere should be regulated and clearer rules of the game should be set. Drnovsek is convinced that his party can grow stronger and more mature because of this affair.

Drnovsek based his view about the strengthening of the party and its more mature policy after the experiences learned in the housing affair on the premise that the affair gave the party an opportunity to prove it can and knows how to overcome various crises. He personally replied affirmatively to this question. The resignation of Justice Minister Miha Kozinc was, he said, a suitable way to resolve open questions of this type and, at the same time, also an opportunity to finally regulate the housing sphere. Regarding the arms' affair, he believes that it should be fully investigated.

FYROM Quotas Disrupt Free Trade Agreement

AU1307085494 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 8 Jul 94 p 3

[Report by Branko Vodusek: "In Relations With Macedonia We Are Cutting the Branch We Sit On"]

[Text] Maribor, 7 July—A visit of a Slovene, pronouncedly Maribor-based, economic delegation to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] on the day when higher import tariffs for Slovene goods came in effect in this country did not satisfy the expectations of either side. The countries that

signed a free trade agreement now trade just as if this agreement had never been signed. Because Slovenia started restricting the import of the Macedonian wine with contingency quotas that did not satisfy Macedonian expectations and were contrary to the free trade agreement, retaliatory measures have ensued.

First, the Macedonian side raised the import tariffs from the insignificant 1 percent to 17 percent, however, as of now, 38.5- percent tariffs apply for the majority of Slovene goods in Macedonia. This means that, price-wise, the Slovene goods are no longer competitive on the Macedonian market, as numerous multinationals are moving into this country with promotional prices that the Slovene companies cannot afford to offer. The economic delegation that returned from Macedonia today concluded that Slovenia should not be so indifferent toward a country with whom it realized $300 million of trade in the previous year. For the Slovene economy, Macedonia is considerably more important than, for example, the United States.

In the negotiations on wine, which represents a serious trade problem for Macedonia even though it only accounts for a few percent in the trade structure, the Slovene side did not manage to find a solution that would allow the temporary import of Macedonian wine without taxation and import tariffs that we could process into vinegar and export.

The Macedonian businessmen, who are well acquainted with an action of the Slovene Customs Office—which had first seized cookers of a Macedonian manufacturer because it had discovered a part of Serbian origin in them and afterward sold them at auction—reproach the Slovene partners most for not being able to balance out the trade with this country. Slovenia exports twice the amount of imports to Macedonia, however, despite this fact, demands for retaliatory measures in response to the latest Macedonian Government measures are rising in Slovenia.

Federal

Government Prepared for Dialogue With Albanians

LD1207200994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1954 GMT 12 Jul 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, July 12 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Minister for Human Rights and Minorities Margit Savovic said Tuesday the government was always ready for dialogue with the Albanian minority on all issues, except requests of its political leaders for self-determination and secession of the Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet) province from Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.).

In a talk with Belgian parliamentary delegation, which was especially interested in whether the government was prepared for dialogue with the Albanians in Kosmet, Savovic pointed out that all the attempts so far by the authorities to establish dialogue spinned precisely around this question, a Federal Information Ministry statement said.

A strong separatist movement of ethnic Albanians has been very active in Kosmet for the past two or so decades. Their political leaders urge secession of the province from Yugoslavia and Serbia and joining it to the neighboring Albania.

Savovic thanked the delegation, headed by Senate member Jeff Ulburghs, but noted no participation of a third party in assisting such dialogue was acceptable because this was Yugoslav territory and the Constitution offered the framework for resolving such problems.

Savovic said Albanians in Yugoslavia were a minority and that, like other minorities, enjoyed all the rights in the areas of information, culture and education, all in keeping with international standards. She also recalled that they never had the status of a constituent people in Yugoslavia.

Pointing out especially the situation regarding human rights, she noted that, just as in other countries, there were individual violations of human rights, but that there could be no talk about massive human rights violations, as some malicious people in the world would like to ascribe this to Yugoslavia.

The Serbian Parliament Foreign Policy Committee President, Slobodan Jovanovic, also received the delegation. He stated the conviction that in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and beyond, peace was closer that ever before.

The international community has discouraged those who wish for a continuation of the war, he said, a statement from the Serbian parliament set out.

Jovanovic pointed out that there were never any obstacles in the way of dialogue with Kosovo Albanians put forth by the Serbian side. However, there was no dialogue because the Albanians boycotted political life of Serbia and Yugoslavia.

The basic problem was secession which the Albanian side stubbornly urges, assessed Jovanovic. He said he hoped the Albanians would understand the need for dialogue and normal participation in the political and social life in Yugoslavia.

The head of the delegation urged dialogue of the Albanians with the federal and republican authorities and stressed that Kosmet was an internal problem of Serbia so that any outside interference would be dangerous as it would have created new problems.

Speaking about the CSCE request for its mission's mandate to be renewed in Serbia, Jovanovic said that Serbia did not oppose the CSCE mission's presence, but an essential condition was mutual acknowledgement, recognition and Yugoslavia's equality-based participation in the work of the CSCE.

Yugoslavia was suspended from the work of the CSCE over its alleged involvement in the civil war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Serbia

Milosevic Meets With UK's Hurd, France's Juppe

LD1307184294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1741 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] Belgrade, 13 Jul (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received British and French Foreign Ministers Douglas Hurd and Alain Juppe and discussed topical issues related to the peace process in former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As announced by the office of the president of the Republic, it was stressed that there is no alternative to the establishment of a just peace in former Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the international community's peace plan should protect the vital interests of all the sides in the conflict. The Republic of Serbia especially underlined the importance of consistent respect for all cessations of hostilities, as a crucial precondition for the successful implementation of the peace process. It was emphasized that the suspension of the economic sanctions undoubtedly represents an integral part of the process of establishing a stable peace and normalizing overall relations in the region of former Yugoslavia, as well as being an important contribution to the removal of flashpoints of crises, conflicts, and instability in the area.

It was said that the parties to the conflict should be helped in resolving mutual disputes by ensuring their equality and by giving them unbiased treatment. This calls for the acknowledgement of the reality of the existence of the Croat-Muslim Federation on the one side and the Srpska republic on the other; it should also

be taken into account that the issue of their future relations is a matter for the people of this region to decide, and that the imposition of solutions to the detriment of one side is doomed to failure, the statement says.

Today's meeting between President Milosevic, Douglas Hurd, and Alain Juppe was also attended by Federal Deputy Prime Minister Zeljko Simic.

Milosevic 'Courting Disaster' if Plan Rejected

LD1307174394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1718 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Text] Belgrade, 13 Jul (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has received British and French Foreign Ministers Douglas Hurd and Alain Juppe. In their 90-minute talks they reviewed the Contact Group's plan for the territorial division of Bosnia and the repercussions which the rejection of the plan by any of the sides would have.

In brief statements after their meeting with Milosevic, Hurd and Juppe repeated what they had said in Sarajevo and Pale today: What is needed is a precise reply to the Contact Group's plan—"yes" or "no"; "yes, but" will not be tolerated.

Hurd laid special emphasis on what "yes" or "no" would entail. A positive reply would mean the lifting of the sanctions, while a negative one would mean courting disaster.

Demonstration in Belgrade Against Hurd, Juppe

LD1307152494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1438 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 13 Jul (TANJUG)—Several hundred people have gathered today in Pioneer Park in front of the Serbian Presidency building, protesting against the arrival in Belgrade of the foreign ministers of Great Britain and France, Douglas Hurd and Alain Juppe.

Mirko Jovic, leader of the Serbian National Renewal [Srpska Narodna Obnova], the party which has organized the meeting, stressed that the demonstrations are neither anti-French nor anti-British, but are directed "against the two Islamic servants and mercenaries" who came to exert pressure on the Serbian side to accept the latest ultimatum.

He announced that the protest meeting will not disperse until "Messrs. Juppe and Hurd turn up." [passage omitted]

Jovic Warns Serbs Against Rejecting Plan

AU1307150494 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 13 Jul 94

[Statement by Borisav Jovic, chairman of the Commission for Foreign Political and Economic Relations of the FRY Assembly Chamber of Citizens and president of the Socialist Party of Serbia; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] My personal view cannot differ from the view of our party and our country since I have been indirectly participating in formulating that view. Everything should be done to reach peace and the proposal by the Contact Group should be interpreted in this light. Simply put, it is hard to believe that the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina can get more than 49 percent of the territory, which is what they are getting now. They are also getting the corridor with (some) territory, which was in question before, and they are also getting the right to have a state on this territory of theirs—which is a fact as they will have an army, a police force, a judiciary system, and taxes, everything that makes a state. I do not think that there is much of a chance—taking into account the international circumstances—that they can get much more in the global sense of the word. It would be a great mistake to miss this opportunity.

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